Skills attack-tree-construction
📦

attack-tree-construction

Content revision r2 Medium Risk ⚙️ External commands

Build Defensible Attack Trees

Complex threats are difficult to compare when attack paths and dependencies remain implicit. This skill structures paths, scores leaf nodes, maps mitigations, and highlights defense priorities.

Supports: Claude Codex Code(CC)
📊 70 Adequate

Install with my Agent

Copy this request to your Agent. It includes the canonical Skill page and manifest.

Agent request
Review the Skillstore skill "attack-tree-construction" from https://skillstore.io/skills/sickn33-attack-tree-construction.md and its manifest at https://skillstore.io/api/skills/sickn33-attack-tree-construction/manifest. Verify the artifact. You may proceed after verification, subject to the environment's own policy.

Your Agent should still show its plan and request any confirmation required by the security policy.

Agent-readable resources

Use these links when an AI agent, crawler, or script needs clean context instead of reading the full page.

Markdown detail GET /skills/sickn33-attack-tree-construction.md Signed manifest GET /api/skills/sickn33-attack-tree-construction/manifest Signed lockfile GET /api/skills/sickn33-attack-tree-construction/lockfile

Test it

Using "attack-tree-construction". Model unauthorized access to a customer portal protected by passwords and multifactor authentication.

Expected outcome:

  • Root goal: Gain unauthorized portal access.
  • OR branch: Obtain valid credentials through approved threat scenarios.
  • AND branch: Acquire a session and bypass the additional verification control.
  • Priority controls: Phishing-resistant authentication, rate limits, session protection, and support verification.

Using "attack-tree-construction". Prioritize controls for an attack tree with several paths sharing an exposed administrative interface.

Expected outcome:

  • Critical node: Reach the administrative interface.
  • Coverage finding: Restricting interface access interrupts the largest number of modeled paths.
  • Next controls: Strong administrator authentication, network restrictions, monitoring, and recovery procedures.

Using "attack-tree-construction". Summarize an attack tree for an executive review.

Expected outcome:

The model identifies three major threat paths and two shared control gaps. Access restrictions and stronger identity controls provide the broadest estimated risk reduction.

Security Audit

Medium Risk
v6 • 7/23/2026 Open versioned report

All 11 static detections are false positives. The backticks delimit file paths, the reconnaissance matches are ordinary tree-processing code, and the keylogger term is a labeled threat with mitigations. One medium semantic concern remains because the playbook ranks low-effort and low-detection attack paths while conditionally allowing sensitive exploit details.

2
Files scanned
721
Lines analyzed
0
Review items
0
False positives ignored

Confirmed security concerns (1)

Medium
resources/implementation-playbook.md:159-169SKILL.md:36-39
Dual-Use Attack Path Optimization
The playbook ranks easiest, cheapest, and stealthiest attack paths. Its safety guidance conditionally permits sensitive exploit details, creating misuse potential despite authorized-use framing.
The named methods explicitly minimize difficulty, cost, and detection risk, and the safety wording contains an exception. Defensive context reduces severity but not the dual-use capability.

Risk Factors

⚙️ External commands (2)
SKILL.md:34 SKILL.md:43
Audited by: codex View Audit History →
Share & cite this report

Share the versioned assessment report, neutral badge, embed card, and citations. Skillstore reports evidence without deciding whether this Skill is safe.

Open versioned report
Security Assessment

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https://skillstore.io/skills/sickn33-attack-tree-construction/audits/6?utm_source=security_passport&utm_medium=share&utm_campaign=versioned_report

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Academic citations (APA · BibTeX · CFF)

APA citation

sickn33. (2026). attack-tree-construction security audit report (audit version 6) [Author version unspecified]. Skillstore. https://skillstore.io/skills/sickn33-attack-tree-construction/audits/6

BibTeX citation

@techreport{sickn33-sickn33-attack-tree-construction-2026, author = {sickn33}, title = {attack-tree-construction security audit report (audit version 6)}, institution = {Skillstore}, year = {2026}, number = {6}, url = {https://skillstore.io/skills/sickn33-attack-tree-construction/audits/6}, note = {Author version unspecified} }

CITATION.cff

cff-version: 1.2.0 message: "If you use this Skill, cite its author and this versioned security audit report." title: "attack-tree-construction security audit report (audit version 6)" version: "unspecified" type: report authors: - name: "sickn33" date-released: "2026-07-23" url: "https://skillstore.io/skills/sickn33-attack-tree-construction/audits/6" identifiers: - type: other value: "skillstore:sickn33-attack-tree-construction:audit:6" description: "Skillstore immutable audit report identifier"

Compare variants

2 installable variants

Each author remains a separate installable skill. The recommended variant is ranked by Skillstore evidence.

Why this variant is first

Highest Skillstore Score
wshobson Recommended

wshobson-attack-tree-construction

Skillstore Score 77
Evidence Confidence High
Skillstore usage 14
Updated

2026-08-21

sickn33 Current

sickn33-attack-tree-construction

Skillstore Score 70
Evidence Confidence High
Skillstore usage 8
Updated

2026-08-21

Skillstore Score

Why this score Evidence Confidence: High
55
Architecture
85
Maintainability
87
Content
69
Community
83
Spec Compliance

What You Can Build

Design Security Controls

Map likely paths to a protected asset and identify controls that interrupt the most branches.

Scope Authorized Assessments

Turn an approved attacker objective into explicit test paths, assumptions, and defensive validation targets.

Explain Risk Priorities

Present threat dependencies and mitigation coverage in a structure that supports investment decisions.

Try These Prompts

Create a Basic Tree 
Create an attack tree for [system]. Use [authorized attacker goal] as the root. Separate AND and OR nodes. Add one mitigation per leaf.
Add Path Attributes 
Expand this attack tree: [tree]. Rate each leaf by cost, skill, time, and detection risk. State assumptions and suggest defensive controls.
Analyze Mitigation Coverage 
Review [tree] and [existing controls]. Identify open paths, shared critical nodes, and controls with the greatest estimated coverage. Keep attack details non-operational.
Compare Defensive Scenarios 
Compare the current and proposed controls for [authorized scope]. Recalculate path exposure, explain uncertainty, and produce separate technical and executive summaries.

Best Practices

  • Confirm authorization, scope, protected assets, and the attacker goal before building the tree.
  • Record assumptions and use consistent scales for difficulty, cost, time, and detection.
  • Attach mitigations to every leaf and review the model with relevant technical experts.

Avoid

  • Do not include operational exploit steps, malware instructions, or real credentials.
  • Do not treat subjective scores as measured probabilities or verified environment facts.
  • Do not publish sensitive attack paths outside the authorized stakeholder group.

Frequently Asked Questions

What inputs are required?
Provide the protected asset, authorized scope, attacker goal, known controls, assumptions, and the audience for the output.
Does this skill execute attacks?
No. It produces models and reference templates without testing systems, running exploits, or collecting environment data.
How are AND and OR nodes used?
An AND node requires every child condition. An OR node requires any one child path.
Can it create diagram formats?
The playbook provides reference exporters for Mermaid and PlantUML representations of an attack tree.
How reliable are the path scores?
Scores are comparative estimates based on supplied assumptions. Validate them with environment evidence and qualified reviewers.
How should sensitive scenarios be handled?
Use only authorized scopes, keep details non-operational, include mitigations, and restrict distribution to approved stakeholders.

Developer Details

Author

sickn33

License

MIT

Skillstore revision

r2

Version notice

The author did not declare a version.

Repository

https://github.com/sickn33/antigravity-awesome-skills/tree/main/skills/attack-tree-construction

Ref

86d877f219e2131f05dd5b37c5e329c71c7b8ec4

Maintenance freshness

7/26/2026

Usage

6 downloads · 116 views

File structure

📁 resources/

📄 implementation-playbook.md

📄 SKILL.md

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