Skills github-multi-repo
📦
github-multi-repo
Content revision r2 High Risk ⚙️ External commands🌐 Network access📁 Filesystem access🔑 Env variables
Coordinate GitHub Repositories at Scale
Multi-repository changes are difficult to coordinate and validate consistently. This skill guides discovery, synchronization, testing, architecture standards, and pull request workflows.
Supports: Claude Codex Code(CC)
Stop for confirmation before installing.
Review the plan and obtain explicit user consent before changing files.
Install with my Agent
Copy this request to your Agent. It includes the canonical Skill page and manifest.
Agent request
Review the Skillstore skill "github-multi-repo" from https://skillstore.io/skills/ruvnet-github-multi-repo.md and its manifest at https://skillstore.io/api/skills/ruvnet-github-multi-repo/manifest. Verify the artifact. Stop and obtain explicit user consent before installing or changing files.Your Agent should still show its plan and request any confirmation required by the security policy.
Agent-readable resources
Use these links when an AI agent, crawler, or script needs clean context instead of reading the full page.
Test it
Using "github-multi-repo". Compare TypeScript versions across frontend, backend, and shared repositories.
Expected outcome:
- Frontend uses version 5.4; backend uses 5.3; shared uses 5.4.
- Update backend first, run unit tests, then run cross-repository integration tests.
- Prepare one reviewed pull request per repository.
Using "github-multi-repo". Plan a security patch across twelve Node.js services.
Expected outcome:
- Inventory completed for twelve selected repositories.
- Patch in three dependency-aware waves with approval before each write phase.
- Record test results, failures, and rollback instructions for every service.
Using "github-multi-repo". Review repository architecture consistency.
Expected outcome:
The report compares directory structure, CI workflows, documentation, ownership, and shared configuration, then prioritizes standardization changes.
Security Audit
High Riskv8 • 7/23/2026 Open versioned report
Most static alerts are false positives from Markdown fences, template delimiters, documentation links, and expected webhook secret access. Confirmed risks involve predictable shared temporary paths and unisolated npm execution. Broad multi-repository writes also lack explicit approval gates.
1
Files scanned
863
Lines analyzed
18
Review items
0
False positives ignored
Confirmed security concerns (2)
High
Unisolated execution of repository scripts
Bulk workflows run npm update, install, audit fixes, and tests from cloned repositories. Package lifecycle or test scripts receive the agent environment and credentials.
The cited workflows explicitly clone repositories and invoke npm commands without a sandbox, restricted environment, or disabled lifecycle scripts.
Medium
Broad repository mutations lack approval gates
Examples create branches, upload files, install dependencies, push commits, and open pull requests across repository sets without an explicit review or confirmation step.
The documented flows perform write operations immediately after tests or scans. No dry run, change preview, or user approval gate is shown.
Capability review items (18)
These are real local capabilities that may be expected for this skill, so they require review but are not counted as confirmed malicious behavior.
High
Shell command substitution
cd /tmp/$(basename $repo .json | sed 's/audit-//')
The working directory is derived from an untrusted shared /tmp filename without validation. Directory planting can redirect later npm and git operations.
High
Template literal with command substitution
Bash(`cat /tmp/repos.txt | while read -r repo; do
The Bash block clones repositories and runs npm update and npm test without isolation. Repository lifecycle and test scripts execute with the agent's credentials.
High
Template literal with command substitution
Bash(`for repo in /tmp/audit-*.json; do
The Bash loop trusts shared /tmp audit files, then runs npm audit fix and npm test in derived directories. Planted files can redirect code execution.
High
Temp directory access
cd /tmp/$repo
The script enters a predictable /tmp directory without checking clone success, then runs npm commands. Directory planting can cause arbitrary local script execution.
High
Temp directory access
cd /tmp/$repo
The workflow enters a predictable /tmp directory without checking clone success, then runs npm install and tests. A planted directory can execute scripts.
High
Temp directory access
cd /tmp/$repo
The workflow enters a predictable /tmp directory without verifying the clone, then invokes npm. A planted directory can redirect subsequent execution.
High
Temp directory access
Bash(`for repo in /tmp/audit-*.json; do
The patch loop trusts every file matching a shared /tmp glob. An attacker can plant an audit file and corresponding directory to trigger npm execution.
High
Temp directory access
cd /tmp/$(basename $repo .json | sed 's/audit-//')
The patch directory is derived from a shared temporary filename without validation. Directory planting can redirect npm and git mutations.
Medium
Shell command substitution
if [ $(jq '.vulnerabilities | length' $repo) -gt 0 ]; then
The jq substitution consumes an unquoted filename selected from a shared /tmp glob. A planted filename can alter audit processing and patch decisions.
Medium
Template literal with command substitution
Bash(`gh api repos/:owner/:repo/contents/claude-code-flow/CLAUDE.md \
The helper uploads content read from a predictable shared temporary file. Another local process can replace that content before publication.
Medium
Temp directory access
--jq '.[] | select(.name | test("-service$")) | .name' > /tmp/repos.txt`)
The command overwrites the predictable shared path /tmp/repos.txt. A symlink or concurrent run can redirect or corrupt the repository list.
Medium
Temp directory access
Bash(`cat /tmp/repos.txt | while read -r repo; do
The workflow trusts repository names read from predictable /tmp/repos.txt. Another process can alter the list before cloning and mutation.
Medium
Temp directory access
gh repo clone org/$repo /tmp/$repo -- --depth=1
Repositories are cloned into predictable shared /tmp directories without exclusive creation. Existing directories or concurrent runs can alter workflow behavior.
Medium
Temp directory access
--jq '.content' | base64 -d > /tmp/claude-source.md`)
Redirection writes to predictable /tmp/claude-source.md. A symlink can redirect the write, and another process can replace the synchronized content.
Medium
Temp directory access
-f content="$(cat /tmp/claude-source.md | base64)"`)
The GitHub update reads from predictable /tmp/claude-source.md. Local tampering can publish unauthorized documentation content.
Medium
Temp directory access
gh repo clone org/$repo /tmp/$repo -- --depth=1
Repositories are cloned into predictable shared /tmp directories without collision handling. A concurrent or planted directory can affect the update workflow.
Medium
Temp directory access
gh repo clone org/$repo /tmp/$repo -- --depth=1
Security scans clone repositories into predictable shared /tmp directories. The workflow does not prevent collisions or planted directories.
Medium
Temp directory access
npm audit --json > /tmp/audit-$repo.json
Audit output is written to a predictable shared /tmp filename. Symlinks, stale files, or concurrent runs can corrupt later patch decisions.
Risk Factors
⚙️ External commands (50)
SKILL.md:30-42 SKILL.md:42-45 SKILL.md:45-51 SKILL.md:51-54 SKILL.md:54-60 SKILL.md:60-67 SKILL.md:67-69 SKILL.md:71-74 SKILL.md:78-86 SKILL.md:86-89 SKILL.md:89-98 SKILL.md:99-102 SKILL.md:118-127 SKILL.md:127-132 SKILL.md:132-148 SKILL.md:150-153 SKILL.md:157-169 SKILL.md:169-172 SKILL.md:172-176 SKILL.md:177-180 SKILL.md:184-192 SKILL.md:192-195 SKILL.md:195-215 SKILL.md:227-228 SKILL.md:228-233 SKILL.md:233-250 SKILL.md:254-266 SKILL.md:266-269 SKILL.md:269-315 SKILL.md:315-318 SKILL.md:318-327 SKILL.md:327-328 SKILL.md:337-342 SKILL.md:342-347 SKILL.md:347-351 SKILL.md:355-358 SKILL.md:364-367 SKILL.md:389-390 SKILL.md:390-393 SKILL.md:393-412 SKILL.md:412-415 SKILL.md:415-419 SKILL.md:424-427 SKILL.md:440-441 SKILL.md:441-446 SKILL.md:446-477 SKILL.md:477-480 SKILL.md:480-497 SKILL.md:497-502 SKILL.md:502-518
🌐 Network access (3)
📁 Filesystem access (17)
🔑 Env variables (2)
Audited by: codex View Audit History →
Share & cite this report
Share the versioned assessment report, neutral badge, embed card, and citations. Skillstore reports evidence without deciding whether this Skill is safe.
Copy report link
https://skillstore.io/skills/ruvnet-github-multi-repo/audits/8?utm_source=security_passport&utm_medium=share&utm_campaign=versioned_reportMarkdown badge
[](https://skillstore.io/skills/ruvnet-github-multi-repo?utm_source=security_passport_badge)HTML badge
<a href="https://skillstore.io/skills/ruvnet-github-multi-repo?utm_source=security_passport_badge"><img src="https://skillstore.io/badges/skills/ruvnet-github-multi-repo/security.svg" alt="Skillstore security assessment" loading="lazy"></a>Embed card
<iframe src="https://skillstore.io/embed/skills/ruvnet-github-multi-repo.html" title="Skillstore Security Assessment" sandbox="allow-popups allow-popups-to-escape-sandbox" loading="lazy" referrerpolicy="no-referrer" width="420" height="180"></iframe>Academic citations (APA · BibTeX · CFF)
APA citation
ruvnet. (2026). github-multi-repo security audit report (audit version 8) [Author version unspecified]. Skillstore. https://skillstore.io/skills/ruvnet-github-multi-repo/audits/8BibTeX citation
@techreport{ruvnet-ruvnet-github-multi-repo-2026,
author = {ruvnet},
title = {github-multi-repo security audit report (audit version 8)},
institution = {Skillstore},
year = {2026},
number = {8},
url = {https://skillstore.io/skills/ruvnet-github-multi-repo/audits/8},
note = {Author version unspecified}
}CITATION.cff
cff-version: 1.2.0
message: "If you use this Skill, cite its author and this versioned security audit report."
title: "github-multi-repo security audit report (audit version 8)"
version: "unspecified"
type: report
authors:
- name: "ruvnet"
date-released: "2026-07-23"
url: "https://skillstore.io/skills/ruvnet-github-multi-repo/audits/8"
identifiers:
- type: other
value: "skillstore:ruvnet-github-multi-repo:audit:8"
description: "Skillstore immutable audit report identifier"
Compare variants
2 installable variantsEach author remains a separate installable skill. The recommended variant is ranked by Skillstore evidence.
Why this variant is first
Higher Skillstore usage
Author / source Skillstore Score Evidence Confidence Skillstore usage Updated
ruvnet-github-multi-repo
Skillstore Score 38
Evidence Confidence Medium
Skillstore usage 9
Updated
2026-08-21
dnyoussef-github-multi-repo
Skillstore Score 38
Evidence Confidence Medium
Skillstore usage 8
Updated
2026-08-21
Skillstore Score
Why this score Evidence Confidence: Medium 55
Architecture
85
Maintainability
87
Content
72
Community
74
Spec Compliance
What You Can Build
Align service dependencies
Discover services, update shared dependencies, run tests, and prepare coordinated pull requests.
Standardize repository architecture
Review repository structures and apply common templates, workflows, and documentation.
Coordinate security patches
Scan selected repositories, identify vulnerable packages, test fixes, and track patch pull requests.
Try These Prompts
Discover repositories
List repositories in {organization} matching {criteria}. Summarize languages, topics, and package dependencies. Do not modify anything.Plan dependency alignment
Compare {package} versions across {repositories}. Propose an update order, compatibility checks, test commands, and rollback points.Standardize workflows
Review CI workflows in {repositories}. Propose a shared template and repository-specific exceptions. Show changes before requesting approval.Orchestrate a phased migration
Plan migration of {feature} across {repositories}. Map dependencies, execution waves, approval gates, tests, observability, rollback, and final reporting.Best Practices
- Start with read-only discovery and an explicit repository allowlist.
- Use minimal GitHub permissions, isolated execution, and private temporary directories.
- Require approval before remote writes and preserve test and rollback evidence.
Avoid
- Do not run package scripts from unknown repositories on the host.
- Do not use organization-wide wildcards for mutation without reviewing the resolved list.
- Do not reuse predictable shared temporary files or continue after clone failures.
Frequently Asked Questions
Does this skill modify repositories automatically?
Its examples include branches, commits, file updates, pushes, and pull requests. Review the plan and approve writes before execution.
Which tools are required?
Examples use GitHub CLI, jq, npm, Claude Flow, and authenticated GitHub access.
Can it work with private repositories?
Yes, when the active GitHub credentials can access every selected repository and operation.
Does it support monorepos?
It discusses monorepo structures and migration planning, but focuses mainly on coordination across separate repositories.
How should credentials be configured?
Use short-lived tokens with the minimum repository permissions. Keep secrets outside prompts, logs, and generated reports.
How are failed updates handled?
The examples use tests and issue comments, but production use needs explicit rollback, cleanup, retries, and failure isolation.