Versioned security assessment

Report ID: SA-A25199BC

7/5/2026, 5:58:52 PM

remotion-render security assessment v4

Skill Security Certification Report

Audit History
Audit model: codex Latest published report
Skill name
remotion-render
Version
v4
Maintainer
inference-sh-skills
Source
github.com/inference-sh-skills/skills/tree/main/tools/video/remotion-render/
Coverage
1 Files scanned · 213 Lines analyzed
Policy version
Unavailable

Highest confirmed finding severity

Medium

1 confirmed security finding requires attention.

Installation context

Check the current Skill page

This page summarizes report evidence only. The Skill page provides the canonical install advisory.

Open current Skill page

This report does not block or authorize the manifest or ZIP.

Most static backtick alerts are false positives from Markdown formatting, input tables, and sample code blocks. The confirmed issues are the documented belt and npx command flows plus the intentional dependency on hosted inference.sh rendering. No prompt injection text was found in SKILL.md.

Report position

Latest published report

Latest refers to the report sequence, not to artifact currentness.

Audit attestation

Not attestable

The required immutable binding is incomplete.

Human verification

Not verified

No human verification is recorded for this report.

Coverage

1 Files scanned · 213 Lines analyzed

13 items shown for review

Limitations

This report does not claim runtime or sandbox execution and does not prove the absence of side effects.

Evidence chain

Follow the evidence from source binding to the install contract. Available evidence supports verification; it is not a safety guarantee.

  1. Source

    Commit and path bound

  2. Artifact

    Content and tree hashes bound

  3. Audit

    Complete

  4. Install contract

    Open manifest to verify

    Open manifest

Capabilities observed

Observed means this report recorded supporting evidence. Not recorded does not prove that a capability is absent.

Contains scripts

May execute code included with the Skill.

Not recorded by this audit

Network access

May connect to external services.

Observed in 6 evidence locations

Filesystem access

May read or write local files.

Not recorded by this audit

Env variables

May read values from the process environment.

Not recorded by this audit

External commands

May invoke commands or programs outside the Skill.

Observed in 31 evidence locations

Capability review items (12)
Medium
SKILL.md:7
Ruby/shell backtick execution
> **Install the belt CLI skill:** `npx skills add belt-sh/cli`
The instruction asks users to execute npx to add a third-party CLI skill. This is a real supply-chain risk because it installs executable tooling from outside the current package.
Medium
SKILL.md:17
Ruby/shell backtick execution
> Requires inference.sh CLI (`belt`). [Install instructions](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/infer
The line directs users to install and use the belt CLI before running the skill. The executable command is not embedded on this line, but the dependency creates real external-command exposure.
Medium
SKILL.md:19-30
Ruby/shell backtick execution
```bash
The fenced quick-start block contains belt login and belt app run commands. Running those commands executes an external CLI and submits render input to a hosted service.
Medium
SKILL.md:72-80
Ruby/shell backtick execution
```bash
This bash example invokes belt app run with user-provided Remotion code. It is legitimate skill behavior, but it is still external CLI execution with remote processing.
Medium
SKILL.md:84-92
Ruby/shell backtick execution
```bash
This bash example invokes belt app run for a render job. The command is an intentional external service call and should remain a confirmed medium-risk finding.
Medium
SKILL.md:96-98
Ruby/shell backtick execution
```bash
The location starts another bash example that runs belt app run. The command path is expected, but it executes third-party CLI tooling and sends input outside the local environment.
Medium
SKILL.md:108-117
Ruby/shell backtick execution
```bash
This example runs belt app run with props and render parameters. It is real external command usage rather than just Markdown formatting.
Medium
SKILL.md:121-129
Ruby/shell backtick execution
```bash
This sequence animation example uses belt app run to submit TSX code for rendering. That is expected functionality, but it is still confirmed external CLI execution.
Medium
SKILL.md:190-205
Ruby/shell backtick execution
```bash
The related-skills block gives npx skills add commands for additional packages. These commands can install third-party skill content, so the supply-chain risk is real.
Low
SKILL.md:11
Hardcoded URL
Render videos from React/Remotion component code via [inference.sh](https://inference.sh) CLI.
The skill explicitly routes rendering through inference.sh. This is disclosed and central to the feature, but it confirms a remote service dependency.
Low
SKILL.md:13
Hardcoded URL
![Remotion Render](https://cloud.inference.sh/app/files/u/4mg21r6ta37mpaz6ktzwtt8krr/01kg2c0egyg243m
The Markdown image uses a hosted cloud.inference.sh asset. Viewing the documentation can trigger a network fetch to a third-party host, which is a low privacy risk.
Low
SKILL.md:17
Hardcoded URL
> Requires inference.sh CLI (`belt`). [Install instructions](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/infer
The install-instructions link points to raw GitHub content for the required CLI. This is an intentional dependency path, but users rely on external network content to set up the tool.

Risk findings

Confirmed security concerns are separated from items that still need review.

Confirmed security concerns (1)

RISK-001 Medium
SKILL.md:11SKILL.md:23-29SKILL.md:37-44
Remote Rendering Receives User TSX Code
The skill sends React and Remotion TSX, props, and render settings to inference.sh for hosted rendering. Users could expose proprietary animation code, unreleased content, or sensitive asset references if they submit private project data.
The documentation states rendering is done through inference.sh and shows code submitted through belt app run input. The behavior is intentional, but the data exposure risk is direct.

Remediation

Suggested fixes recorded by this audit. Applying them is the maintainer’s responsibility.

  1. FIX-001
    Medium
    External CLI commands are required for normal use.
    Require explicit user confirmation before running belt or npx commands, and document the exact commands and permissions needed.
  2. FIX-002
    Medium
    Render inputs are sent to a hosted inference.sh service.
    Warn users not to submit secrets, private code, or confidential media. Link to data handling and retention terms near the quick start.
  3. FIX-003
    Low
    Setup instructions depend on third-party installation sources.
    Pin recommended CLI and related-skill versions when possible, and provide checksum or provenance guidance for trusted installation.

Expert evidence

Immutable subject identity, scanner metadata, dismissed matches, and source-level evidence.

Artifact subject

Marketplace commit
a25199bc7d6b82598536822d1738eb5d5f54025b
Content hash
27c9a0c03006db2a5eba5ef1783842b74edec38ffcccd3a239161f6a29bac246
Tree hash
2b8072583eac799f61e8826560be1293ebc70512cb46193e62ef62f268152df8
Skill path
skills/inference-sh-skills/remotion-render
Audit payload hash
37405cebba788308f4e24937fce2fc84

Analysis metadata

Audit model: codex

Analysis state: Complete

Scope is limited to the recorded files, lines, methods, and evidence. No runtime or sandbox execution is claimed.

Verify and export

JSON report CITATION.cff SARIF 2.1.0 Signed installation manifest Source

The manifest and lockfile bind install artifacts to cryptographic hashes. This integrity claim is separate from the security assessment.

Audit attestation: not_attestable