Most static backtick alerts are false positives from Markdown formatting, input tables, and sample code blocks. The confirmed issues are the documented belt and npx command flows plus the intentional dependency on hosted inference.sh rendering. No prompt injection text was found in SKILL.md.
The skill sends React and Remotion TSX, props, and render settings to inference.sh for hosted rendering. Users could expose proprietary animation code, unreleased content, or sensitive asset references if they submit private project data.
The documentation states rendering is done through inference.sh and shows code submitted through belt app run input. The behavior is intentional, but the data exposure risk is direct.
Capability review items (12)
These are real local capabilities that may be expected for this skill, so they require review but are not counted as confirmed malicious behavior.
> **Install the belt CLI skill:** `npx skills add belt-sh/cli`
The instruction asks users to execute npx to add a third-party CLI skill. This is a real supply-chain risk because it installs executable tooling from outside the current package.
The line directs users to install and use the belt CLI before running the skill. The executable command is not embedded on this line, but the dependency creates real external-command exposure.
The fenced quick-start block contains belt login and belt app run commands. Running those commands executes an external CLI and submits render input to a hosted service.
The Markdown image uses a hosted cloud.inference.sh asset. Viewing the documentation can trigger a network fetch to a third-party host, which is a low privacy risk.
The install-instructions link points to raw GitHub content for the required CLI. This is an intentional dependency path, but users rely on external network content to set up the tool.
Most static backtick alerts are false positives from Markdown formatting, input tables, and sample code blocks. The confirmed issues are the documented belt and npx command flows plus the intentional dependency on hosted inference.sh rendering. No prompt injection text was found in SKILL.md.
The skill sends React and Remotion TSX, props, and render settings to inference.sh for hosted rendering. Users could expose proprietary animation code, unreleased content, or sensitive asset references if they submit private project data.
The documentation states rendering is done through inference.sh and shows code submitted through belt app run input. The behavior is intentional, but the data exposure risk is direct.
Capability review items (12)
These are real local capabilities that may be expected for this skill, so they require review but are not counted as confirmed malicious behavior.
> **Install the belt CLI skill:** `npx skills add belt-sh/cli`
The instruction asks users to execute npx to add a third-party CLI skill. This is a real supply-chain risk because it installs executable tooling from outside the current package.
The line directs users to install and use the belt CLI before running the skill. The executable command is not embedded on this line, but the dependency creates real external-command exposure.
The fenced quick-start block contains belt login and belt app run commands. Running those commands executes an external CLI and submits render input to a hosted service.
The Markdown image uses a hosted cloud.inference.sh asset. Viewing the documentation can trigger a network fetch to a third-party host, which is a low privacy risk.
The install-instructions link points to raw GitHub content for the required CLI. This is an intentional dependency path, but users rely on external network content to set up the tool.
Static analysis flagged many external command and network patterns. Review found these are mostly documented belt CLI examples and official documentation links, but the skill intentionally sends user-supplied TSX code to inference.sh for remote rendering. No evidence found of prompt injection, hidden scripts, credential theft, or malicious intent in SKILL.md.
1
Files scanned
213
Lines analyzed
4
Review items
3
False positives ignored
Capability review items (2)
These are real local capabilities that may be expected for this skill, so they require review but are not counted as confirmed malicious behavior.
TRUE POSITIVE for network risk. The skill directs users to render TSX component code through inference.sh using the belt CLI. This is intended, but proprietary code, props, URLs, or assets may be processed by a third-party service.
The documentation explicitly names inference.sh and shows belt app run calls that submit a code field for rendering. This confirms the network exposure, while the context shows it is the stated purpose of the skill.
TRUE POSITIVE for external command capability. The skill permits Bash(belt *) and provides belt command examples. The scope is limited to the belt CLI, but marketplace users should know the skill can run external commands that contact a remote service.
The allowed-tools declaration is direct evidence of a scoped CLI command surface. I did not find evidence that it executes arbitrary shell commands outside belt.
Static false positives ignored (3)
These static matches were dismissed by semantic review or matched schema-only tokens, so they are shown for transparency but do not drive the quality score.
FALSE POSITIVE for malicious command execution. The detected shell snippets are fenced examples showing how to use the documented belt render workflow and related skill installs. They are not hidden scripts or automatic execution paths.
The command patterns occur inside markdown code fences and match the skill purpose. No separate executable file or stealth command path exists in the reviewed file set.
Hardcoded URLs Are Documentation and Service References
FALSE POSITIVE for suspicious network destinations. The URLs point to inference.sh, a hosted image, install documentation, and Remotion or inference.sh documentation. No evidence found that secrets are collected or exfiltrated.
The URLs are visible user-facing references, not hidden endpoints. Their placement in descriptions and documentation links supports benign use.
FALSE POSITIVE for weak cryptography. The reviewed lines do not show cryptographic functions, hashing, ciphers, or security-sensitive comparisons. No evidence found of MD5, SHA1, DES, or similar weak algorithms in SKILL.md.
The cited locations are metadata prose and a parameter table header, not code using cryptography. Confidence is high because the only scanned file contains no crypto implementation.
Static analysis found 41 potential issues. After evaluation: all 3 'weak cryptographic algorithm' findings are false positives ('codec' refers to video codec, not cryptography). All 32 'Ruby/shell backtick execution' findings are false positives (markdown fenced bash code blocks, not Ruby). All 6 'hardcoded URL' findings are false positives (documentation links to legitimate services). The skill is a legitimate Remotion video renderer that uses external commands (belt CLI) and network access (inference.sh API) as documented. No prompt injection or malicious intent detected. Published with medium risk and appropriate warnings.
1
Files scanned
213
Lines analyzed
4
Review items
0
False positives ignored
Capability review items (2)
These are real local capabilities that may be expected for this skill, so they require review but are not counted as confirmed malicious behavior.
The skill declares allowed-tools: Bash(belt *) granting broad shell execution. Multiple bash code examples invoke the belt CLI to send user-provided TSX code to a remote rendering API. While the usage is legitimate, unrestricted bash access poses risk if the AI tool executes commands with modified inputs.
The bash commands are explicit documentation examples for a legitimate video rendering workflow. Risk is medium because the allowed-tools declaration is broad but the actual commands are well-scoped to the belt CLI tool.
The skill contains hardcoded URLs to remotion.dev and inference.sh documentation. These are legitimate references for the skill's intended functionality but reveal dependence on external services.
URLs point to official documentation pages for Remotion and inference.sh. No evidence of malicious domains or data exfiltration endpoints.