Most static backtick findings are Markdown examples, table values, endpoint names, or prompt samples rather than Ruby shell execution. The skill relies on local RunComfy CLI commands and a RunComfy API request with a bearer token. No prompt injection attempt or malicious exfiltration intent was found.
The workflow sends user prompts to the RunComfy Model API and authenticates with a bearer token. Users should understand that prompt content leaves the local environment.
Lines 178-181 describe CLI submission, a POST to the RunComfy API with the bearer token, polling, and result retrieval. This is explicit third-party data transfer, not inferred behavior.
Capability review items (9)
These are real local capabilities that may be expected for this skill, so they require review but are not counted as confirmed malicious behavior.
Calls `runcomfy run happyhorse/happyhorse-1-0/text-to-video` through
The skill documentation intentionally directs the agent or user to run the local RunComfy CLI. External CLI execution can affect the host and submit data externally, so it requires user awareness and constrained arguments.
The prerequisite tells users to install the RunComfy CLI globally through npm. Global CLI installation is legitimate but has package supply-chain and host modification risk.
The prerequisite directs users to run runcomfy login, which opens an authentication flow and creates local credentials. That is expected but still a security-relevant command.
1. The skill invokes `runcomfy run happyhorse/happyhorse-1-0/text-to-video` with a JSON body matchin
The skill documentation intentionally directs the agent or user to run the local RunComfy CLI. External CLI execution can affect the host and submit data externally, so it requires user awareness and constrained arguments.
2. The CLI POSTs to `https://model-api.runcomfy.net/v1/models/happyhorse/happyhorse-1-0/text-to-vide
The documented workflow posts requests to the RunComfy Model API using a bearer token. This is intentional network behavior, but it exposes prompts and credentials to a third-party service.
Most static backtick findings are Markdown examples, table values, endpoint names, or prompt samples rather than Ruby shell execution. The skill relies on local RunComfy CLI commands and a RunComfy API request with a bearer token. No prompt injection attempt or malicious exfiltration intent was found.
The workflow sends user prompts to the RunComfy Model API and authenticates with a bearer token. Users should understand that prompt content leaves the local environment.
Lines 178-181 describe CLI submission, a POST to the RunComfy API with the bearer token, polling, and result retrieval. This is explicit third-party data transfer, not inferred behavior.
Capability review items (9)
These are real local capabilities that may be expected for this skill, so they require review but are not counted as confirmed malicious behavior.
Calls `runcomfy run happyhorse/happyhorse-1-0/text-to-video` through
The skill documentation intentionally directs the agent or user to run the local RunComfy CLI. External CLI execution can affect the host and submit data externally, so it requires user awareness and constrained arguments.
The prerequisite tells users to install the RunComfy CLI globally through npm. Global CLI installation is legitimate but has package supply-chain and host modification risk.
The prerequisite directs users to run runcomfy login, which opens an authentication flow and creates local credentials. That is expected but still a security-relevant command.
1. The skill invokes `runcomfy run happyhorse/happyhorse-1-0/text-to-video` with a JSON body matchin
The skill documentation intentionally directs the agent or user to run the local RunComfy CLI. External CLI execution can affect the host and submit data externally, so it requires user awareness and constrained arguments.
2. The CLI POSTs to `https://model-api.runcomfy.net/v1/models/happyhorse/happyhorse-1-0/text-to-vide
The documented workflow posts requests to the RunComfy Model API using a bearer token. This is intentional network behavior, but it exposes prompts and credentials to a third-party service.
The static analyzer flagged many Markdown backticks, URLs, sample paths, and quoted prompt examples as high-risk patterns. Review found no evidence of malware or prompt injection, but the skill does intentionally run the RunComfy CLI, sends prompts to a third-party API, downloads generated files, and may use local token storage.
1
Files scanned
196
Lines analyzed
6
Review items
1
False positives ignored
Capability review items (3)
These are real local capabilities that may be expected for this skill, so they require review but are not counted as confirmed malicious behavior.
The skill instructs agents to call the local runcomfy CLI to submit jobs and poll results. This is legitimate for a RunComfy integration, but it executes an external command and should only run after the user has reviewed the prompt and output directory.
The command invocation is explicit and repeated in examples. The risk is operational rather than malicious because the command target is a documented model endpoint and no hidden script is present.
The documented workflow sends the user prompt and bearer token to RunComfy model API endpoints, then downloads generated assets from RunComfy domains. Users should avoid submitting confidential prompts unless their RunComfy account and data policy allow it.
The file explicitly documents outbound POST, polling, result fetching, and allowed download hosts. This is expected functionality, but it confirms third-party data transfer.
The skill documents that runcomfy login stores a token under the user home configuration directory with owner-only permissions. This is normal CLI behavior, but it means users must protect the local account and configuration directory.
The home-directory token path is explicitly documented. The same line states file mode 0600, which reduces but does not eliminate local credential exposure risk.
Static false positives ignored (1)
These static matches were dismissed by semantic review or matched schema-only tokens, so they are shown for transparency but do not drive the quality score.
The Ruby backtick execution, weak cryptography, and path traversal findings are false positives caused by Markdown inline code, fenced command examples, ellipses in HTTP paths, and ordinary prose. No evidence found of Ruby code, weak cryptographic implementation, prompt injection, or path traversal logic in the single reviewed file.
The reviewed file is Markdown documentation, and the flagged locations are examples or prose. The scanner patterns do not correspond to executable Ruby, cryptographic code, or filesystem traversal implementation.
Static analysis flagged 86 potential issues, but evaluation confirms all are FALSE POSITIVES. The skill is a legitimate text-to-video wrapper that passes user prompts as JSON-encoded strings via the RunComfy CLI, not shell arguments. Network access is limited to the RunComfy API endpoint only. Token storage uses proper file permissions (0600). No malicious code patterns, shell injection vectors, or prompt injection attempts detected.