Versioned security assessment

Report ID: SA-181FDEFC

7/23/2026, 7:05:34 AM

secrets-gitleaks security assessment v9

Skill Security Certification Report

Audit History
Scanner version 3.0.0 Audit model: codex Latest published report
Skill name
secrets-gitleaks
Version
v0.1.0
Maintainer
AgentSecOps
Source
github.com/AgentSecOps/SecOpsAgentKit/tree/main/skills/devsecops/secrets-gitleaks
Coverage
13 Files scanned · 3,321 Lines analyzed
Policy version
skillstore-security-audit-policy-v1

Highest confirmed finding severity

High

5 confirmed security findings require attention.

Installation context

Check the current Skill page

This page summarizes report evidence only. The Skill page provides the canonical install advisory.

Open current Skill page

This report does not block or authorize the manifest or ZIP.

Most static alerts are false positives caused by Markdown formatting, detector examples, placeholders, and expected CI secret references. Three static findings are confirmed, and semantic review found unredacted CI outputs, broad allowlists, mutable dependencies, and unsafe cleanup guidance. No prompt injection or live credentials were found.

Report position

Latest published report

Latest refers to the report sequence, not to artifact currentness.

Audit attestation

Active attestation

A public attestation is available for this exact report.

Human verification

Not verified

No human verification is recorded for this report.

Coverage

13 Files scanned · 3,321 Lines analyzed

8 items shown for review

Limitations

This report does not claim runtime or sandbox execution and does not prove the absence of side effects.

Evidence chain

Follow the evidence from source binding to the install contract. Available evidence supports verification; it is not a safety guarantee.

  1. Source

    Commit and path bound

  2. Artifact

    Content and tree hashes bound

  3. Audit

    Complete

  4. Install contract

    Open manifest to verify

    Open manifest

Capabilities observed

Observed means this report recorded supporting evidence. Not recorded does not prove that a capability is absent.

Contains scripts

May execute code included with the Skill.

Not recorded by this audit

Network access

May connect to external services.

Observed in 26 evidence locations

Filesystem access

May read or write local files.

Observed in 8 evidence locations

Env variables

May read values from the process environment.

Observed in 33 evidence locations

External commands

May invoke commands or programs outside the Skill.

Observed in 50 evidence locations

Capability review items (3)
High
references/compliance_mapping.md:278
Hardcoded URL
curl -X POST https://siem.company.com/api/events \
The example posts the complete Gitleaks report to a SIEM endpoint without requiring redaction. Reports may contain detected secret values, creating disclosure risk.
High
references/false_positives.md:562
xargs command (can execute arbitrary commands)
gitleaks detect --report-format json | jq -r '.[0] | .File, .StartLine' | xargs -I {} sh -c 'sed -n
Repository-controlled file names are substituted into sh -c without safe argument passing. Shell metacharacters in a malicious file name can execute commands.
Medium
references/false_positives.md:481
Temp directory access
echo 'api_key = "sk_live_actual_key"' > /tmp/test_detection.py
The command overwrites a fixed path in a shared temporary directory. A local attacker could pre-create a symlink and redirect the write.

Risk findings

Confirmed security concerns are separated from items that still need review.

Confirmed security concerns (5)

RISK-001 High
assets/github-action.yml:53-70assets/github-action.yml:73-89assets/gitlab-ci.yml:38-70assets/gitlab-ci.yml:94-115
Unredacted secret reports retained as CI artifacts
Both CI templates create Gitleaks reports without redaction and retain them as artifacts, potentially exposing detected secret values to artifact readers.
The report commands visibly omit --redact, and subsequent artifact steps retain their output. Gitleaks JSON reports can include matched secret values.
RISK-002 High
assets/gitlab-ci.yml:104-107
Full secret findings may be printed to CI logs
The GitLab incremental job prints the complete findings document with jq, which can place detected credentials in broadly retained CI logs.
The command directly passes the full findings file to jq without field selection or redaction. This output is written to the job log.
RISK-003 High
assets/config-balanced.toml:15-35assets/config-balanced.toml:37-62SKILL.md:174-177
Recommended configuration broadly suppresses detection
The balanced configuration globally excludes documentation, tests, fixtures, distributions, and common weak values, allowing real secrets in those locations to escape scanning.
The exclusions apply globally, and SKILL.md recommends this configuration. Real credentials can occur in excluded text, documentation, test, or generated files.
RISK-004 Medium
assets/github-action.yml:38-46assets/github-action.yml:53-57assets/gitlab-ci.yml:9-17assets/precommit-config.yaml:8-10
CI templates use mutable third-party dependencies
Workflow actions and container images use version tags or latest tags instead of immutable commits and digests, increasing upstream supply-chain exposure.
The cited dependencies use v2, v4, v8.18.0, or latest references. These names can resolve to different content after template adoption.
RISK-005 Medium
SKILL.md:273-280
Test cleanup can reset a legitimate commit
The workstation test expects the secret commit to fail but then resets HEAD, which can remove the prior legitimate commit when no test commit exists.
The documented commit should be blocked, so HEAD does not advance. Running git reset HEAD~1 afterward targets the commit preceding the test.

Remediation

Suggested fixes recorded by this audit. Applying them is the maintainer’s responsibility.

  1. FIX-001
    High
    CI examples retain or print unredacted secret findings.
    Add --redact, remove full-report log output, restrict artifact access, and minimize report retention.
  2. FIX-002
    High
    The recommended balanced allowlist excludes broad path and value classes.
    Use narrowly scoped rule allowlists, remove blanket documentation and test exclusions, and validate changes with representative true-positive tests.
  3. FIX-003
    High
    The xargs troubleshooting command interpolates repository file names into sh -c.
    Parse file and line fields separately, validate line numbers, and pass file names as positional arguments without shell interpolation.
  4. FIX-004
    Medium
    Workflow actions, hooks, and container images use mutable references.
    Pin actions and hooks to reviewed commit hashes and containers to immutable image digests. Document a controlled update process.
  5. FIX-005
    Medium
    Examples use an unconditional git reset and a predictable temporary path.
    Remove the reset or guard it on commit success, and create test files with mktemp plus reliable cleanup.

Expert evidence

Immutable subject identity, scanner metadata, dismissed matches, and source-level evidence.

Artifact subject

Marketplace commit
181fdefcafd96b041926e61c4b2e306ca7e7820e
Content hash
c0017cd830d273798d15ba4d51f8798d51f698e42342ef0553c0eceae3012872
Tree hash
3979c37721b0cd6425af74f1416de4984f0ba1cb2721e1d8f3e0fcf86d82041d
Skill path
skills/agentsecops/secrets-gitleaks
Audit payload hash
8ba7603fc3d6c5fa502380ac0bb3aac9

Analysis metadata

Audit model: codex

Analysis state: Complete

Scope is limited to the recorded files, lines, methods, and evidence. No runtime or sandbox execution is claimed.

Verify and export

JSON report Signed attestation CITATION.cff SARIF 2.1.0 Signed installation manifest Source

The manifest and lockfile bind install artifacts to cryptographic hashes. This integrity claim is separate from the security assessment.

Audit attestation: active