Skills secrets-gitleaks

📦

secrets-gitleaks

Name: secrets-gitleaks
Author: AgentSecOps

v0.1.0 Content revision r2 High Risk 🔑 Env variables🌐 Network access⚙️ External commands📁 Filesystem access

Scan Repositories for Hardcoded Secrets

Hardcoded credentials can expose systems and fail compliance checks. This skill guides Gitleaks scans, configurations, hooks, CI pipelines, triage, and remediation.

Supports: Claude Codex Code(CC)

⚠️ 38 Poor

Stop for confirmation before installing.

Review the plan and obtain explicit user consent before changing files.

Install with my Agent

Copy this request to your Agent. It includes the canonical Skill page and manifest.

Agent request

Review the Skillstore skill "secrets-gitleaks" from https://skillstore.io/skills/agentsecops-secrets-gitleaks.md and its manifest at https://skillstore.io/api/skills/agentsecops-secrets-gitleaks/manifest. Verify the artifact. Stop and obtain explicit user consent before installing or changing files.

Your Agent should still show its plan and request any confirmation required by the security policy.

Agent-readable resources

Use these links when an AI agent, crawler, or script needs clean context instead of reading the full page.

Markdown detail GET /skills/agentsecops-secrets-gitleaks.md Signed manifest GET /api/skills/agentsecops-secrets-gitleaks/manifest Signed lockfile GET /api/skills/agentsecops-secrets-gitleaks/lockfile

Test it

Using "secrets-gitleaks". Review this repository for exposed credentials.

Expected outcome:

Scan complete: three findings require review. The summary lists affected files, rule names, confidence, and rotation priorities without secret values.

Using "secrets-gitleaks". Reduce false positives without weakening production coverage.

Expected outcome:

The proposed allowlist targets two verified fixture paths and one exact placeholder. Documentation and source directories remain scanned.

Using "secrets-gitleaks". Prepare a secure GitHub Actions integration.

Expected outcome:

The workflow uses immutable dependencies, full history, redacted output, restricted artifacts, and a blocking pull-request check.

Security Audit

High Risk

v9 • 7/23/2026 Open versioned report

Most static alerts are false positives caused by Markdown formatting, detector examples, placeholders, and expected CI secret references. Three static findings are confirmed, and semantic review found unredacted CI outputs, broad allowlists, mutable dependencies, and unsafe cleanup guidance. No prompt injection or live credentials were found.

Files scanned

3,321

Lines analyzed

Review items

False positives ignored

Confirmed security concerns (5)

High

assets/github-action.yml:53-70 assets/github-action.yml:73-89 assets/gitlab-ci.yml:38-70 assets/gitlab-ci.yml:94-115

Unredacted secret reports retained as CI artifacts

Both CI templates create Gitleaks reports without redaction and retain them as artifacts, potentially exposing detected secret values to artifact readers.

The report commands visibly omit --redact, and subsequent artifact steps retain their output. Gitleaks JSON reports can include matched secret values.

High

assets/gitlab-ci.yml:104-107

Full secret findings may be printed to CI logs

The GitLab incremental job prints the complete findings document with jq, which can place detected credentials in broadly retained CI logs.

The command directly passes the full findings file to jq without field selection or redaction. This output is written to the job log.

High

assets/config-balanced.toml:15-35 assets/config-balanced.toml:37-62 SKILL.md:174-177

Recommended configuration broadly suppresses detection

The balanced configuration globally excludes documentation, tests, fixtures, distributions, and common weak values, allowing real secrets in those locations to escape scanning.

The exclusions apply globally, and SKILL.md recommends this configuration. Real credentials can occur in excluded text, documentation, test, or generated files.

Medium

assets/github-action.yml:38-46 assets/github-action.yml:53-57 assets/gitlab-ci.yml:9-17 assets/precommit-config.yaml:8-10

CI templates use mutable third-party dependencies

Workflow actions and container images use version tags or latest tags instead of immutable commits and digests, increasing upstream supply-chain exposure.

The cited dependencies use v2, v4, v8.18.0, or latest references. These names can resolve to different content after template adoption.

Medium

SKILL.md:273-280

Test cleanup can reset a legitimate commit

The workstation test expects the secret commit to fail but then resets HEAD, which can remove the prior legitimate commit when no test commit exists.

The documented commit should be blocked, so HEAD does not advance. Running git reset HEAD~1 afterward targets the commit preceding the test.

Capability review items (3)

These are real local capabilities that may be expected for this skill, so they require review but are not counted as confirmed malicious behavior.

High

references/compliance_mapping.md:278

Hardcoded URL

curl -X POST https://siem.company.com/api/events \

The example posts the complete Gitleaks report to a SIEM endpoint without requiring redaction. Reports may contain detected secret values, creating disclosure risk.

High

references/false_positives.md:562

xargs command (can execute arbitrary commands)

gitleaks detect --report-format json | jq -r '.[0] | .File, .StartLine' | xargs -I {} sh -c 'sed -n

Repository-controlled file names are substituted into sh -c without safe argument passing. Shell metacharacters in a malicious file name can execute commands.

Medium

references/false_positives.md:481

Temp directory access

echo 'api_key = "sk_live_actual_key"' > /tmp/test_detection.py

The command overwrites a fixed path in a shared temporary directory. A local attacker could pre-create a symlink and redirect the write.

Risk Factors

🔑 Env variables (35)

assets/config-balanced.toml:41 assets/config-custom.toml:152 assets/config-custom.toml:156 assets/config-custom.toml:170 assets/config-custom.toml:177 assets/github-action.yml:48 assets/gitlab-ci.yml:220 references/compliance_mapping.md:43 references/compliance_mapping.md:99 references/detection_rules.md:236 references/false_positives.md:31 references/false_positives.md:74 references/false_positives.md:113 references/false_positives.md:128 references/false_positives.md:133 references/false_positives.md:175 references/false_positives.md:347 references/false_positives.md:481 references/remediation_guide.md:145 references/remediation_guide.md:149 references/remediation_guide.md:459 references/remediation_guide.md:138 references/remediation_guide.md:149 references/remediation_guide.md:160 references/remediation_guide.md:469 references/remediation_guide.md:137 references/remediation_guide.md:145 references/remediation_guide.md:146 references/remediation_guide.md:147 references/remediation_guide.md:470 SKILL.md:111 SKILL.md:159 SKILL.md:274 SKILL.md:378 SKILL.md:470

🌐 Network access (26)

⚙️ External commands (50)

assets/github-action.yml:102-112 assets/github-action.yml:137 assets/gitlab-ci.yml:54 assets/gitlab-ci.yml:104 assets/gitlab-ci.yml:207 assets/gitlab-ci.yml:208 references/compliance_mapping.md:334 references/false_positives.md:503 references/false_positives.md:506 references/false_positives.md:509 references/false_positives.md:425 references/false_positives.md:562 references/remediation_guide.md:310 references/remediation_guide.md:439 SKILL.md:36-49 SKILL.md:49-57 SKILL.md:57-69 SKILL.md:69-77 SKILL.md:77-85 SKILL.md:85-89 SKILL.md:89-91 SKILL.md:91-99 SKILL.md:99-112 SKILL.md:112-116 SKILL.md:116-127 SKILL.md:127-135 SKILL.md:135-141 SKILL.md:141-147 SKILL.md:147-149 SKILL.md:149-172 SKILL.md:172-174 SKILL.md:174-175 SKILL.md:175-176 SKILL.md:176-177 SKILL.md:177-185 SKILL.md:185-187 SKILL.md:187 SKILL.md:215-217 SKILL.md:217-218 SKILL.md:218-219 SKILL.md:219-221 SKILL.md:221-223 SKILL.md:223-224 SKILL.md:224-225 SKILL.md:225-226 SKILL.md:226-228 SKILL.md:228-230 SKILL.md:230-231 SKILL.md:231-232 SKILL.md:232-233

📁 Filesystem access (9)

assets/github-action.yml:99 assets/github-action.yml:99 assets/github-action.yml:162 assets/github-action.yml:170 references/false_positives.md:443 references/false_positives.md:503 references/false_positives.md:506 references/false_positives.md:481 references/false_positives.md:482

Audited by: codex View Audit History →

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Academic citations (APA · BibTeX · CFF)

APA citation

AgentSecOps. (2026). secrets-gitleaks security audit report (audit version 9) [Author version 0.1.0]. Skillstore. https://skillstore.io/skills/agentsecops-secrets-gitleaks/audits/9

BibTeX citation

@techreport{agentsecops-agentsecops-secrets-gitleaks-2026,
  author = {AgentSecOps},
  title = {secrets-gitleaks security audit report (audit version 9)},
  institution = {Skillstore},
  year = {2026},
  number = {9},
  url = {https://skillstore.io/skills/agentsecops-secrets-gitleaks/audits/9},
  note = {Author version 0.1.0}
}

CITATION.cff

cff-version: 1.2.0
message: "If you use this Skill, cite its author and this versioned security audit report."
title: "secrets-gitleaks security audit report (audit version 9)"
version: "0.1.0"
type: report
authors:
  - name: "AgentSecOps"
date-released: "2026-07-23"
url: "https://skillstore.io/skills/agentsecops-secrets-gitleaks/audits/9"
identifiers:
  - type: other
    value: "skillstore:agentsecops-secrets-gitleaks:audit:9"
    description: "Skillstore immutable audit report identifier"

Skillstore Score

Why this score Evidence Confidence: Medium

Architecture

100

Maintainability

Content

Community

Spec Compliance

What You Can Build

Audit a repository

Run a redacted full-history scan, classify findings, and prepare a prioritized remediation summary.

Prevent secret commits

Configure a pre-commit control and focused allowlists for a development team.

Add a CI security gate

Adapt a pipeline template to block new secrets and retain protected evidence.

Try These Prompts

Run a safe repository scan

Scan this repository with Gitleaks. Use redaction, inspect current files and git history, then summarize findings without revealing secret values.

Configure pre-commit protection

Design a Gitleaks pre-commit setup for this repository. Keep allowlists narrow, explain prerequisites, and provide a safe validation procedure.

Build a CI secret gate

Adapt the Gitleaks CI template for this platform. Pin dependencies, redact reports, restrict artifacts, and fail only on verified new findings.

Plan an enterprise rollout

Create a Gitleaks rollout plan using baselines, custom rules, review ownership, remediation deadlines, protected reporting, and measurable compliance evidence.

Best Practices

Use redaction for terminal output, reports, artifacts, and notifications.
Rotate exposed credentials before removing them from current code or history.
Review every allowlist entry and test that representative real secrets remain detectable.

Avoid

Do not publish complete findings files or detected values in CI logs.
Do not exclude entire source, documentation, or test trees without documented review.
Do not treat history cleanup as a substitute for credential rotation.