Versioned security assessment

Report ID: SA-73B43E19

6/28/2026, 6:18:51 AM

container-grype security assessment v6

Skill Security Certification Report

Audit History
Audit model: codex Historical report
Skill name
container-grype
Version
v6
Maintainer
AgentSecOps
Source
github.com/AgentSecOps/SecOpsAgentKit/tree/main/skills/devsecops/container-grype
Coverage
10 Files scanned · 3,459 Lines analyzed
Policy version
Unavailable

Highest confirmed finding severity

Medium

1 confirmed security finding requires attention.

Installation context

Historical evidence

This report may not describe the currently installable artifact. Open the current Skill page for install guidance.

Open current Skill page

This report does not block or authorize the manifest or ZIP.

Static analysis found many command, network, filesystem, environment, and script patterns, but most are documentation examples for legitimate vulnerability scanning workflows. The confirmed risks are operational: some CI templates install tools with curl piped to a shell and one Jenkins example mounts the Docker socket, so publication is acceptable only with clear warnings and review guidance.

Report position

Historical report

Open audit history before using this report to install.

Audit attestation

Not attestable

The required immutable binding is incomplete.

Human verification

Not verified

No human verification is recorded for this report.

Coverage

10 Files scanned · 3,459 Lines analyzed

4 items shown for review

Limitations

This report does not claim runtime or sandbox execution and does not prove the absence of side effects.

Evidence chain

Follow the evidence from source binding to the install contract. Available evidence supports verification; it is not a safety guarantee.

  1. Source

    Binding unavailable

  2. Artifact

    Identity incomplete

  3. Audit

    Complete

  4. Install contract

    Open manifest to verify

    Open manifest

Capabilities observed

Observed means this report recorded supporting evidence. Not recorded does not prove that a capability is absent.

Contains scripts

May execute code included with the Skill.

Observed in 1 evidence location

Network access

May connect to external services.

Observed in 4 evidence locations

Filesystem access

May read or write local files.

Observed in 3 evidence locations

Env variables

May read values from the process environment.

Observed in 3 evidence locations

External commands

May invoke commands or programs outside the Skill.

Observed in 4 evidence locations

Capability review items (3)
Medium
assets/grype-ci-config.yml:205assets/grype-ci-config.yml:269assets/ci-config-template.yml:240
Remote Installer Piped to Shell in CI Templates
The CircleCI and Azure examples install Grype by downloading a script from GitHub and piping it directly to a shell. This is a real supply-chain risk if users copy the templates without pinning, checksum verification, or controlled package sources.
The pattern is present in executable CI snippets and would execute remote code during builds. Confidence is high, but the context is an example template for a security scanner rather than hidden malicious behavior.
Low
assets/rule-template.yaml:132-148references/EXAMPLE.md:137-138references/cvss_guide.md:14
Educational Security Examples Trigger Static Patterns
Several findings are false positives from educational examples that demonstrate vulnerable patterns, CVSS concepts, CISA KEV prioritization, or remediation guidance. These examples are not executed by the skill itself.
The surrounding files are clearly templates or reference documents, and the flagged lines are used to teach detection and remediation. They should be documented, but they do not show active malicious behavior.
Low
assets/ci-config-template.yml:164assets/grype-config.yaml:89assets/grype-config.yaml:107assets/ci-config-template.yml:323
Normal CI Token and Local Configuration Access
The GitHub token, environment variable, .grype.yaml, cache directory, and report file reads are expected for CI security reporting and Grype configuration. No evidence found that the skill exfiltrates secrets or reads unrelated user files.
The evidence appears in CI configuration and local Grype configuration examples. It remains low risk because users may copy the templates into privileged environments.

Risk findings

Confirmed security concerns are separated from items that still need review.

Confirmed security concerns (1)

RISK-001 Medium
assets/grype-ci-config.yml:140
Docker Socket Mounted Into Jenkins Scan Container
The Jenkins example mounts /var/run/docker.sock into the Grype container. This is sometimes required for image scanning, but it gives the scan container broad control over the Docker daemon if the container or pipeline is compromised.
The Docker socket mount is explicitly present in the Jenkins CI example. It is a legitimate operational pattern, but it materially expands pipeline privileges.

Expert evidence

Immutable subject identity, scanner metadata, dismissed matches, and source-level evidence.

Artifact subject

Marketplace commit
Unavailable
Content hash
Unavailable
Tree hash
Unavailable
Skill path
Unavailable
Audit payload hash
Unavailable

Analysis metadata

Audit model: codex

Analysis state: Complete

Scope is limited to the recorded files, lines, methods, and evidence. No runtime or sandbox execution is claimed.

Verify and export

JSON report CITATION.cff SARIF 2.1.0 Signed installation manifest

The manifest and lockfile bind install artifacts to cryptographic hashes. This integrity claim is separate from the security assessment.

Audit attestation: not_attestable