Skills container-grype

📦

container-grype

Name: container-grype
Author: AgentSecOps

v0.1.0 Content revision r2 Critical ⚙️ External commands🌐 Network access📁 Filesystem access🔑 Env variables⚡ Contains scripts

Scan Containers and Prioritize Vulnerabilities

Container findings are difficult to rank across severity, exploitability, and exposure. This skill guides Grype scans and practical remediation priorities.

Supports: Claude Codex Code(CC)

⚠️ 38 Poor

Do not auto-install this skill.

The canonical policy requires operator review before any installation action.

Install with my Agent

Copy this request to your Agent. It includes the canonical Skill page and manifest.

Agent request

Review the Skillstore skill "container-grype" from https://skillstore.io/skills/agentsecops-container-grype.md and its manifest at https://skillstore.io/api/skills/agentsecops-container-grype/manifest. Verify the artifact. Do not auto-install. Inspect the skill and report your findings, then wait for an operator or manual installation decision.

Your Agent should still show its plan and request any confirmation required by the security policy.

Agent-readable resources

Use these links when an AI agent, crawler, or script needs clean context instead of reading the full page.

Markdown detail GET /skills/agentsecops-container-grype.md Signed manifest GET /api/skills/agentsecops-container-grype/manifest Signed lockfile GET /api/skills/agentsecops-container-grype/lockfile

Test it

Using "container-grype". Prioritize three findings: a KEV high, a critical with low EPSS, and a medium with high EPSS.

Expected outcome:

Priority 1 is the KEV high because exploitation is confirmed. Priority 2 is the high-EPSS medium. Priority 3 is the low-EPSS critical.

Using "container-grype". Recommend a production gate for a container image.

Expected outcome:

Block releases with critical or high findings that have available fixes.
Escalate every CISA KEV finding regardless of CVSS score.
Store SARIF and human-readable reports as restricted build artifacts.

Using "container-grype". Explain whether a Grype ignore rule is acceptable.

Expected outcome:

Accept the rule only with exact scope, evidence, an owner, an expiration date, and a scheduled rescan. Avoid package-wide or fix-state-wide suppressions.

Security Audit

Critical

v9 • 7/23/2026 Open versioned report

Most static matches are false positives caused by Markdown formatting, defensive examples, and normal Grype configuration. Confirmed risks include unpinned pipe-to-shell installers, Docker socket exposure, and unquoted Tekton parameters that permit command injection. Semantic review also found bypassable security gates, broad ignore rules, and mutable CI dependencies.

Files scanned

3,469

Lines analyzed

Review items

False positives ignored

Confirmed security concerns (7)

Critical

assets/ci-config-template.yml:240

Pipe to shell pattern

curl -s https://raw.githubusercontent.com/aquasecurity/tfsec/master/scripts/install_linux.sh | bash

The template pipes an unpinned remote installer directly into bash. A compromised branch, repository, or connection endpoint would gain code execution in the CI runner.

Critical

assets/grype-ci-config.yml:205

Pipe to shell pattern

curl -sSfL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/anchore/grype/main/install.sh | sh -s -- -b /usr/local/

The CircleCI example streams an unpinned main-branch installer into a shell. Upstream compromise or an unexpected change would execute with runner permissions.

Critical

assets/grype-ci-config.yml:269

Pipe to shell pattern

curl -sSfL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/anchore/grype/main/install.sh | sh -s -- -b /usr/local/

The Azure Pipelines example streams an unpinned main-branch installer into a shell. Upstream compromise or an unexpected change would execute with runner permissions.

Critical

assets/grype-ci-config.yml:140

Docker socket access

args '-v /var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock'

The Jenkins container mounts the host Docker socket. Code in that container can control the Docker daemon and commonly obtain host-level access.

High

assets/ci-config-template.yml:125-140 assets/ci-config-template.yml:228-256

Security gates can pass without enforcing findings

Node audit output is never evaluated, and the IaC stage converts scanner failures into warnings. Vulnerable builds can pass despite the template presenting these checks as gates.

The Node command is followed by no result check, while the IaC block uses || true and leaves exit 1 commented out.

High

assets/ci-config-template.yml:196-202 assets/grype-ci-config.yml:121-140 assets/grype-ci-config.yml:364-373

CI examples execute mutable action and image references

The templates use a GitHub Action from master and Grype container images tagged latest. Future upstream changes can execute without repository review or digest verification.

The files explicitly reference aquasecurity/trivy-action@master, set GRYPE_VERSION to latest, and run anchore/grype:latest.

Medium

assets/grype-config.yaml:11-38

Example configuration suppresses broad vulnerability classes

The bundled Grype configuration ignores every wont-fix vulnerability and all matches for a named package. Copying it can hide real findings without expiry or target-specific justification.

The active ignore rules include fix-state: wont-fix and a package-only pytest match, both broader than the example-specific CVE suppressions.

Capability review items (6)

These are real local capabilities that may be expected for this skill, so they require review but are not counted as confirmed malicious behavior.

High

assets/grype-ci-config.yml:369

Shell command substitution

grype $(params.IMAGE) \

Tekton substitutes the user-supplied IMAGE parameter directly into an unquoted shell command. Shell metacharacters in the parameter can inject commands into the task.

High

assets/grype-ci-config.yml:370

Shell command substitution

--fail-on $(params.SEVERITY_THRESHOLD) \

Tekton substitutes the severity parameter directly into an unquoted shell command. A crafted parameter value can alter arguments or inject additional shell commands.

High

assets/grype-ci-config.yml:373

Shell command substitution

grype $(params.IMAGE) -o table | tee /workspace/grype-report.txt

The user-supplied IMAGE parameter is expanded unquoted in a second shell pipeline. This repeats the command-injection path in the report-generation command.

Low

assets/ci-config-template.yml:240

Hardcoded URL

curl -s https://raw.githubusercontent.com/aquasecurity/tfsec/master/scripts/install_linux.sh | bash

This URL is used to download an installer that is immediately executed. The mutable upstream script creates a supply-chain exposure even though the domain is legitimate.

Low

assets/grype-ci-config.yml:205

Hardcoded URL

curl -sSfL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/anchore/grype/main/install.sh | sh -s -- -b /usr/local/

This URL supplies executable installer content from a mutable main branch. Its direct use in CI creates a real external supply-chain dependency.

Low

assets/grype-ci-config.yml:269

Hardcoded URL

curl -sSfL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/anchore/grype/main/install.sh | sh -s -- -b /usr/local/

This URL supplies executable installer content from a mutable main branch. Its direct use in CI creates a real external supply-chain dependency.

Risk Factors

⚙️ External commands (50)

🌐 Network access (29)

📁 Filesystem access (5)

assets/ci-config-template.yml:323 assets/ci-config-template.yml:323 assets/grype-config.yaml:107 assets/grype-config.yaml:89 assets/grype-config.yaml:107

🔑 Env variables (23)

⚡ Contains scripts (2)

references/EXAMPLE.md:138 references/EXAMPLE.md:137

Detected Patterns

Pipe to shell pattern×3Docker socket access

Audited by: codex View Audit History →

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https://skillstore.io/skills/agentsecops-container-grype/audits/9?utm_source=security_passport&utm_medium=share&utm_campaign=versioned_report

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Academic citations (APA · BibTeX · CFF)

APA citation

AgentSecOps. (2026). container-grype security audit report (audit version 9) [Author version 0.1.0]. Skillstore. https://skillstore.io/skills/agentsecops-container-grype/audits/9

BibTeX citation

@techreport{agentsecops-agentsecops-container-grype-2026,
  author = {AgentSecOps},
  title = {container-grype security audit report (audit version 9)},
  institution = {Skillstore},
  year = {2026},
  number = {9},
  url = {https://skillstore.io/skills/agentsecops-container-grype/audits/9},
  note = {Author version 0.1.0}
}

CITATION.cff

cff-version: 1.2.0
message: "If you use this Skill, cite its author and this versioned security audit report."
title: "container-grype security audit report (audit version 9)"
version: "0.1.0"
type: report
authors:
  - name: "AgentSecOps"
date-released: "2026-07-23"
url: "https://skillstore.io/skills/agentsecops-container-grype/audits/9"
identifiers:
  - type: other
    value: "skillstore:agentsecops-container-grype:audit:9"
    description: "Skillstore immutable audit report identifier"

Skillstore Score

Why this score Evidence Confidence: Medium

Architecture

100

Maintainability

Content

Community

Spec Compliance

What You Can Build

Gate container releases

Add a Grype severity threshold and retain scan reports before deployment.

Prioritize remediation work

Rank package findings using KEV status, EPSS probability, CVSS severity, and fix availability.

Assess software inventories

Scan archived SPDX, CycloneDX, or Syft SBOMs without rebuilding container images.

Try These Prompts

Run a basic scan

Show the safest Grype command to scan [image]. Explain each option and use a production severity threshold.

Review scan findings

Review this Grype report summary: [findings]. Rank the issues by KEV, EPSS, CVSS, fix availability, and package exposure.

Design a CI gate

Design a Grype gate for [CI platform] scanning [image source]. Pin dependencies and retain reports without exposing the Docker socket.

Build a remediation program

Create a remediation plan for [portfolio]. Define SLAs, exception evidence, expiry rules, rescan checks, and metrics for KEV and high-EPSS findings.

Best Practices

Pin scanner actions, images, and installers to reviewed immutable versions.
Prioritize KEV and high-EPSS findings before relying only on CVSS severity.
Document every suppression with evidence, ownership, expiration, and periodic review.