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Evaluación de seguridad versionada

ID del informe: SA-EBDFE608

7/23/2026, 6:05:40 PM

azure-compute evaluación de seguridad v5

Informe de certificación de seguridad de la habilidad

Historial de auditorías
Versión del escáner 3.0.0 Modelo de auditoría: codex Último informe publicado
Nombre de la habilidad
azure-compute
Versión
v0.0.0-placeholder
Mantenedor
microsoft
Fuente
github.com/microsoft/github-copilot-for-azure/tree/main/plugin/skills/azure-compute/
Cobertura
51 Archivos escaneados · 3,381 Líneas analizadas
Versión de la política
skillstore-security-audit-policy-v1

Gravedad máxima de hallazgo confirmada

Alto

16 hallazgos de seguridad confirmados requieren atención.

Contexto de instalación

Consulta la página actual de Skill

Esta página resume únicamente las pruebas del informe. La página de la Skill proporciona el aviso de instalación canónico.

Abrir la página actual de la habilidad

Este informe no bloquea ni autoriza el manifiesto ni el ZIP.

Most static alerts are documentation syntax, official Microsoft endpoints, private or sample addresses, and SSH public-key references. Fourteen static findings remain confirmed because they contact a third party or change remote firewall, authentication, privilege, networking, or SELinux state. Semantic review also found shell injection exposure, fail-open ingress, unsafe host-key guidance, broad unconfirmed EMM changes, and plaintext password handling.

Posición del informe

Último informe publicado

«Más reciente» se refiere a la secuencia del informe, no a la actualidad del artefacto.

Atestación de auditoría

Atestación activa

Hay una atestación pública disponible para este informe exacto.

Verificación humana

No verificado

No se ha registrado ninguna verificación humana para este informe.

Cobertura

51 Archivos escaneados · 3,381 Líneas analizadas

19 elementos mostrados para revisión

Limitaciones

Este informe no afirma ninguna ejecución en tiempo de ejecución ni en entorno aislado y no prueba la ausencia de efectos secundarios.

Cadena de evidencias

Sigue la evidencia desde la vinculación del código fuente hasta el contrato de instalación. La evidencia disponible permite la verificación; no constituye una garantía de seguridad.

  1. Fuente

    Vinculado al commit y la ruta

  2. Artefacto

    Hashes de contenido y árbol vinculados

  3. Auditoría

    Completo

  4. Contrato de instalación

    Abrir el manifiesto para verificar

    Abrir el manifiesto

Capacidades observadas

Observado significa que este informe registró evidencia de respaldo. No registrado no prueba que una capacidad esté ausente.

Contiene scripts

Puede ejecutar código incluido con la habilidad.

No registrado por esta auditoría

Acceso a red

Puede conectarse a servicios externos.

Observado en 33 ubicaciones de evidencia

Acceso al sistema de archivos

Puede leer o escribir archivos locales.

Observado en 34 ubicaciones de evidencia

Variables de entorno

Puede leer valores del entorno del proceso.

No registrado por esta auditoría

Comandos externos

Puede invocar comandos o programas fuera de la habilidad.

Observado en 41 ubicaciones de evidencia

Elementos de revisión de capacidades (3)
Alto
workflows/vm-troubleshooter/references/credential-auth-errors.md:25
sudo privilege escalation
| sudo password prompt fails / user not in sudoers | Fix via Run Command or Serial Consol
The workflow recommends fixing sudo access through Run Command or Serial Console. This can grant administrative privileges and requires explicit authorization.
Alto
workflows/vm-troubleshooter/references/firewall-blocking.md:33
PowerShell invocation
--command-id RunPowerShellScript \
This Azure Run Command invokes PowerShell to enable the Remote Desktop firewall rule. It changes guest firewall policy and can increase network exposure if applied without explicit approval.
Medio
workflows/vm-creator/examples/terraform/README.md:14
Shell command substitution
MY_IP=$(curl -s ifconfig.me)/32 # your current public IP, locked to /32
This example contacts ifconfig.me to derive the caller public IP for an NSG source. It reveals client metadata to a third-party service and adds an external dependency.

Hallazgos de riesgos

Las preocupaciones de seguridad confirmadas están separadas de los elementos que aún deben revisarse.

Preocupaciones de seguridad confirmadas (16)

RISK-001 Alto
workflows/vm-troubleshooter/references/firewall-blocking.md:33
System reconnaissance
--command-id RunPowerShellScript \
The paired remote command enables the Windows Remote Desktop firewall rule. This changes guest firewall policy and can increase administrative network exposure.
RISK-002 Alto
workflows/vm-troubleshooter/references/firewall-blocking.md:48
System reconnaissance
--command-id RunShellScript --scripts "iptables -I INPUT -p tcp --dport 22 -j ACCEPT"
The command inserts an iptables rule that permits inbound SSH. This changes guest firewall policy and may expose port 22 beyond the intended source network.
RISK-003 Alto
workflows/vm-troubleshooter/references/firewall-blocking.md:52
System reconnaissance
--command-id RunShellScript \
This Run Command begins a persistent firewalld change that opens the SSH service. The operation changes a VM security control and needs explicit approval.
RISK-004 Alto
workflows/vm-troubleshooter/references/firewall-blocking.md:57
System reconnaissance
--command-id RunShellScript --scripts "ufw status; ufw allow 22/tcp"
The command runs ufw allow for port 22 on the remote VM. It changes firewall policy and can broaden SSH exposure.
RISK-005 Alto
workflows/vm-troubleshooter/references/ssh-connectivity.md:47
System reconnaissance
--command-id RunShellScript --scripts "setenforce 0"
The command sets SELinux to permissive mode on the remote VM. This weakens mandatory access controls and should only run after explicit approval with a restoration plan.
RISK-006 Alto
workflows/vm-creator/references/delivery-options/github-pr.md:5-12workflows/vm-creator/references/delivery-options/github-pr.md:25-51
Unvalidated shell placeholders in GitHub delivery
The workflow accepts user-supplied repository, branch, and target path values, then inserts them into shell commands without validation or consistent quoting. Crafted values could execute unintended commands.
The same file collects user-controlled branch and path values and later places those placeholders in shell command positions. No allowlist validation or complete shell quoting is specified.
RISK-007 Alto
workflows/vm-creator/references/depth-probe/beginner.md:16
Fail-open management port exposure
The beginner flow permits an unrestricted source when public IP detection fails. This can expose SSH or RDP management ports to the entire internet.
The guidance explicitly allows a wildcard source after detection failure. A warning in the Plan Card does not prevent generation of the exposed configuration.
RISK-008 Alto
workflows/vm-troubleshooter/references/ssh-connectivity.md:13
SSH host key removal lacks fingerprint verification
The SSH troubleshooting table recommends removing the old known_hosts entry after redeployment without first verifying the replacement host key. This can normalize a man-in-the-middle warning.
The line directly maps host-key verification failure to deleting the stored entry and provides no fingerprint validation step. The omission is security-relevant even in a legitimate redeployment.
RISK-009 Alto
workflows/essential-machine-management/references/emm-enable-flow.md:115-137workflows/essential-machine-management/references/emm-enable-flow.md:162-185
Subscription-wide EMM changes lack a final confirmation gate
The EMM flow registers providers and submits a subscription-level deployment on the user behalf without an explicit final confirmation. Enrollment affects existing VMs and can enable paid services.
The workflow states that Copilot performs commands and API calls, then reaches provider registration and PUT or DELETE operations without a final approval instruction. The documented scope and pricing effects are subscription-wide.
RISK-010 Alto
workflows/vm-creator/references/output-adapters/az-cli.md:65workflows/vm-troubleshooter/references/ssh-connectivity.md:33-35workflows/vm-troubleshooter/references/rdp-connectivity.md:40-41workflows/vm-troubleshooter/references/credential-auth-errors.md:32-33workflows/vm-troubleshooter/references/credential-auth-errors.md:48-50
Plaintext passwords in command arguments
Creator and troubleshooting guidance place VM administrator passwords directly in command arguments. These secrets can remain in shell history, transcripts, or process listings.
Each cited command passes a password through an az CLI argument. Command-line secrets can be retained in shell history and exposed through process inspection.
RISK-011 Medio
workflows/vm-troubleshooter/references/credential-auth-errors.md:9
System reconnaissance
| "Your credentials did not work" | Reset password via Portal or CLI
The table recommends resetting a VM password through the portal or CLI. This changes credentials and can affect account access.
RISK-012 Medio
workflows/vm-troubleshooter/references/credential-auth-errors.md:54
System reconnaissance
--command-id RunShellScript --scripts "passwd -u <username>"
The command remotely unlocks a Linux account with passwd. This changes authentication state and should require explicit user confirmation and target verification.
RISK-013 Medio
workflows/vm-troubleshooter/references/network-connectivity.md:57
System reconnaissance
--command-id RunShellScript --scripts "ip link set eth0 up && dhclient eth0"
The remote command brings eth0 up and renews DHCP configuration. It mutates guest networking and could disrupt connectivity if the interface name or configuration is wrong.
RISK-014 Bajo
workflows/vm-creator/examples/terraform/README.md:14
Network reconnaissance
MY_IP=$(curl -s ifconfig.me)/32 # your current public IP, locked to /32
The command discovers the caller public IP through ifconfig.me. The purpose is narrow NSG scoping, but the lookup still discloses client metadata to a third party.
RISK-015 Bajo
workflows/vm-creator/references/depth-probe/beginner.md:16
Network reconnaissance
- **NSG:** create new, allow SSH 22 (Linux) or RDP 3389 (Windows) from **the user's current public I
The workflow explicitly instructs using ifconfig.me or an equivalent service to discover the user's public IP. This discloses client network metadata to a third party.
RISK-016 Bajo
workflows/vm-creator/references/depth-probe/networking-deep.md:9
Network reconnaissance
| NSG | "Inbound rules: default (SSH/RDP from your IP) or paste a rule set?" | Restrict source to us
The workflow explicitly instructs curl to query ifconfig.me for the user's public IP. This sends client network metadata to a third-party service.

Medidas correctivas

Esta auditoría registra correcciones sugeridas. Aplicarlas es responsabilidad de la persona encargada del mantenimiento.

  1. FIX-001
    Alto
    User-controlled GitHub delivery values enter shell commands without complete validation.
    Allowlist repository and branch formats, resolve target paths inside the checkout, and pass every value as a structured argument instead of shell interpolation.
  2. FIX-002
    Alto
    Public IP detection failure can produce an unrestricted SSH or RDP source.
    Fail closed when detection fails. Require the user to provide and confirm a trusted CIDR before generating or applying any management-port rule.
  3. FIX-003
    Alto
    Remote remediation and subscription-wide EMM operations can change security controls or incur costs.
    Show the exact target, commands, scope, and expected impact, then require explicit confirmation immediately before every state-changing operation.
  4. FIX-004
    Alto
    SSH recovery guidance removes a stored host key without verifying the replacement.
    Retrieve the expected host fingerprint through a trusted Azure channel and compare it before removing or replacing any known_hosts entry.
  5. FIX-005
    Alto
    Windows administrator passwords are placed directly in command-line arguments.
    Use a secure prompt, protected parameter file, Key Vault reference, or managed identity flow that keeps passwords out of history and process arguments.
  6. FIX-006
    Bajo
    Public IP discovery depends on a third-party ifconfig.me request.
    Ask before the lookup and offer a manual CIDR value or an Azure-owned discovery method that avoids disclosing metadata to a third party.

Evidencia experta

Identidad inmutable del sujeto, metadatos del escáner, coincidencias descartadas y evidencia a nivel de código fuente.

Sujeto del artefacto

Commit de Marketplace
ebdfe608f5de2b66ff37ab4af12af8ac4f5e8006
Hash del contenido
3880c4bec643e54768b13d5dfc45a119ebc11277dfe643b97d71432698483d78
Hash del árbol
963ccd905d545835bb9bd578b3b394c7924d300515d3c233c79f9da3fcffbd4b
Ruta del Skill
skills/microsoft/azure-compute
Hash de la carga de auditoría
fcba76708187325019da360dd5ce8d15

Metadatos del análisis

Modelo de auditoría: codex

Estado del análisis: Completo

El alcance se limita a los archivos, líneas, métodos y pruebas registrados. No se afirma ninguna ejecución en tiempo de ejecución ni en entorno aislado.

Verificar y exportar

Informe JSON Atestación de auditoría firmada CITATION.cff SARIF 2.1.0 Manifiesto de instalación firmado Fuente

El manifiesto y el archivo de bloqueo vinculan los artefactos de instalación a hashes criptográficos. Esta afirmación de integridad es independiente de la evaluación de seguridad.

Atestación de auditoría: active