Habilidades parallel-swarm-implementation
📦
parallel-swarm-implementation
Revisión del contenido r1 Riesgo alto ⚙️ Comandos externos📁 Acceso al sistema de archivos
Coordinar la implementación de enjambre paralelo
Los planes de implementación complejos son difíciles de asignar, validar e integrar entre muchos agentes. Esta skill proporciona un flujo de trabajo estructurado de Loop 2 para la selección de agentes, la ejecución en paralelo, las pruebas y el empaquetado de entrega.
Compatible con: Claude Codex Code(CC)
Detente y solicita confirmación antes de instalar.
Revisa el plan y obtén el consentimiento explícito del usuario antes de modificar archivos.
Instalar con mi Agente
Copia esta solicitud en tu Agente. Incluye la página canónica del Skill y el manifiesto.
Solicitud de agente
Review the Skillstore skill "parallel-swarm-implementation" from https://skillstore.io/skills/dnyoussef-parallel-swarm-implementation.md and its manifest at https://skillstore.io/api/skills/dnyoussef-parallel-swarm-implementation/manifest. Verify the artifact. Stop and obtain explicit user consent before installing or changing files.Tu Agente debe seguir mostrando su plan y solicitar cualquier confirmación exigida por la política de seguridad.
Recursos legibles por agentes
Usa estos enlaces cuando un agente de IA, crawler o script necesite contexto limpio en vez de leer la página completa.
Pruébalo
Usando "parallel-swarm-implementation". Un paquete de Loop 1 para una funcionalidad de autenticación.
Resultado esperado:
Un plan de asignación conciso con tareas de backend, pruebas, documentación, validación e integración agrupadas por orden de dependencias.
Usando "parallel-swarm-implementation". Una implementación multiagente parcialmente completada con pruebas fallidas.
Resultado esperado:
Un resumen de estado de integración que nombre las áreas fallidas, asigne la responsabilidad de reparación y defina la siguiente pasada de validación.
Usando "parallel-swarm-implementation". Una implementación completada lista para revisión de CI/CD.
Resultado esperado:
Un resumen de entrega con métricas de implementación, resultados de validación de simulación, estado de pruebas y preparación para Loop 3.
Auditoría de seguridad
Riesgo altov8 • 5/7/2026 Abrir el informe versionado
Most static backtick detections are Markdown formatting false positives, but the skill does include real agent-facing shell execution, hidden artifact access, and filesystem writes. The highest concerns are mutable npx claude-flow@alpha usage and unsanitized artifact content being promoted into downstream agent prompts. No explicit prompt-injection attack text was found in SKILL.md.
2
Archivos escaneados
960
Líneas analizadas
52
Elementos de revisión
0
Falsos positivos ignorados
Preocupaciones de seguridad confirmadas (3)
Alto
Unpinned External CLI Execution
The skill instructs users or agents to run npx claude-flow@alpha commands. The alpha tag is mutable and can execute package code from outside the repository when npx resolves or updates the dependency.
Multiple explicit npx claude-flow@alpha commands appear in operational workflow steps. The security impact depends on the runtime environment, but the mutable external package execution risk is clear.
Alto
Unsanitized Artifact Content Promoted To Agent Instructions
The workflow reads planning and assignment artifacts, then inserts fields such as task descriptions, research, risk mitigations, and fix instructions directly into delegated agent prompts. A malicious or corrupted artifact could inject instructions into downstream agents.
The cited lines show generated artifact values being read and passed into Task prompts without validation or quoting rules. This is a strong prompt-injection pathway, although exploitation requires control over those artifacts.
Medio
Automatic Downstream Skill Transition
The skill directs an automatic transition to cicd-intelligent-recovery after Loop 2 completes. This can extend execution into another skill and toolchain without an explicit review checkpoint in the documented workflow.
The text explicitly says to automatically transition and provides the downstream skill invocation context. The risk is procedural rather than direct code execution, so confidence is moderate-high.
Elementos de revisión de capacidades (52)
Estas son capacidades locales reales que pueden esperarse para esta habilidad, por lo que requieren revisión, pero no se cuentan como comportamiento malicioso confirmado.
Medio
Shell command substitution
- Parse: $(jq '.planning.enhanced_plan' .claude/.artifacts/loop1-planning-package.json)
The Bash snippet uses command substitution to execute jq, seq, or cat against workspace artifacts. This is legitimate workflow logic, but it is real shell execution over generated files and should be reviewed before use.
Medio
Shell command substitution
2. Memory store: npx claude-flow@alpha memory store 'agent_assignments' "$(cat .claude/.artifacts/ag
This command substitution reads a local artifact and passes the result into a claude-flow memory command. The pattern can expose generated project data to external tooling or shared agent memory if run without review.
Medio
Shell command substitution
TOTAL_GROUPS=$(jq '.parallelGroups | length' "$MATRIX")
The Bash snippet uses command substitution to execute jq, seq, or cat against workspace artifacts. This is legitimate workflow logic, but it is real shell execution over generated files and should be reviewed before use.
Medio
Shell command substitution
for GROUP_NUM in $(seq 1 $TOTAL_GROUPS); do
The Bash snippet uses command substitution to execute jq, seq, or cat against workspace artifacts. This is legitimate workflow logic, but it is real shell execution over generated files and should be reviewed before use.
Medio
Shell command substitution
TASKS=$(jq -r ".parallelGroups[$((GROUP_NUM-1))].tasks[]" "$MATRIX")
The Bash snippet uses command substitution to execute jq, seq, or cat against workspace artifacts. This is legitimate workflow logic, but it is real shell execution over generated files and should be reviewed before use.
Medio
Shell command substitution
AGENT=$(jq -r ".tasks[] | select(.taskId==\"$TASK_ID\") | .assignedAgent" "$MATRIX")
The Bash snippet uses command substitution to execute jq, seq, or cat against workspace artifacts. This is legitimate workflow logic, but it is real shell execution over generated files and should be reviewed before use.
Medio
Shell command substitution
SKILL=$(jq -r ".tasks[] | select(.taskId==\"$TASK_ID\") | .useSkill" "$MATRIX")
The Bash snippet uses command substitution to execute jq, seq, or cat against workspace artifacts. This is legitimate workflow logic, but it is real shell execution over generated files and should be reviewed before use.
Medio
Shell command substitution
INSTRUCTIONS=$(jq -r ".tasks[] | select(.taskId==\"$TASK_ID\") | .customInstructions" "$MATRIX")
The Bash snippet uses command substitution to execute jq, seq, or cat against workspace artifacts. This is legitimate workflow logic, but it is real shell execution over generated files and should be reviewed before use.
Medio
Shell command substitution
PRIORITY=$(jq -r ".tasks[] | select(.taskId==\"$TASK_ID\") | .priority" "$MATRIX")
The Bash snippet uses command substitution to execute jq, seq, or cat against workspace artifacts. This is legitimate workflow logic, but it is real shell execution over generated files and should be reviewed before use.
Medio
Shell command substitution
- Research: $(jq -r ".tasks[] | select(.taskId==\"$TASK_ID\") | .loop1_research" "$MATRIX")
The substitution injects values read from generated artifacts directly into agent instructions. If those artifacts are untrusted or compromised, they can steer delegated agents through prompt injection.
Medio
Shell command substitution
- Risk Mitigation: $(jq -r ".tasks[] | select(.taskId==\"$TASK_ID\") | .loop1_risk_mitigation" "$MAT
The substitution injects values read from generated artifacts directly into agent instructions. If those artifacts are untrusted or compromised, they can steer delegated agents through prompt injection.
Medio
Shell command substitution
- Check dependencies complete: $(jq -r ".tasks[] | select(.taskId==\"$TASK_ID\") | .dependencies[]"
The substitution injects values read from generated artifacts directly into agent instructions. If those artifacts are untrusted or compromised, they can steer delegated agents through prompt injection.
Medio
Shell command substitution
"Task: $(jq -r ".tasks[] | select(.taskId==\"$TASK_ID\") | .description" "$MATRIX")
The substitution injects values read from generated artifacts directly into agent instructions. If those artifacts are untrusted or compromised, they can steer delegated agents through prompt injection.
Medio
Shell command substitution
- Research findings: $(jq -r ".tasks[] | select(.taskId==\"$TASK_ID\") | .loop1_research" "$MATRIX")
The substitution injects values read from generated artifacts directly into agent instructions. If those artifacts are untrusted or compromised, they can steer delegated agents through prompt injection.
Medio
Shell command substitution
- Risk mitigations to apply: $(jq -r ".tasks[] | select(.taskId==\"$TASK_ID\") | .loop1_risk_mitigat
The substitution injects values read from generated artifacts directly into agent instructions. If those artifacts are untrusted or compromised, they can steer delegated agents through prompt injection.
Medio
Shell command substitution
- Wait for dependencies if any: $(jq -r ".tasks[] | select(.taskId==\"$TASK_ID\") | .dependencies[]"
The substitution injects values read from generated artifacts directly into agent instructions. If those artifacts are untrusted or compromised, they can steer delegated agents through prompt injection.
Medio
Shell command substitution
THEATER_COUNT=$(jq '.confirmed_theater_count' .claude/.artifacts/theater-consensus-report.json)
The Bash snippet uses command substitution to execute jq, seq, or cat against workspace artifacts. This is legitimate workflow logic, but it is real shell execution over generated files and should be reviewed before use.
Medio
Shell command substitution
FIX_AGENT=$(jq -r '.responsible_agent' .claude/.artifacts/fix-strategy-iter-$ITERATION.json)
The Bash snippet uses command substitution to execute jq, seq, or cat against workspace artifacts. This is legitimate workflow logic, but it is real shell execution over generated files and should be reviewed before use.
Medio
Shell command substitution
FIX_INSTRUCTIONS=$(jq -r '.fix_instructions' .claude/.artifacts/fix-strategy-iter-$ITERATION.json)
The Bash snippet uses command substitution to execute jq, seq, or cat against workspace artifacts. This is legitimate workflow logic, but it is real shell execution over generated files and should be reviewed before use.
Medio
Shell command substitution
Analysis: $(cat .claude/.artifacts/fix-strategy-iter-$ITERATION.json)
The substitution injects values read from generated artifacts directly into agent instructions. If those artifacts are untrusted or compromised, they can steer delegated agents through prompt injection.
Medio
Shell command substitution
"$(cat .claude/.artifacts/loop2-delivery-package.json)" \
This command substitution reads a local artifact and passes the result into a claude-flow memory command. The pattern can expose generated project data to external tooling or shared agent memory if run without review.
Medio
Template literal with command substitution
`MISSION: Compile Loop 1 planning package into executable agent+skill graph.
The example combines generated artifact values with agent instructions or shell execution flow. Even though it is presented in Markdown, the skill tells agents to use this pattern during implementation, so untrusted artifact content can influence execution.
Medio
Template literal with command substitution
```bash
The example combines generated artifact values with agent instructions or shell execution flow. Even though it is presented in Markdown, the skill tells agents to use this pattern during implementation, so untrusted artifact content can influence execution.
Medio
Template literal with command substitution
```javascript
The example combines generated artifact values with agent instructions or shell execution flow. Even though it is presented in Markdown, the skill tells agents to use this pattern during implementation, so untrusted artifact content can influence execution.
Medio
Template literal with command substitution
```bash
The example combines generated artifact values with agent instructions or shell execution flow. Even though it is presented in Markdown, the skill tells agents to use this pattern during implementation, so untrusted artifact content can influence execution.
Medio
Template literal with command substitution
```bash
The example combines generated artifact values with agent instructions or shell execution flow. Even though it is presented in Markdown, the skill tells agents to use this pattern during implementation, so untrusted artifact content can influence execution.
Medio
Unix shell invocation
#!/bin/bash
The shebang introduces an agent-facing Bash workflow that runs local commands over project artifacts. That is intentional, but it is real external command execution in a community skill.
Medio
Unix shell invocation
#!/bin/bash
The shebang introduces an agent-facing Bash workflow that runs local commands over project artifacts. That is intentional, but it is real external command execution in a community skill.
Medio
Node.js fs operations
fs.writeFileSync(
The Node snippet calls fs.writeFileSync to write the Loop 2 delivery package into the workspace. This is a real filesystem write and can overwrite generated artifact state.
Medio
Synchronous file operations
fs.writeFileSync(
The synchronous write is used to create or replace a hidden delivery artifact. It is bounded to the project artifact directory, but it is still a real local file modification.
Medio
Hidden file access
test -f .claude/.artifacts/loop1-planning-package.json && echo "✅ Loop 1 Complete" || {
This line reads from or writes to paths under .claude/.artifacts as part of the workflow. Hidden artifact access is intentional here but can expose or alter agent state if run on sensitive repositories.
Medio
Hidden file access
.claude/.artifacts/loop1-planning-package.json
This line reads from or writes to paths under .claude/.artifacts as part of the workflow. Hidden artifact access is intentional here but can expose or alter agent state if run on sensitive repositories.
Medio
Hidden file access
- Load planning package: .claude/.artifacts/loop1-planning-package.json
The skill references hidden .claude artifact state in an operational context. This is legitimate for the workflow but remains a real filesystem risk factor.
Medio
Hidden file access
- Parse: $(jq '.planning.enhanced_plan' .claude/.artifacts/loop1-planning-package.json)
This line reads from or writes to paths under .claude/.artifacts as part of the workflow. Hidden artifact access is intentional here but can expose or alter agent state if run on sensitive repositories.
Medio
Hidden file access
Create .claude/.artifacts/agent-skill-assignments.json:
This line instructs agents to create, store, parse, or load files under .claude/.artifacts. It is expected workflow behavior, but it still relies on hidden workspace state.
Medio
Hidden file access
1. Store matrix: .claude/.artifacts/agent-skill-assignments.json
This line instructs agents to create, store, parse, or load files under .claude/.artifacts. It is expected workflow behavior, but it still relies on hidden workspace state.
Medio
Hidden file access
2. Memory store: npx claude-flow@alpha memory store 'agent_assignments' "$(cat .claude/.artifacts/ag
This line reads from or writes to paths under .claude/.artifacts as part of the workflow. Hidden artifact access is intentional here but can expose or alter agent state if run on sensitive repositories.
Medio
Hidden file access
**Output**: `.claude/.artifacts/agent-skill-assignments.json` with complete agent+skill graph
This line instructs agents to create, store, parse, or load files under .claude/.artifacts. It is expected workflow behavior, but it still relies on hidden workspace state.
Medio
Hidden file access
MATRIX=".claude/.artifacts/agent-skill-assignments.json"
This line reads from or writes to paths under .claude/.artifacts as part of the workflow. Hidden artifact access is intentional here but can expose or alter agent state if run on sensitive repositories.
Medio
Hidden file access
"Wait for all 5 detection agents. Apply Byzantine consensus: require 4/5 agreement on theater detect
This line instructs agents to create, store, parse, or load files under .claude/.artifacts. It is expected workflow behavior, but it still relies on hidden workspace state.
Medio
Hidden file access
THEATER_COUNT=$(jq '.confirmed_theater_count' .claude/.artifacts/theater-consensus-report.json)
This line reads from or writes to paths under .claude/.artifacts as part of the workflow. Hidden artifact access is intentional here but can expose or alter agent state if run on sensitive repositories.
Medio
Hidden file access
npm test 2>&1 | tee .claude/.artifacts/test-results-iter-$ITERATION.txt
This line reads from or writes to paths under .claude/.artifacts as part of the workflow. Hidden artifact access is intentional here but can expose or alter agent state if run on sensitive repositories.
Medio
Hidden file access
1. Parse test output: .claude/.artifacts/test-results-iter-$ITERATION.txt
This line instructs agents to create, store, parse, or load files under .claude/.artifacts. It is expected workflow behavior, but it still relies on hidden workspace state.
Medio
Hidden file access
FIX_AGENT=$(jq -r '.responsible_agent' .claude/.artifacts/fix-strategy-iter-$ITERATION.json)
This line reads from or writes to paths under .claude/.artifacts as part of the workflow. Hidden artifact access is intentional here but can expose or alter agent state if run on sensitive repositories.
Medio
Hidden file access
FIX_INSTRUCTIONS=$(jq -r '.fix_instructions' .claude/.artifacts/fix-strategy-iter-$ITERATION.json)
This line reads from or writes to paths under .claude/.artifacts as part of the workflow. Hidden artifact access is intentional here but can expose or alter agent state if run on sensitive repositories.
Medio
Hidden file access
Analysis: $(cat .claude/.artifacts/fix-strategy-iter-$ITERATION.json)
This line reads from or writes to paths under .claude/.artifacts as part of the workflow. Hidden artifact access is intentional here but can expose or alter agent state if run on sensitive repositories.
Medio
Hidden file access
const matrix = require('.claude/.artifacts/agent-skill-assignments.json');
This line reads from or writes to paths under .claude/.artifacts as part of the workflow. Hidden artifact access is intentional here but can expose or alter agent state if run on sensitive repositories.
Medio
Hidden file access
'.claude/.artifacts/loop2-delivery-package.json',
This line instructs agents to create, store, parse, or load files under .claude/.artifacts. It is expected workflow behavior, but it still relies on hidden workspace state.
Medio
Hidden file access
"$(cat .claude/.artifacts/loop2-delivery-package.json)" \
This line reads from or writes to paths under .claude/.artifacts as part of the workflow. Hidden artifact access is intentional here but can expose or alter agent state if run on sensitive repositories.
Medio
Hidden file access
Load implementation data from: .claude/.artifacts/loop2-delivery-package.json
This line instructs agents to create, store, parse, or load files under .claude/.artifacts. It is expected workflow behavior, but it still relies on hidden workspace state.
Medio
Hidden file access
.claude/.artifacts/skill-registry.json > tmp.json && mv tmp.json .claude/.artifacts/skill-registry.j
This line reads from or writes to paths under .claude/.artifacts as part of the workflow. Hidden artifact access is intentional here but can expose or alter agent state if run on sensitive repositories.
Medio
Hidden file access
}' .claude/.artifacts/loop2-delivery-package.json
This line reads from or writes to paths under .claude/.artifacts as part of the workflow. Hidden artifact access is intentional here but can expose or alter agent state if run on sensitive repositories.
Factores de riesgo
⚙️ Comandos externos (69)
SKILL.md:35 SKILL.md:60-81 SKILL.md:81-85 SKILL.md:85-109 SKILL.md:109-117 SKILL.md:117-131 SKILL.md:131-143 SKILL.md:143-145 SKILL.md:145-151 SKILL.md:246-248 SKILL.md:248-258 SKILL.md:258-270 SKILL.md:270-273 SKILL.md:273-332 SKILL.md:332-336 SKILL.md:336-348 SKILL.md:348-437 SKILL.md:437-448 SKILL.md:448-490 SKILL.md:490-501 SKILL.md:501-557 SKILL.md:557-565 SKILL.md:565-633 SKILL.md:633-641 SKILL.md:641-645 SKILL.md:645-678 SKILL.md:678-710 SKILL.md:710-721 SKILL.md:721-728 SKILL.md:728-735 SKILL.md:735-738 SKILL.md:738-745 SKILL.md:745-750 SKILL.md:750-767 SKILL.md:767-775 SKILL.md:775-785 SKILL.md:785-786 SKILL.md:786-787 SKILL.md:787-788 SKILL.md:788-789 SKILL.md:156 SKILL.md:243 SKILL.md:356 SKILL.md:358 SKILL.md:362 SKILL.md:368 SKILL.md:369 SKILL.md:370 SKILL.md:371 SKILL.md:380 SKILL.md:381 SKILL.md:388 SKILL.md:396 SKILL.md:402 SKILL.md:403 SKILL.md:409 SKILL.md:482 SKILL.md:535 SKILL.md:536 SKILL.md:541 SKILL.md:548 SKILL.md:629 SKILL.md:151-246 SKILL.md:348-437 SKILL.md:448-490 SKILL.md:501-557 SKILL.md:565-633 SKILL.md:349 SKILL.md:502
📁 Acceso al sistema de archivos (26)
SKILL.md:620 SKILL.md:620 SKILL.md:63 SKILL.md:91 SKILL.md:119 SKILL.md:130 SKILL.md:154 SKILL.md:156 SKILL.md:191 SKILL.md:242 SKILL.md:243 SKILL.md:336 SKILL.md:353 SKILL.md:478 SKILL.md:482 SKILL.md:512 SKILL.md:525 SKILL.md:535 SKILL.md:536 SKILL.md:541 SKILL.md:587 SKILL.md:621 SKILL.md:629 SKILL.md:643 SKILL.md:724 SKILL.md:774
Auditado por: codex Ver historial de auditorías →
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<iframe src="https://skillstore.io/embed/skills/dnyoussef-parallel-swarm-implementation.html" title="Skillstore Security Assessment" sandbox="allow-popups allow-popups-to-escape-sandbox" loading="lazy" referrerpolicy="no-referrer" width="420" height="180"></iframe>Citas académicas (APA · BibTeX · CFF)
Cita APA
DNYoussef. (2026). parallel-swarm-implementation security audit report (audit version 8) [Author version unspecified]. Skillstore. https://skillstore.io/skills/dnyoussef-parallel-swarm-implementation/audits/8Cita BibTeX
@techreport{dnyoussef-dnyoussef-parallel-swarm-implementation-2026,
author = {DNYoussef},
title = {parallel-swarm-implementation security audit report (audit version 8)},
institution = {Skillstore},
year = {2026},
number = {8},
url = {https://skillstore.io/skills/dnyoussef-parallel-swarm-implementation/audits/8},
note = {Author version unspecified}
}CITATION.cff
cff-version: 1.2.0
message: "If you use this Skill, cite its author and this versioned security audit report."
title: "parallel-swarm-implementation security audit report (audit version 8)"
version: "unspecified"
type: report
authors:
- name: "DNYoussef"
date-released: "2026-07-05"
url: "https://skillstore.io/skills/dnyoussef-parallel-swarm-implementation/audits/8"
identifiers:
- type: other
value: "skillstore:dnyoussef-parallel-swarm-implementation:audit:8"
description: "Skillstore immutable audit report identifier"
Puntuación de Skillstore
Por qué esta puntuación Confianza de la evidencia: Medio 55
Arquitectura
85
Mantenibilidad
87
Contenido
71
Comunidad
74
Cumplimiento de la especificación
Lo que puedes crear
Desarrollo de funcionalidades basado en plan
Usa un paquete de planificación validado para asignar trabajo de implementación, pruebas, documentación y validación entre agentes especializados.
Control de calidad centrado en la realidad
Ejecuta detección de simulación, validación en sandbox y comprobaciones de integración antes de marcar como completa una implementación compleja con agentes.
Preparación de entrega para Loop 3
Crea un paquete de entrega que registre las elecciones de agentes, las métricas de implementación y los datos de handoff para la recuperación de CI/CD.
Prueba estos prompts
Iniciar implementación de Loop 2
Usa parallel-swarm-implementation con mi paquete de planificación de Loop 1. Crea la matriz de asignación de agentes y skills, luego muestra los grupos de ejecución propuestos antes de ejecutar el trabajo.
Crear solo la matriz de asignación
Analiza el paquete de Loop 1 y crea solo la matriz de agentes y skills. Incluye propietarios de tareas, dependencias, elecciones de skills y puntos de control de validación.
Ejecutar con validación primero
Ejecuta el flujo de trabajo de implementación con detección estricta de simulación, validación en sandbox y reparación iterativa de pruebas. Pausa antes de cualquier operación destructiva de archivos.
Personalizar despliegue de enjambre grande
Usa la skill para diseñar un plan de ejecución paralela para una funcionalidad grande. Limita los agentes paralelos a la capacidad del proyecto, identifica tareas de ruta crítica y define criterios de handoff de Loop 3.
Mejores prácticas
- Revisa la matriz de asignación generada antes de permitir que los agentes editen archivos.
- Ejecuta el flujo de trabajo en un workspace en sandbox con puntos de control de control de versiones.
- Valida todas las entradas de artefactos antes de inyectarlas en prompts o comandos de shell.
Evitar
- No uses el flujo de trabajo para ediciones triviales de un solo archivo que no necesiten coordinación multiagente.
- No ejecutes snippets de shell generados contra artefactos no confiables sin revisión.
- No trates las tasas de aprobación declaradas o las puntuaciones de simulación como prueba sin inspeccionar la evidencia de las pruebas.
Preguntas frecuentes
¿Qué hace esta skill?
Define un flujo de trabajo de implementación de Loop 2 que asigna el trabajo planificado a agentes, ejecuta validación y prepara un paquete de entrega.
¿Crea código de producción por sí misma?
No. Guía la coordinación de agentes e incluye comandos de ejemplo, pero los cambios de código reales dependen de los agentes seleccionados y del contexto del proyecto.
¿Qué entrada espera?
Espera un paquete de planificación de Loop 1 y artefactos relacionados bajo el directorio de artefactos .claude.
¿Qué herramientas asume?
Asume herramientas como jq, npm, node, claude-flow y un runtime de agentes que admita delegación de estilo Task.
¿Qué deben revisar los usuarios antes de ejecutarla?
Los usuarios deben revisar comandos de shell, rutas de artefactos, instrucciones generadas y cualquier uso de paquetes externos antes de la ejecución.
¿Es adecuada para repositorios sensibles?
Úsala con cautela. El flujo de trabajo lee y escribe artefactos ocultos y puede pasar contenido de artefactos a prompts de agentes y herramientas externas.
Detalles del desarrollador
Autor
DNYoussefLicencia
MIT
Revisión de Skillstore
r1
Aviso de versión
El autor no declaró una versión.
Repositorio
https://github.com/DNYoussef/ai-chrome-extension/tree/main/.claude/skills/parallel-swarm-implementationRef.
c579efd02184f1128d6741d16e6c8d951d7d4208
Actualidad del mantenimiento
20/7/2026
Uso
5 descargas · 276 vistas
Estructura de archivos