Skills agent-tools

📦

agent-tools

Name: agent-tools
Author: qu-skills

Content revision r1 Critical 🌐 Network access🔑 Env variables📁 Filesystem access⚙️ External commands

使用 belt 執行雲端 AI 應用程式

AI 應用程式工作流程通常需要許多獨立的供應商工具。此技能會引導 Codex、Claude 和 Claude Code 透過 belt 命令進行探索、執行與任務追蹤。

Supports: Claude Codex Code(CC)

⚠️ 38 Poor

Maintain this Skill? Claim it ⚠️ 38 Poor

Do not auto-install this skill.

The canonical policy requires operator review before any installation action.

Install with my Agent

Copy this request to your Agent. It includes the canonical Skill page and manifest.

Agent request

Review the Skillstore skill "agent-tools" from https://skillstore.io/skills/qu-skills-agent-tools.md and its manifest at https://skillstore.io/api/skills/qu-skills-agent-tools/manifest. Verify the artifact. Do not auto-install. Inspect the skill and report your findings, then wait for an operator or manual installation decision.

Your Agent should still show its plan and request any confirmation required by the security policy.

Agent-readable resources

Use these links when an AI agent, crawler, or script needs clean context instead of reading the full page.

Markdown detail GET /skills/qu-skills-agent-tools.md Signed manifest GET /api/skills/qu-skills-agent-tools/manifest Signed lockfile GET /api/skills/qu-skills-agent-tools/lockfile

Test it

Using "agent-tools". 尋找用於生成產品圖片的雲端應用程式。

Expected outcome:

此技能會傳回候選圖片應用程式、摘要各自的結構描述，並推薦最安全、適合執行所請求資產的應用程式。

Using "agent-tools". 執行長時間影片生成作業，並稍後檢查。

Expected outcome:

此技能會提交任務、記錄任務識別碼，並稍後回報任務狀態與可用的輸出連結。

Using "agent-tools". 使用本機圖片作為升級解析度工作流程的輸入。

Expected outcome:

此技能會警告該檔案將上傳至雲端應用程式、要求確認，然後使用所選檔案路徑。

Security Audit

Critical

v4 • 7/5/2026 Open versioned report

The audit confirms critical installer risk from multiple curl-to-shell examples and high-risk handling of local file paths that can be uploaded to cloud apps. Most API-key and documentation-link matches are false positives, but the skill still performs external CLI operations, remote app execution, and account automation. No prompt injection attempt was found in the reviewed files.

Files scanned

599

Lines analyzed

Review items

False positives ignored

Confirmed security concerns (6)

Critical

references/authentication.md:6

Pipe to shell pattern

curl -fsSL https://cli.inference.sh | sh

The command pipes a remote script directly into sh. If the remote endpoint or transport path is compromised, arbitrary shell code can execute.

Critical

references/authentication.md:44

Pipe to shell pattern

curl -fsSL https://cli.inference.sh | sh

The reinstall instructions repeat curl piped directly to sh. This preserves the same remote code execution and supply-chain risk.

Critical

references/cli-reference.md:6

Pipe to shell pattern

curl -fsSL https://cli.inference.sh | sh

The CLI installation command executes a remote script through sh. This is a classic high-impact supply-chain pattern.

Critical

SKILL.md:18

Pipe to shell pattern

curl -fsSL https://cli.inference.sh | sh

The skill prominently instructs users to pipe a remote installer directly into sh. This is a direct remote-code-execution supply-chain hazard.

High

SKILL.md:58-73 references/running-apps.md:21-42

Implicit Local File Upload to Cloud Apps

The skill explains that local file paths are automatically uploaded to cloud apps, including photos, audio, and media paths. An agent could disclose user files if it supplies paths without explicit approval.

Both cited sections explicitly describe automatic local file uploads and show local media paths. This is a clear data-disclosure risk when used by an autonomous agent.

High

SKILL.md:51-52 SKILL.md:98 SKILL.md:119-120

External Account Action Automation

The skill includes Twitter/X workflows for posting, media creation, direct messages, follows, likes, and retweets. Those actions can mutate external accounts and public content if run without explicit user consent.

The referenced lines show concrete posting examples and list account actions. The risk depends on available credentials, but the capability is explicit.

Capability review items (19)

These are real local capabilities that may be expected for this skill, so they require review but are not counted as confirmed malicious behavior.

High

references/running-apps.md:41

Path traversal sequence

- Relative paths: `./image.png`, `../data/video.mp4`

The running-apps guide says local paths are automatically uploaded, then permits ../ parent-directory paths. That can expose files outside the working directory if an agent uses it carelessly.

High

SKILL.md:62-74

Ruby/shell backtick execution

```bash

The block shows belt commands that pass local image, audio, and media paths to cloud apps. Those commands can upload user files outside the model context.

High

SKILL.md:28

Shell command substitution

> curl -LO $(curl -fsSL https://dist.inference.sh/cli/manifest.json | grep -o '"url":"[^"]*"' | grep

The command substitution fetches a remote manifest and uses local system details to choose a download URL. This is a supply-chain sensitive pattern before installing a binary.

High

SKILL.md:25-34

Template literal with command substitution

> ```bash

The manual install block includes command substitution that resolves a binary URL from remote manifest data. That creates risk if the manifest or parsing output is compromised.

High

SKILL.md:33

Hidden file in home directory

> mv inferencesh-cli-* ~/.local/bin/inferencesh

The install instructions move a downloaded executable into ~/.local/bin. That creates persistent executable state in the user home path and needs strong verification.

Medium

SKILL.md:7

Ruby/shell backtick execution

> **Install the belt CLI skill:** `npx skills add belt-sh/cli`

The line recommends running npx to install another CLI skill. That is a real external install path with supply-chain risk, even though the backtick subtype is imprecise.

Medium

SKILL.md:17-20

Ruby/shell backtick execution

```bash

The fenced block contains install and login shell commands, including the remote installer captured separately. It is intended command execution guidance for the agent workflow.

Medium

SKILL.md:25-34

Ruby/shell backtick execution

> ```bash

The manual install block downloads binaries, verifies checksums, extracts an archive, and moves an executable into PATH. These commands are legitimate but security-sensitive.

Medium

SKILL.md:38-56

Ruby/shell backtick execution

```bash

The quick examples run cloud AI apps through the belt CLI, including web search and Twitter posting. That creates real network and account-side effects.

Medium

SKILL.md:85-86

Ruby/shell backtick execution

| Run app | `belt app run google/veo-3-1-fast --input input.json` |

The command submits an app run through the belt CLI with an input file. It can send user-provided data to a cloud app.

Medium

SKILL.md:86-87

Ruby/shell backtick execution

| Run without waiting | `belt app run <app> --input input.json --no-wait` |

The no-wait run command submits cloud work asynchronously. It can create remote tasks that continue after the immediate agent turn.

Medium

SKILL.md:103-129

Ruby/shell backtick execution

```bash

The related-skills block contains multiple npx skills add commands. Installing remote skills expands the trusted code and instruction surface.

Medium

SKILL.md:33

Hidden file access

> mv inferencesh-cli-* ~/.local/bin/inferencesh

The command writes into a hidden home-directory path as part of installing a binary. This is common, but it is still a security-sensitive filesystem change.

Low

references/authentication.md:6

Hardcoded URL

curl -fsSL https://cli.inference.sh | sh

Line 6 fetches a remote installer from cli.inference.sh as part of a shell install path. The network access is intentional, but it retrieves executable installation content.

Low

references/authentication.md:44

Hardcoded URL

curl -fsSL https://cli.inference.sh | sh

Line 44 repeats the remote installer URL for reinstallation. This is a real network dependency tied to executable installation content.

Low

references/cli-reference.md:6

Hardcoded URL

curl -fsSL https://cli.inference.sh | sh

The installation command downloads from a hardcoded remote installer URL. The URL is expected, but it is part of an executable install flow.

Low

SKILL.md:18

Hardcoded URL

curl -fsSL https://cli.inference.sh | sh

The URL is used to fetch the installer that is then piped to sh. The network dependency is part of the critical installer path.

Low

SKILL.md:27

Hardcoded URL

> curl -LO https://dist.inference.sh/cli/checksums.txt

The command downloads a checksum file from a remote distribution host. That is expected for install verification but remains a security-sensitive network dependency.

Low

SKILL.md:28

Hardcoded URL

> curl -LO $(curl -fsSL https://dist.inference.sh/cli/manifest.json | grep -o '"url":"[^"]*"' | grep

The command fetches a remote manifest and derives a binary URL from it. The hardcoded host is part of a dynamic binary download flow.

Risk Factors

🌐 Network access (17)

references/authentication.md:6 references/authentication.md:44 references/cli-reference.md:6 references/running-apps.md:152 SKILL.md:9 SKILL.md:13 SKILL.md:18 SKILL.md:22 SKILL.md:27 SKILL.md:28 SKILL.md:140 SKILL.md:141 SKILL.md:142 SKILL.md:143 SKILL.md:144 SKILL.md:145 SKILL.md:146

🔑 Env variables (3)

references/authentication.md:30 references/authentication.md:53 references/cli-reference.md:79

📁 Filesystem access (5)

references/cli-reference.md:91 references/cli-reference.md:91 references/running-apps.md:41 SKILL.md:33 SKILL.md:33

⚙️ External commands (21)

Detected Patterns

Pipe to shell pattern×4

Audited by: codex View Audit History →

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Academic citations (APA · BibTeX · CFF)

APA citation

qu-skills. (2026). agent-tools security audit report (audit version 4) [Author version unspecified]. Skillstore. https://skillstore.io/skills/qu-skills-agent-tools/audits/4

BibTeX citation

@techreport{qu-skills-qu-skills-agent-tools-2026,
  author = {qu-skills},
  title = {agent-tools security audit report (audit version 4)},
  institution = {Skillstore},
  year = {2026},
  number = {4},
  url = {https://skillstore.io/skills/qu-skills-agent-tools/audits/4},
  note = {Author version unspecified}
}

CITATION.cff

cff-version: 1.2.0
message: "If you use this Skill, cite its author and this versioned security audit report."
title: "agent-tools security audit report (audit version 4)"
version: "unspecified"
type: report
authors:
  - name: "qu-skills"
date-released: "2026-07-05"
url: "https://skillstore.io/skills/qu-skills-agent-tools/audits/4"
identifiers:
  - type: other
    value: "skillstore:qu-skills-agent-tools:audit:4"
    description: "Skillstore immutable audit report identifier"

Compare variants

20 installable variants

Each author remains a separate installable skill. The recommended variant is ranked by Skillstore evidence.

Why this variant is first

Higher Skillstore usage

Author / source Skillstore Score Evidence Confidence Skillstore usage Updated

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inferen-sh

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tool-belt

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inference-sh-7

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Evidence Confidence Medium

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inference-skills

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Evidence Confidence Medium

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inference-sh-9

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Evidence Confidence Medium

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inference-sh-3

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Skillstore Score 38

Evidence Confidence Medium

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qu-skills Current

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Evidence Confidence Medium

Skillstore usage 46

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infsh-skills

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Skillstore Score 38

Evidence Confidence Medium

Skillstore usage 46

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inf-sh

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inference-sh-skills

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Evidence Confidence Medium

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inference-shell

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Skillstore Score 38

Evidence Confidence Medium

Skillstore usage 46

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Evidence Confidence Medium

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Evidence Confidence Medium

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inference-sh-0

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Skillstore Score 38

Evidence Confidence Medium

Skillstore usage 43

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inference-sh-8

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Skillstore Score 38

Evidence Confidence Medium

Skillstore usage 42

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halt-catch-fire

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Evidence Confidence Medium

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skillssh

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Skillstore Score

Why this score Evidence Confidence: Medium

Architecture

Maintainability

Content

Community

Spec Compliance

What You Can Build

建立媒體工作流程原型

透過單一 CLI 流程尋找並執行用於圖片、影片、音訊和 3D 資產的雲端應用程式。

比較模型供應商

檢查公開應用程式結構描述，並透過供應商專屬應用程式執行 LLM、搜尋或生成任務。

追蹤長時間任務

提交較長的雲端作業，保留任務識別碼，並在完成後擷取生成的輸出。

Try These Prompts

尋找應用程式

使用 agent-tools 尋找用於圖片生成的 inference.sh 應用程式。顯示最佳選項，並說明各自適合的使用時機。

準備執行

使用 agent-tools 檢查影片生成應用程式的輸入需求，並在執行前準備安全的執行計畫。

執行並追蹤任務

使用 agent-tools 執行長時間影片任務而不等待，儲存任務識別碼，並稍後檢查結果。

建立多步驟工作流程

使用 agent-tools 設計一個工作流程，用於搜尋來源素材、生成媒體，並以明確核准追蹤每個雲端任務。

Best Practices

在安裝 CLI 或執行遠端應用程式命令前，先要求明確核准。
上傳前確認每個本機檔案路徑，尤其是父目錄或主目錄路徑。
使用任務識別碼和應用程式結構描述，讓雲端執行可重現。

Avoid

未驗證來源與 checksum 前，不要執行 pipe-to-shell 安裝程式。
未取得使用者確認前，不要上傳本機媒體、音訊或文件。
未取得明確同意前，不要透過 X/Twitter 發布、追蹤、按讚、轉發或傳送訊息。

Frequently Asked Questions

此技能可以協助什麼？

它可協助代理程式使用 belt CLI 探索、執行並追蹤 inference.sh 雲端 AI 應用程式。

它需要外部帳戶嗎？

是。大多數工作流程需要 belt CLI、inference.sh 登入，以及可用的帳戶額度或權限。

它可以上傳本機檔案嗎？

可以。參考的 CLI 可在應用程式輸入接受檔案時自動上傳本機路徑。

它可以自動化 Twitter 或 X 動作嗎？

可以。此技能記錄了用於發布、媒體上傳、追蹤、按讚、轉發和訊息的應用程式範例。

安裝預設就是完全安全的嗎？

否。記錄中的 pipe-to-shell 安裝程式應改為經驗證的下載步驟，並取得使用者核准。

哪些代理工具可以使用它？

報告列出支援 Claude、Codex 和 Claude Code。

Developer Details

Author

qu-skills

License

MIT

Skillstore revision

Version notice

The author did not declare a version.

Repository

https://github.com/qu-skills/skills/tree/main/tools/agent-tools/

Ref

62e2a730c5cd74eab4c7164309d810de660fcea3

Maintenance freshness

7/18/2026

Usage

5 downloads · 0 views

File structure

📁 references/

📄 app-discovery.md

📄 authentication.md

📄 cli-reference.md

📄 running-apps.md

📄 SKILL.md