Skills seedance-v2 Audit History v4 This report is not translated for the requested language. The canonical English report is shown instead.
Versioned security assessment
Report ID: SA-A5D64B3E
7/5/2026, 1:52:08 PM
seedance-v2 security assessment v4 Skill Security Certification Report
Audit History Audit model: codex Historical report
Skill name seedance-v2
Version v4
Maintainer doany-ai
Coverage 1 Files scanned · 182 Lines analyzed
Policy version Unavailable Confirmed finding summary
No confirmed security findings The completed audit recorded no confirmed security findings. This is not proof that the Skill has no side effects.
Installation context
Historical evidence This report may not describe the currently installable artifact. Open the current Skill page for install guidance.
Open current Skill page This report does not block or authorize the manifest or ZIP.
Most static findings are false positives caused by Markdown backticks, placeholder URLs, and documented schema examples. Confirmed issues are the intended RunComfy CLI execution and outbound requests to RunComfy model endpoints. No prompt injection, malware intent, or unauthorized filesystem access was found in SKILL.md.
Report position
Historical report
Open audit history before using this report to install.
Audit attestation
Not attestable
The required immutable binding is incomplete.
Human verification
Not verified
No human verification is recorded for this report.
Coverage
1 Files scanned · 182 Lines analyzed
13 items shown for review
Limitations
This report does not claim runtime or sandbox execution and does not prove the absence of side effects.
01 Evidence chain Follow the evidence from source binding to the install contract. Available evidence supports verification; it is not a safety guarantee.
Source
Binding unavailable
Artifact
Identity incomplete
02 Capabilities observed Observed means this report recorded supporting evidence. Not recorded does not prove that a capability is absent.
May execute code included with the Skill.
Not recorded by this audit
May connect to external services.
Observed in 8 evidence locations
May read or write local files.
Observed in 5 evidence locations
May read values from the process environment.
Not recorded by this audit
External commands May invoke commands or programs outside the Skill.
Observed in 37 evidence locations
Medium Ruby/shell backtick execution
Calls `runcomfy run bytedance/seedance-v2/pro` through the local
The description states that the skill calls the local RunComfy CLI. This is intentional external command execution against a third-party tool.
Medium Ruby/shell backtick execution
```bash
The fenced block contains an npx install command for a skill package with global scope. That is real external command execution and supply-chain exposure.
Medium Ruby/shell backtick execution
| Audio-driven lip-sync from your own track | Wan 2.7 (`audio_url`) |
This span reaches the prerequisite that installs the RunComfy CLI globally. The risk is legitimate but contextual because it is setup documentation.
Medium Ruby/shell backtick execution
1. **RunComfy CLI** — `npm i -g @runcomfy/cli`
The line instructs users to run npm install globally for @runcomfy/cli. Global package installation is real external command execution.
Medium Ruby/shell backtick execution
2. **RunComfy account** — `runcomfy login` opens a browser device-code flow.
The line instructs users to run runcomfy login, which invokes an external CLI and browser authentication flow. This is intended but security relevant.
Medium Ruby/shell backtick execution
3. **CI / containers** — set `RUNCOMFY_TOKEN=<token>` instead of `runcomfy login`.
The line references runcomfy login and token-based CI setup. It is a real command workflow involving credentials, although it is documented plainly.
Medium Ruby/shell backtick execution
```bash
The fenced example runs runcomfy with user prompt input and a local output directory. This is a concrete external CLI invocation.
Medium Ruby/shell backtick execution
```bash
The lip-sync example invokes runcomfy with JSON input and user reference media. This is real external command execution against a remote service.
Medium Ruby/shell backtick execution
```bash
The multimodal example invokes runcomfy with prompt, image, video, and audio references. This is real third-party CLI execution.
Medium Ruby/shell backtick execution
```
The surrounding text describes the CLI submitting, polling, fetching, and downloading outputs. It is command side-effect documentation, not shell injection.
Medium Ruby/shell backtick execution
The skill invokes `runcomfy run bytedance/seedance-v2/pro` with a JSON body matching the schema. The
The line describes invoking runcomfy run with a JSON body and downloading generated URLs. This confirms intended external command execution.
Medium Ruby/shell backtick execution
- **Token storage**: `runcomfy login` writes the API token to `~/.config/runcomfy/token.json` with m
The line references runcomfy login and API token handling. It is a real command workflow with credential implications, though not evidence of abuse.
Low Hardcoded URL
The skill invokes `runcomfy run bytedance/seedance-v2/pro` with a JSON body matching the schema. The
The line states that the CLI posts to model-api.runcomfy.net and downloads from RunComfy domains. This is intentional third-party network access.
03 Risk findings Confirmed security concerns are separated from items that still need review.
No confirmed security findings were recorded for this completed audit. 04 Remediation Suggested fixes recorded by this audit. Applying them is the maintainer’s responsibility.
FIX-001 Medium The skill depends on external RunComfy CLI execution.
Ask for user confirmation before installing or running the CLI, and show the exact command first.
FIX-002 Medium The setup flow recommends global package installation.
Prefer a pinned CLI version or document how to verify the package before global installation.
FIX-003 Low Prompts and media references are sent to a third-party model API.
Warn users not to submit confidential prompts, private media URLs, or regulated data unless approved.
05 Expert evidence Immutable subject identity, scanner metadata, dismissed matches, and source-level evidence.
Artifact subject
Marketplace commit Unavailable
Content hash Unavailable
Tree hash Unavailable
Skill path Unavailable
Audit payload hash Unavailable Analysis metadata
Audit model: codex
Analysis state: Complete
Scope is limited to the recorded files, lines, methods, and evidence. No runtime or sandbox execution is claimed.
05
Verify and export The manifest and lockfile bind install artifacts to cryptographic hashes. This integrity claim is separate from the security assessment.
Audit attestation: not_attestable