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Versioned security assessment

Report ID: SA-996A88DA

7/9/2026, 5:02:35 PM

pptx security assessment v13

Skill Security Certification Report

Audit History
Audit model: codex Historical report
Skill name
pptx
Version
v13
Maintainer
davila7
Source
github.com/davila7/claude-code-templates/tree/main/cli-tool/components/skills/scientific/document-skills/pptx
Coverage
56 Files scanned · 26,538 Lines analyzed
Policy version
Unavailable

Confirmed finding summary

No confirmed security findings

The completed audit recorded no confirmed security findings. This is not proof that the Skill has no side effects.

Installation context

Historical evidence

This report may not describe the currently installable artifact. Open the current Skill page for install guidance.

Open current Skill page

This report does not block or authorize the manifest or ZIP.

The audit confirms unsafe archive extraction with zipfile.extractall on Office archives and privilege-escalating sudo install guidance. Most other static hits are false positives from OOXML namespace URLs, Markdown backticks, XML examples, JavaScript template literals, and local validation code. Static review was capped at 400/508 representative findings; omitted static matches are unconfirmed, so automatic publishing stays disabled until manual review.

Report position

Historical report

Open audit history before using this report to install.

Audit attestation

Not attestable

The required immutable binding is incomplete.

Human verification

Not verified

No human verification is recorded for this report.

Coverage

56 Files scanned · 26,538 Lines analyzed

14 items shown for review

Limitations

This report does not claim runtime or sandbox execution and does not prove the absence of side effects.

Evidence chain

Follow the evidence from source binding to the install contract. Available evidence supports verification; it is not a safety guarantee.

  1. Source

    Binding unavailable

  2. Artifact

    Identity incomplete

  3. Audit

    Complete

  4. Install contract

    Open manifest to verify

    Open manifest

Capabilities observed

Observed means this report recorded supporting evidence. Not recorded does not prove that a capability is absent.

Contains scripts

May execute code included with the Skill.

Not recorded by this audit

Network access

May connect to external services.

Observed in 50 evidence locations

Filesystem access

May read or write local files.

Observed in 48 evidence locations

Env variables

May read values from the process environment.

Observed in 2 evidence locations

External commands

May invoke commands or programs outside the Skill.

Observed in 52 evidence locations

Capability review items (14)
High
ooxml/scripts/unpack.py:17
Archive extract all (zip slip risk)
zipfile.ZipFile(input_file).extractall(output_path)
zipfile.extractall is used on Office archives without validating member paths. A crafted archive could escape the target directory with zip-slip paths.
High
ooxml/scripts/validation/base.py:891
Archive extract all (zip slip risk)
zip_ref.extractall(temp_path)
zipfile.extractall is used on Office archives without validating member paths. A crafted archive could escape the target directory with zip-slip paths.
High
ooxml/scripts/validation/docx.py:201
Archive extract all (zip slip risk)
zip_ref.extractall(temp_dir)
zipfile.extractall is used on Office archives without validating member paths. A crafted archive could escape the target directory with zip-slip paths.
High
ooxml/scripts/validation/redlining.py:70
Archive extract all (zip slip risk)
zip_ref.extractall(temp_path)
zipfile.extractall is used on Office archives without validating member paths. A crafted archive could escape the target directory with zip-slip paths.
High
SKILL.md:516
sudo privilege escalation
- **LibreOffice**: `sudo apt-get install libreoffice` (for PDF conversion)
The skill documentation recommends sudo apt-get installs. If followed by an autonomous agent, this can modify host packages with elevated privileges.
High
SKILL.md:517
sudo privilege escalation
- **Poppler**: `sudo apt-get install poppler-utils` (for pdftoppm to convert PDF to images)
The skill documentation recommends sudo apt-get installs. If followed by an autonomous agent, this can modify host packages with elevated privileges.
Medium
ooxml/scripts/unpack.py:7
Python archive libraries
import zipfile
This zipfile usage is part of the same archive extraction workflow that uses extractall without path validation. It should stay linked to the zip-slip risk.
Medium
ooxml/scripts/unpack.py:17
Python archive libraries
zipfile.ZipFile(input_file).extractall(output_path)
This zipfile usage is part of the same archive extraction workflow that uses extractall without path validation. It should stay linked to the zip-slip risk.
Medium
ooxml/scripts/validation/base.py:879
Python archive libraries
import zipfile
This zipfile usage is part of the same archive extraction workflow that uses extractall without path validation. It should stay linked to the zip-slip risk.
Medium
ooxml/scripts/validation/base.py:890
Python archive libraries
with zipfile.ZipFile(self.original_file, "r") as zip_ref:
This zipfile usage is part of the same archive extraction workflow that uses extractall without path validation. It should stay linked to the zip-slip risk.
Medium
ooxml/scripts/validation/docx.py:7
Python archive libraries
import zipfile
This zipfile usage is part of the same archive extraction workflow that uses extractall without path validation. It should stay linked to the zip-slip risk.
Medium
ooxml/scripts/validation/docx.py:200
Python archive libraries
with zipfile.ZipFile(self.original_file, "r") as zip_ref:
This zipfile usage is part of the same archive extraction workflow that uses extractall without path validation. It should stay linked to the zip-slip risk.
Medium
ooxml/scripts/validation/redlining.py:7
Python archive libraries
import zipfile
This zipfile usage is part of the same archive extraction workflow that uses extractall without path validation. It should stay linked to the zip-slip risk.
Medium
ooxml/scripts/validation/redlining.py:69
Python archive libraries
with zipfile.ZipFile(self.original_docx, "r") as zip_ref:
This zipfile usage is part of the same archive extraction workflow that uses extractall without path validation. It should stay linked to the zip-slip risk.

Risk findings

Confirmed security concerns are separated from items that still need review.

No confirmed security findings were recorded for this completed audit.

Remediation

Suggested fixes recorded by this audit. Applying them is the maintainer’s responsibility.

  1. FIX-001
    High
    Unsafe ZIP extraction of Office documents
    Replace every extractall call with safe member extraction that rejects absolute paths, drive prefixes, symlinks, and paths escaping the destination directory.
  2. FIX-002
    High
    Privilege-escalating dependency installation guidance
    Remove sudo apt-get commands from skill instructions and require users to install system packages manually outside autonomous agent execution.
  3. FIX-003
    Medium
    Static review capped
    Manually review the omitted 108 static analyzer matches or reduce bundled generated/vendor/reference content before enabling automatic publication.
  4. FIX-004
    Medium
    External document converters run on local presentation files
    Document sandbox expectations for LibreOffice, Poppler, and other converters when handling untrusted PPTX input.

Expert evidence

Immutable subject identity, scanner metadata, dismissed matches, and source-level evidence.

Artifact subject

Marketplace commit
Unavailable
Content hash
Unavailable
Tree hash
Unavailable
Skill path
Unavailable
Audit payload hash
Unavailable

Analysis metadata

Audit model: codex

Analysis state: Complete

Scope is limited to the recorded files, lines, methods, and evidence. No runtime or sandbox execution is claimed.

Verify and export

JSON report CITATION.cff SARIF 2.1.0 Signed installation manifest

The manifest and lockfile bind install artifacts to cryptographic hashes. This integrity claim is separate from the security assessment.

Audit attestation: not_attestable