Versioned security assessment

Report ID: SA-20D15AEC

7/15/2026, 3:52:13 PM

test-engineer security assessment v1

Skill Security Certification Report

Audit History
Scanner version 3.0.0 Audit model: codex Historical report
Skill name
test-engineer
Version
v1
Maintainer
zl2023github
Source
github.com/zl2023github/software-engineer-skills/tree/main/software-engineering/test-engineer
Coverage
1 Files scanned · 216 Lines analyzed
Policy version
skillstore-security-audit-policy-v1

Highest confirmed finding severity

High

1 confirmed security finding requires attention.

Installation context

Historical evidence

This report may not describe the currently installable artifact. Open the current Skill page for install guidance.

Open current Skill page

This report does not block or authorize the manifest or ZIP.

Eight static findings are confirmed because their cited ranges direct the agent to install dependencies or execute test, load, Python, and container commands. Eleven findings are false positives caused by Markdown backticks, code fences, tool names, or UTF-8 Chinese documentation rather than executable or obfuscated content. Active API and load testing also lacks explicit authorization and environment safeguards.

Report position

Historical report

Open audit history before using this report to install.

Audit attestation

Attestation superseded

A newer attestation exists.

Human verification

Not verified

No human verification is recorded for this report.

Coverage

1 Files scanned · 216 Lines analyzed

9 items shown for review

Limitations

This report does not claim runtime or sandbox execution and does not prove the absence of side effects.

Evidence chain

Follow the evidence from source binding to the install contract. Available evidence supports verification; it is not a safety guarantee.

  1. Source

    Commit and path bound

  2. Artifact

    Content and tree hashes bound

  3. Audit

    Complete

  4. Install contract

    Open manifest to verify

    Open manifest

Capabilities observed

Observed means this report recorded supporting evidence. Not recorded does not prove that a capability is absent.

Contains scripts

May execute code included with the Skill.

Not recorded by this audit

Network access

May connect to external services.

Not recorded by this audit

Filesystem access

May read or write local files.

Not recorded by this audit

Env variables

May read values from the process environment.

Not recorded by this audit

External commands

May invoke commands or programs outside the Skill.

Observed in 18 evidence locations

Capability review items (8)
Medium
SKILL.md:127-135
Ruby/shell backtick execution
```
The cited example directs the agent to run pip install and pytest. Installing project requirements and executing tests can run untrusted package or repository code without an approval boundary.
Medium
SKILL.md:148-155
Ruby/shell backtick execution
```
The example explicitly directs the agent to run a k6 load test. External load generation can affect a target service when authorization and limits are not required.
Medium
SKILL.md:164-172
Ruby/shell backtick execution
```
The cited range ends with an instruction to run pip installation and pytest commands. These commands can execute downloaded or repository-controlled code.
Medium
SKILL.md:172
Ruby/shell backtick execution
| Web UI自动化 | Playwright | `pip install playwright && playwright install` → 生成脚本 → `pytest` 运行 |
Line 172 explicitly chains pip install, Playwright installation, and pytest execution. Dependency installation and test execution modify the environment and can execute untrusted code.
Medium
SKILL.md:173-174
Ruby/shell backtick execution
| API测试 | Python requests / curl | 生成脚本 → `python test_api.py` 执行 |
The range instructs the agent to execute a generated Python API test and includes load-test commands. Generated scripts and supplied targets are not constrained by approval or isolation.
Medium
SKILL.md:174
Ruby/shell backtick execution
| 性能测试 | k6 / wrk / hey | `k6 run script.js` 或 `wrk -t4 -c100 -d30s URL` |
Line 174 provides direct k6 and wrk command invocations against a URL. These commands generate substantial traffic and can disrupt an unintended target.
Medium
SKILL.md:175-179
Ruby/shell backtick execution
| 单元测试 | pytest / JUnit / Jest | `pytest -v --tb=short --junitxml=report.xml` |
The cited range includes direct pytest execution and a Docker Compose command. Both execute project-controlled configuration or code and can change the local environment.
Medium
SKILL.md:179-185
Ruby/shell backtick execution
| 容器化 | Docker Compose | `docker compose up -d` 启动测试环境 |
Line 179 directs the agent to start services with Docker Compose. Repository-controlled compose files can run images, expose ports, mount files, and alter the host environment.

Risk findings

Confirmed security concerns are separated from items that still need review.

Confirmed security concerns (1)

RISK-001 High
SKILL.md:69-86SKILL.md:147-154
Missing Authorization Safeguards for Active Testing
The skill requires real API calls and load tests but does not require target ownership, explicit authorization, non-production confirmation, traffic limits, or stop conditions.
The cited workflows explicitly require actual API and performance test execution. The document contains no authorization or production-safety gate for those actions.

Remediation

Suggested fixes recorded by this audit. Applying them is the maintainer’s responsibility.

  1. FIX-001
    High
    Active API and load testing instructions do not require proof of authorization, a non-production target, or resource limits.
    Require target authorization, environment confirmation, rate and duration limits, monitoring, and an immediate stop condition before sending traffic.
  2. FIX-002
    Medium
    The skill directs agents to install dependencies and execute project or container commands without a required approval or isolation step.
    Require command preview and explicit user approval, inspect dependency files, use an isolated environment, and restrict commands to the agreed test scope.

Expert evidence

Immutable subject identity, scanner metadata, dismissed matches, and source-level evidence.

Artifact subject

Marketplace commit
20d15aec19fbd00408b0c18c6101a0baa88f4527
Content hash
26b6c482c2c2e3f9e1f493fd0b47a78eef55125f9a04e7337430fcfe0da07655
Tree hash
656a088bccc6268601e5c5010f425dfbba3be27de1cc417cbaec719365c3b651
Skill path
skills/zl2023github/test-engineer
Audit payload hash
5b2efabec3ac78b3b2bba33915233e2e

Analysis metadata

Audit model: codex

Analysis state: Complete

Scope is limited to the recorded files, lines, methods, and evidence. No runtime or sandbox execution is claimed.

Verify and export

JSON report Signed attestation CITATION.cff SARIF 2.1.0 Signed installation manifest Source

The manifest and lockfile bind install artifacts to cryptographic hashes. This integrity claim is separate from the security assessment.

Audit attestation: superseded