Versioned security assessment

Report ID: SA-6C65117B

7/1/2026, 3:49:52 AM

vercel-deploy security assessment v3

Skill Security Certification Report

Audit History

Audit model: codex Historical report

Skill name: vercel-deploy
Version: v3
Maintainer: ZhanlinCui
Source: github.com/ZhanlinCui/Ultimate-Agent-Skills-Collection/tree/main/vercel-deploy
Coverage: 2 Files scanned · 363 Lines analyzed
Policy version: Unavailable

Confirmed finding summary

No confirmed security findings

The completed audit recorded no confirmed security findings. This is not proof that the Skill has no side effects.

Installation context

Historical evidence

This report may not describe the currently installable artifact. Open the current Skill page for install guidance.

Open current Skill page

This report does not block or authorize the manifest or ZIP.

Static shell and network findings are partly true positives because the script creates an archive and uploads it to a hardcoded hosted endpoint. Many SKILL.md backtick, weak-crypto, and reconnaissance flags are false positives from documentation text, but the semantic risk remains high because project source and possible secrets can be sent outside the local workspace.

Report position

Historical report

Open audit history before using this report to install.

Audit attestation

Not attestable

The required immutable binding is incomplete.

Human verification

Not verified

No human verification is recorded for this report.

Coverage

2 Files scanned · 363 Lines analyzed

4 items shown for review

Limitations

This report does not claim runtime or sandbox execution and does not prove the absence of side effects.

Evidence chain

Follow the evidence from source binding to the install contract. Available evidence supports verification; it is not a safety guarantee.

Source

Binding unavailable
Artifact

Identity incomplete
Audit

Complete
Install contract

Open manifest to verify
Open manifest

Capabilities observed

Observed means this report recorded supporting evidence. Not recorded does not prove that a capability is absent.

Contains scripts

May execute code included with the Skill.

Observed in 1 evidence location

Network access

May connect to external services.

Observed in 4 evidence locations

Filesystem access

May read or write local files.

Observed in 3 evidence locations

Env variables

May read values from the process environment.

Not recorded by this audit

External commands

May invoke commands or programs outside the Skill.

Observed in 9 evidence locations

Capability review items (4)

High

scripts/deploy.sh:9 scripts/deploy.sh:210 scripts/deploy.sh:222

Project Archive Uploaded to Hardcoded External Endpoint

TRUE POSITIVE: the script defines a hosted deploy endpoint, archives the selected project, and uploads that archive with curl. This can disclose source code, configuration files, and local secrets to a third-party service.

The endpoint, archive creation, and upload are directly present in the script. Deployment requires network upload, but the data exposure risk is clear and material.

Medium

scripts/deploy.sh:210

Deployment Package Does Not Exclude Common Secret Files

TRUE POSITIVE: the tar command excludes node_modules and .git only. Files such as .env, private keys, build artifacts, and service credentials can be included if they are present in the project directory.

The exclusion list is visible and limited. I did not find evidence of secret filtering before upload.

Medium

scripts/deploy.sh:159 scripts/deploy.sh:178-182 scripts/deploy.sh:222

User-Supplied Directory or Tarball Is Uploaded Without Review

TRUE POSITIVE: the script accepts a path argument or an existing .tgz file and uploads it to the deployment endpoint. There is no manifest preview, size warning, or confirmation step before data leaves the workspace.

The path handling and upload are explicit. The risk depends on user choice, but the script provides no guardrail against uploading sensitive archives.

Low

scripts/deploy.sh:199-203

Script Can Rename a User HTML File

TRUE POSITIVE: for static HTML projects, the script may rename a single HTML file to index.html. This local mutation is intentional but can surprise users and alter their working tree.

The rename branch is directly present and uses mv. The behavior is limited to one static HTML case, so severity is low.

Risk findings

Confirmed security concerns are separated from items that still need review.

No confirmed security findings were recorded for this completed audit.

Expert evidence

Immutable subject identity, scanner metadata, dismissed matches, and source-level evidence.

Artifact subject

Marketplace commit: Unavailable
Content hash: Unavailable
Tree hash: Unavailable
Skill path: Unavailable
Audit payload hash: Unavailable

Analysis metadata

Audit model: codex

Analysis state: Complete

Scope is limited to the recorded files, lines, methods, and evidence. No runtime or sandbox execution is claimed.

Static false positives ignored (2)

Low

SKILL.md:15-16 SKILL.md:22-40 SKILL.md:68-78

Documentation Backtick and Weak-Crypto Flags Are False Positives

FALSE POSITIVE: SKILL.md contains fenced examples, inline code, URLs, and framework text. I found no prompt injection attempt, cryptographic operation, or executable backtick expansion in the Markdown content.

The cited Markdown lines are descriptive text and examples. There is no evidence that these lines execute commands or define weak cryptography.

Low

scripts/deploy.sh:20 scripts/deploy.sh:186-189 scripts/deploy.sh:232-233

Shell Command Substitutions Are Mostly Legitimate Workflow Steps

FALSE POSITIVE WITH RESIDUAL RISK: command substitutions gather file paths, parse responses, and detect frameworks. They are not direct command injection evidence because variables are quoted, but they support the higher-risk archive upload workflow.

The shell substitutions are visible and appear quoted in the relevant command contexts. The residual concern is data handling, not direct shell injection.

Verify and export

JSON report CITATION.cff SARIF 2.1.0 Signed installation manifest

The manifest and lockfile bind install artifacts to cryptographic hashes. This integrity claim is separate from the security assessment.

Audit attestation: not_attestable