Versioned security assessment

Report ID: SA-EF83796B

6/30/2026, 9:49:37 PM

shareone security assessment v3

Skill Security Certification Report

Audit History
Audit model: codex Historical report
Skill name
shareone
Version
v3
Maintainer
sudoprivacy
Source
github.com/sudoprivacy/shareone-skill/tree/df96cc7c4d602c816b6a50704e840b8224a501ad/
Coverage
20 Files scanned · 1,935 Lines analyzed
Policy version
Unavailable

Highest confirmed finding severity

High

3 confirmed security findings require attention.

Installation context

Historical evidence

This report may not describe the currently installable artifact. Open the current Skill page for install guidance.

Open current Skill page

This report does not block or authorize the manifest or ZIP.

Static external-command and weak-crypto alerts are mostly false positives: reviewed lines are Markdown command examples, JavaScript template strings, URL parsing, timeout handling, and crypto.randomBytes for multipart boundaries. The skill still has confirmed high-risk behavior because it reads local files, sends content and API keys over the network, stores credentials locally, prints API keys, and can derive an authenticated request host from a user-supplied URL.

Report position

Historical report

Open audit history before using this report to install.

Audit attestation

Not attestable

The required immutable binding is incomplete.

Human verification

Not verified

No human verification is recorded for this report.

Coverage

20 Files scanned · 1,935 Lines analyzed

6 items shown for review

Limitations

This report does not claim runtime or sandbox execution and does not prove the absence of side effects.

Evidence chain

Follow the evidence from source binding to the install contract. Available evidence supports verification; it is not a safety guarantee.

  1. Source

    Binding unavailable

  2. Artifact

    Identity incomplete

  3. Audit

    Complete

  4. Install contract

    Open manifest to verify

    Open manifest

Capabilities observed

Observed means this report recorded supporting evidence. Not recorded does not prove that a capability is absent.

Contains scripts

May execute code included with the Skill.

Observed in 3 evidence locations

Network access

May connect to external services.

Observed in 3 evidence locations

Filesystem access

May read or write local files.

Observed in 3 evidence locations

Env variables

May read values from the process environment.

Observed in 3 evidence locations

External commands

May invoke commands or programs outside the Skill.

Observed in 3 evidence locations

Capability review items (3)
High
scripts/update_share_settings.js:98-103scripts/update_share_settings.js:147-153scripts/shareone_client.js:164-190
API Key Can Be Sent to a User-Supplied Host
update_share_settings.js derives SHAREONE_BASE_URL from a full URL supplied as the target link, then sends authenticated PUT requests through shareone_client.js. A non-ShareOne URL could receive the X-API-Key header or Sudowork proxy authorization flow, creating a credential disclosure risk.
The host is taken from user-controlled URL input and later used by the authenticated request builder. The reviewed code shows no allowlist that restricts this flow to shareone.app.
Medium
scripts/upload_page.js:60-90scripts/shareone_upload.js:58-78scripts/shareone_upload.js:123-151
Local Files Are Uploaded to External Services
The skill reads user-selected local files and uploads them to ShareOne, Azure, or S3 upload URLs returned by ShareOne. This is core functionality, but it creates data exposure risk if sensitive files are selected or consent is mishandled.
The file reads and outbound upload requests are explicit. The workflow includes a publish consent step, so this is high-impact legitimate functionality rather than confirmed malicious behavior.
Medium
scripts/shareone_client.js:8scripts/shareone_client.js:42-43scripts/save_api_key.js:9-17
API Keys Are Stored Locally Without Permission Hardening
Local ShareOne API keys are written to a home-directory credentials file as JSON. The code does not set restrictive file permissions or encrypt the credential before writing it.
The code writes the raw API key value directly to disk and no chmod or encryption step appears near the write. Local config storage can be legitimate, but this implementation has weak protection.

Risk findings

Confirmed security concerns are separated from items that still need review.

Confirmed security concerns (3)

RISK-001 High
scripts/check_api_key.js:18-20scripts/create_guest_key.js:16-31workflows/environment-and-credentials.md:60-64
API Keys Are Printed to Command Output
The credential check and guest-key scripts print API keys in machine-readable output. The workflows then instruct the assistant to display newly created keys and binding links to the user, which can persist secrets in transcripts and logs.
Direct code evidence shows API key values are written to stdout. The workflow also explicitly requires user-facing display of generated key material.
RISK-002 Medium
scripts/download_share.js:60-80workflows/download-file.md:11-18workflows/download-file.md:53-57
Owner Downloads Can Bypass Public Download Restrictions
The download workflow first attempts owner download when credentials are present, which bypasses public password and allow-download restrictions for owned links. This is documented behavior but should be clear to users because it changes privacy expectations.
The behavior is explicit in code and documentation. It appears intended for owner workflows, so the concern is user expectation and access control clarity rather than malicious intent.
RISK-003 Low
SKILL.md:1-5workflows/environment-and-credentials.md:1-3
No Prompt Injection Pattern Found
I searched the skill instructions, workflows, and scripts for explicit override, ignore, pre-approved, and skip-security language from the audit warning list. No evidence found in the searched files.
The search covered the listed suspicious phrases across the provided skill files. This does not prove absence of every possible injection, but no direct warning-pattern evidence was found.

Expert evidence

Immutable subject identity, scanner metadata, dismissed matches, and source-level evidence.

Artifact subject

Marketplace commit
Unavailable
Content hash
Unavailable
Tree hash
Unavailable
Skill path
Unavailable
Audit payload hash
Unavailable

Analysis metadata

Audit model: codex

Analysis state: Complete

Scope is limited to the recorded files, lines, methods, and evidence. No runtime or sandbox execution is claimed.

Static false positives ignored (2)
Low
SKILL.md:17-23scripts/check_api_key.js:20workflows/publish-text-page.md:45-49
External Command Alerts Are Mostly False Positives
Most static external-command matches are Markdown code examples or JavaScript template literals. I found no evidence in the reviewed files of child_process, eval, shell execution, or backticks executing OS commands.
Reviewed representative locations contain command documentation or string interpolation. No shell execution API was found in the inspected implementation files.
Low
scripts/shareone_upload.js:36-38scripts/download_share.js:41-58scripts/shareone_client.js:83-86
Weak Crypto Alerts Are False Positives in Reviewed Code
The reviewed weak-crypto locations do not show MD5, SHA-1, DES, RC4, or custom encryption. The only crypto use found is crypto.randomBytes for a multipart boundary, which is appropriate for that purpose.
Targeted review found URL parsing, timeout handling, and multipart boundary generation rather than weak cryptographic algorithms. No evidence found for insecure hashing or encryption in the reviewed code.

Verify and export

JSON report CITATION.cff SARIF 2.1.0 Signed installation manifest

The manifest and lockfile bind install artifacts to cryptographic hashes. This integrity claim is separate from the security assessment.

Audit attestation: not_attestable