Versioned security assessment

Report ID: SA-F93E9BB0

7/7/2026, 4:44:32 AM

webapp-testing security assessment v3

Skill Security Certification Report

Audit History
Audit model: codex Historical report
Skill name
webapp-testing
Version
v3
Maintainer
sickn33
Coverage
3 Files scanned · 404 Lines analyzed
Policy version
Unavailable

Highest confirmed finding severity

High

1 confirmed security finding requires attention.

Installation context

Historical evidence

This report may not describe the currently installable artifact. Open the current Skill page for install guidance.

Open current Skill page

This report does not block or authorize the manifest or ZIP.

Most SKILL.md static hits are false positives caused by Markdown backticks and example code fences. The helper script does present real risk because it runs caller-provided commands, including a shell-based server command, and the documentation encourages black-box script execution before source review.

Report position

Historical report

Open audit history before using this report to install.

Audit attestation

Not attestable

The required immutable binding is incomplete.

Human verification

Not verified

No human verification is recorded for this report.

Coverage

3 Files scanned · 404 Lines analyzed

3 items shown for review

Limitations

This report does not claim runtime or sandbox execution and does not prove the absence of side effects.

Evidence chain

Follow the evidence from source binding to the install contract. Available evidence supports verification; it is not a safety guarantee.

  1. Source

    Binding unavailable

  2. Artifact

    Identity incomplete

  3. Audit

    Complete

  4. Install contract

    Open manifest to verify

    Open manifest

Capabilities observed

Observed means this report recorded supporting evidence. Not recorded does not prove that a capability is absent.

Contains scripts

May execute code included with the Skill.

Not recorded by this audit

Network access

May connect to external services.

Observed in 1 evidence location

Filesystem access

May read or write local files.

Observed in 1 evidence location

Env variables

May read values from the process environment.

Not recorded by this audit

External commands

May invoke commands or programs outside the Skill.

Observed in 23 evidence locations

Capability review items (2)
High
Python subprocess.run
result = subprocess.run(args.command)
subprocess.run executes the caller-provided command after the local servers are ready. This is intentional tooling, but it gives the skill a direct arbitrary local command execution capability.
High
Python subprocess.Popen
process = subprocess.Popen(
subprocess.Popen starts the user-provided --server string with shell=True. This creates command-injection risk if any part of the server command is derived from untrusted text.

Risk findings

Confirmed security concerns are separated from items that still need review.

Confirmed security concerns (1)

RISK-001 High
Prompt Injection Attempt Detected
SKILL.md says, "DO NOT read the source until you try running the script first" and later tells agents to use bundled scripts as black boxes. That guidance can suppress inspection of local command execution behavior before use.
The wording directly discourages source review before execution. This matters because the bundled helper later runs caller-provided shell commands.

Remediation

Suggested fixes recorded by this audit. Applying them is the maintainer’s responsibility.

  1. FIX-001
    High
    Server command is executed through a shell.
    Parse server commands into argument arrays and avoid shell=True, or require explicit user confirmation before shell execution.
  2. FIX-002
    High
    Automation command can execute any local program supplied after the separator.
    Document this as arbitrary local command execution and require the agent to show the exact command before running it.
  3. FIX-003
    High
    Documentation discourages source review before running bundled scripts.
    Replace black-box execution guidance with instructions to inspect helper behavior and run --help only after trust is established.

Expert evidence

Immutable subject identity, scanner metadata, dismissed matches, and source-level evidence.

Artifact subject

Marketplace commit
Unavailable
Content hash
Unavailable
Tree hash
Unavailable
Skill path
Unavailable
Audit payload hash
Unavailable

Analysis metadata

Audit model: codex

Analysis state: Complete

Scope is limited to the recorded files, lines, methods, and evidence. No runtime or sandbox execution is claimed.

Verify and export

The manifest and lockfile bind install artifacts to cryptographic hashes. This integrity claim is separate from the security assessment.

Audit attestation: not_attestable