Versioned security assessment

Report ID: SA-9F814FC6

7/7/2026, 3:11:41 AM

stripe-automation security assessment v4

Skill Security Certification Report

Audit History
Audit model: codex Latest published report
Skill name
stripe-automation
Version
v4
Maintainer
sickn33
Source
github.com/sickn33/antigravity-awesome-skills/tree/main/skills/stripe-automation
Coverage
1 Files scanned · 199 Lines analyzed
Policy version
Unavailable

Highest confirmed finding severity

High

2 confirmed security findings require attention.

Installation context

Check the current Skill page

This page summarizes report evidence only. The Skill page provides the canonical install advisory.

Open current Skill page

This report does not block or authorize the manifest or ZIP.

Most static external command findings are false positives from Markdown backticks around tool names and parameters. The hardcoded Rube MCP URL is a real external dependency, and semantic review found risk from privileged Stripe operations without explicit approval or trust-boundary guidance. No prompt injection text was found in SKILL.md.

Report position

Latest published report

Latest refers to the report sequence, not to artifact currentness.

Audit attestation

Not attestable

The required immutable binding is incomplete.

Human verification

Not verified

No human verification is recorded for this report.

Coverage

1 Files scanned · 199 Lines analyzed

3 items shown for review

Limitations

This report does not claim runtime or sandbox execution and does not prove the absence of side effects.

Evidence chain

Follow the evidence from source binding to the install contract. Available evidence supports verification; it is not a safety guarantee.

  1. Source

    Commit and path bound

  2. Artifact

    Content and tree hashes bound

  3. Audit

    Complete

  4. Install contract

    Open manifest to verify

    Open manifest

Capabilities observed

Observed means this report recorded supporting evidence. Not recorded does not prove that a capability is absent.

Contains scripts

May execute code included with the Skill.

Not recorded by this audit

Network access

May connect to external services.

Observed in 1 evidence location

Filesystem access

May read or write local files.

Not recorded by this audit

Env variables

May read values from the process environment.

Not recorded by this audit

External commands

May invoke commands or programs outside the Skill.

Observed in 57 evidence locations

Capability review items (1)
Low
SKILL.md:20
Hardcoded URL
**Get Rube MCP**: Add `https://rube.app/mcp` as an MCP server in your client configuration. No API k
Line 20 directs users to add https://rube.app/mcp as an external MCP server. This is legitimate setup documentation, but the hardcoded external network dependency is real.

Risk findings

Confirmed security concerns are separated from items that still need review.

Confirmed security concerns (2)

RISK-001 High
SKILL.md:57-60SKILL.md:80-82SKILL.md:101SKILL.md:135-136
High-Impact Stripe Actions Lack Explicit Approval Step
SKILL.md lists workflows for creating or confirming payments, capturing charges, creating subscriptions and invoices, and issuing refunds. It does not require an explicit user approval step before these financial mutations.
The documented tool sequences include direct money movement and billing state changes. The surrounding workflow text does not show a confirmation gate, amount preview, or test-mode requirement.
RISK-002 Medium
SKILL.md:20SKILL.md:23-26
Third-Party MCP Handles Stripe Authorization
The setup directs users to add an external Rube MCP endpoint and connect the Stripe toolkit through RUBE_MANAGE_CONNECTIONS. This creates a trust boundary for Stripe account access that is not explained in the skill.
The endpoint and Stripe connection instructions are explicit in the setup section. The risk depends on user authorization scope, so confidence is high but not absolute.

Remediation

Suggested fixes recorded by this audit. Applying them is the maintainer’s responsibility.

  1. FIX-001
    High
    High-impact Stripe mutations do not require explicit approval.
    Before payments, captures, subscriptions, invoices, or refunds, show amount, currency, customer, object ID, and operation type, then require user approval.
  2. FIX-002
    Medium
    Third-party MCP trust boundary is not documented.
    Explain that Rube MCP mediates Stripe authorization, list expected permissions, and advise users to review access and revoke it when no longer needed.
  3. FIX-003
    Medium
    Financial workflows lack idempotency and test-mode guidance.
    Recommend test mode for validation and idempotency keys for payment creation, refunds, and invoice or subscription mutations where supported.
  4. FIX-004
    Low
    The setup says no API keys are needed without explaining authorization impact.
    Clarify that OAuth or delegated authorization can still grant sensitive Stripe account access through the MCP provider.

Expert evidence

Immutable subject identity, scanner metadata, dismissed matches, and source-level evidence.

Artifact subject

Marketplace commit
9f814fc6a43fd99946f2da5e0df231c65a38bc76
Content hash
0c790074dfc1930eff37b8d7a0f36e7d6edadc0848c1b86d177a512a647a137f
Tree hash
87abea31a020aac3a73a18f84f99ffbc0b5acfbfe093559aad7df3ff100224dc
Skill path
skills/sickn33/stripe-automation
Audit payload hash
d03e80044e5c78cfbedbe47b827ce197

Analysis metadata

Audit model: codex

Analysis state: Complete

Scope is limited to the recorded files, lines, methods, and evidence. No runtime or sandbox execution is claimed.

Verify and export

JSON report CITATION.cff SARIF 2.1.0 Signed installation manifest Source

The manifest and lockfile bind install artifacts to cryptographic hashes. This integrity claim is separate from the security assessment.

Audit attestation: not_attestable