Versioned security assessment

Report ID: SA-5D8384CB

6/30/2026, 5:50:27 PM

skill-creator security assessment v2

Skill Security Certification Report

Audit History
Audit model: codex Historical report
Skill name
skill-creator
Version
v2
Maintainer
Eric Andrade
Source
github.com/sickn33/antigravity-awesome-skills/tree/main/skills/skill-creator
Coverage
8 Files scanned · 1,688 Lines analyzed
Policy version
Unavailable

Highest confirmed finding severity

Medium

3 confirmed security findings require attention.

Installation context

Historical evidence

This report may not describe the currently installable artifact. Open the current Skill page for install guidance.

Open current Skill page

This report does not block or authorize the manifest or ZIP.

Static analysis reported many command, network, and filesystem patterns, but most command and network hits are markdown examples, license URLs, or template text. AI review found no evidence of malicious network exfiltration or prompt injection, but the shipped scripts and installation guidance can write files, create archives, and create global symlinks, so publication should include a filesystem warning.

Report position

Historical report

Open audit history before using this report to install.

Audit attestation

Not attestable

The required immutable binding is incomplete.

Human verification

Not verified

No human verification is recorded for this report.

Coverage

8 Files scanned · 1,688 Lines analyzed

3 items shown for review

Limitations

This report does not claim runtime or sandbox execution and does not prove the absence of side effects.

Evidence chain

Follow the evidence from source binding to the install contract. Available evidence supports verification; it is not a safety guarantee.

  1. Source

    Binding unavailable

  2. Artifact

    Identity incomplete

  3. Audit

    Complete

  4. Install contract

    Open manifest to verify

    Open manifest

Capabilities observed

Observed means this report recorded supporting evidence. Not recorded does not prove that a capability is absent.

Contains scripts

May execute code included with the Skill.

Observed in 3 evidence locations

Network access

May connect to external services.

Observed in 3 evidence locations

Filesystem access

May read or write local files.

Observed in 5 evidence locations

Env variables

May read values from the process environment.

Not recorded by this audit

External commands

May invoke commands or programs outside the Skill.

Observed in 3 evidence locations

Risk findings

Confirmed security concerns are separated from items that still need review.

Confirmed security concerns (3)

RISK-001 Medium
scripts/init_skill.py:206-215scripts/init_skill.py:228-257scripts/init_skill.py:287-294
Path-Controlled Skill Scaffolding Writes Files
The initializer combines a user-provided path and skill name, creates the resulting directory, writes SKILL.md, creates resource directories, writes placeholder files, and marks an example script executable. This is expected for a scaffolding tool, but it can modify arbitrary user-writable filesystem locations if arguments are careless or adversarial.
The script directly creates directories and writes files based on command-line arguments. The behavior is legitimate scaffolding, but the filesystem impact is real and not limited to a fixed safe directory.
RISK-002 Medium
README.md:43-48SKILL.md:381-410SKILL.md:551-553
Global Symlink Installation Guidance Can Overwrite Skill Links
The documentation recommends forced symlink creation into assistant home directories. This is a legitimate installation pattern, but ln -sf can replace existing symlinks and affects global assistant behavior.
The cited lines show forced symlink commands and verification of home-directory skill paths. The commands are presented as installation steps, so the risk is contextual rather than malicious.
RISK-003 Medium
scripts/package_skill.py:56-74
Archive Packaging Can Include Unintended Files
The packager walks every file under the selected skill directory and writes it into a .skill archive after basic validation. This can accidentally include secrets or unrelated files if the source directory is not reviewed first.
The recursive archive creation is explicit and does not filter sensitive filenames. There is no upload path, so the concern is accidental disclosure through later sharing of the archive.

Expert evidence

Immutable subject identity, scanner metadata, dismissed matches, and source-level evidence.

Artifact subject

Marketplace commit
Unavailable
Content hash
Unavailable
Tree hash
Unavailable
Skill path
Unavailable
Audit payload hash
Unavailable

Analysis metadata

Audit model: codex

Analysis state: Complete

Scope is limited to the recorded files, lines, methods, and evidence. No runtime or sandbox execution is claimed.

Static false positives ignored (3)
Low
LICENSE.txt:4README.md:35SKILL.md:590-591
Static Network Findings Are Documentation Links
Hardcoded URL findings occur in the license, clone examples, and references. No executable HTTP client, fetch call, or credential-bearing outbound request was found in the inspected files.
The evidence is limited to URLs in text and example clone commands. A targeted search found no requests, urllib, curl, wget, socket, fetch, or similar executable network client in the scripts.
Low
LICENSE.txt:61scripts/quick_validate.py:42-56SKILL.md:568-583
Static Weak Cryptography Findings Are Text Matches
The weak-cryptography alerts appear to be triggered by ordinary words inside license text, documentation, validation messages, and template guidance. No cryptographic API use was found in the reviewed scripts.
The inspected code imports pathlib, zipfile, yaml, re, os, and sys, but not cryptographic libraries. The flagged lines are not cryptographic operations.
Low
README.md:33-48SKILL.md:42-72references/workflows.md:7-15
Markdown Command Examples Were Counted As Execution
Many external-command findings are shell examples or illustrative markdown blocks. They are not executed by the package scripts, although users should still review commands before running them.
The cited command text is contained in markdown documentation. The Python scripts do not call subprocess, os.system, eval, or exec.

Verify and export

JSON report CITATION.cff SARIF 2.1.0 Signed installation manifest

The manifest and lockfile bind install artifacts to cryptographic hashes. This integrity claim is separate from the security assessment.

Audit attestation: not_attestable