Versioned security assessment

Report ID: SA-81E05E63

8/4/2026, 3:04:28 PM

mtls-configuration security assessment v6

Skill Security Certification Report

Audit History
Scanner version 3.0.0 Audit model: codex Latest published report
Skill name
mtls-configuration
Version
v6
Maintainer
sickn33
Source
github.com/sickn33/antigravity-awesome-skills/tree/main/skills/mtls-configuration
Coverage
1 Files scanned · 368 Lines analyzed
Policy version
skillstore-security-audit-policy-v1

Highest confirmed finding severity

High

2 confirmed security findings require attention.

Installation context

Check the current Skill page

This page summarizes report evidence only. The Skill page provides the canonical install advisory.

Open current Skill page

This report does not block or authorize the manifest or ZIP.

Most static alerts are false positives caused by Markdown fences, example paths, placeholders, and reference links. The review confirms an all-interface bind and identifies unsafe mTLS bypass examples and insufficient CA key protection guidance.

Report position

Latest published report

Latest refers to the report sequence, not to artifact currentness.

Audit attestation

Active attestation

A public attestation is available for this exact report.

Human verification

Not verified

No human verification is recorded for this report.

Coverage

1 Files scanned · 368 Lines analyzed

3 items shown for review

Limitations

This report does not claim runtime or sandbox execution and does not prove the absence of side effects.

Evidence chain

Follow the evidence from source binding to the install contract. Available evidence supports verification; it is not a safety guarantee.

  1. Source

    Commit and path bound

  2. Artifact

    Content and tree hashes bound

  3. Audit

    Complete

  4. Install contract

    Open manifest to verify

    Open manifest

Capabilities observed

Observed means this report recorded supporting evidence. Not recorded does not prove that a capability is absent.

Contains scripts

May execute code included with the Skill.

Not recorded by this audit

Network access

May connect to external services.

Observed in 5 evidence locations

Filesystem access

May read or write local files.

Not recorded by this audit

Env variables

May read values from the process environment.

Not recorded by this audit

External commands

May invoke commands or programs outside the Skill.

Observed in 18 evidence locations

Capability review items (1)
Medium
SKILL.md:213
Hardcoded IP address
bind_address = "0.0.0.0"
The SPIRE server example binds to 0.0.0.0, exposing the service on every interface unless external controls restrict access.

Risk findings

Confirmed security concerns are separated from items that still need review.

Confirmed security concerns (2)

RISK-001 High
SKILL.md:84-110SKILL.md:297-303
mTLS Bypass Examples Lack Compensating Controls
Examples permit plaintext mesh traffic and bypass Linkerd TLS without requiring authorization, network isolation, monitoring, or a removal deadline.
The examples explicitly use PERMISSIVE, DISABLE, and skip-outbound-ports settings. These settings can allow traffic outside mutual authentication.
RISK-002 High
SKILL.md:154-175
CA Signing Key Protection Is Underspecified
The template places CA signing material in a standard Kubernetes Secret without guidance for encryption, strict access control, auditing, or external key storage.
The example creates a CA issuer backed by a Secret containing tls.key. Compromise of that key can undermine the mesh trust domain.

Remediation

Suggested fixes recorded by this audit. Applying them is the maintainer’s responsibility.

  1. FIX-001
    High
    Examples permit plaintext traffic or bypass mesh TLS without compensating controls.
    Label every exception as temporary and require authorization, network policy, monitoring, and a removal deadline.
  2. FIX-002
    High
    The CA signing key example uses a standard Kubernetes Secret without protection guidance.
    Recommend an external key manager or encrypted secrets with strict RBAC, audit logging, backup protection, and rotation procedures.
  3. FIX-003
    Medium
    The SPIRE example binds its server to every network interface.
    Use a scoped interface and require network policy or firewall restrictions around the SPIRE server port.

Expert evidence

Immutable subject identity, scanner metadata, dismissed matches, and source-level evidence.

Artifact subject

Marketplace commit
81e05e636292629114b76cbb3922fbe57672fc02
Content hash
7b3799f44070bb754817f9a6168c3a90b0aa401e9be7e6a92a1f2c3cf2fd8641
Tree hash
adb9d7aabd05ba00a214c2ad43a4fcd0846f4650c57725f32f0886f500d0ac2a
Skill path
skills/sickn33/mtls-configuration
Audit payload hash
eb1a70f472c9145f9d9a2727fcdb5edc

Analysis metadata

Audit model: codex

Analysis state: Complete

Scope is limited to the recorded files, lines, methods, and evidence. No runtime or sandbox execution is claimed.

Verify and export

JSON report Signed attestation CITATION.cff SARIF 2.1.0 Signed installation manifest Source

The manifest and lockfile bind install artifacts to cryptographic hashes. This integrity claim is separate from the security assessment.

Audit attestation: active