Most code fence, PowerShell, Cobalt Strike, rootkit, and reconnaissance alerts are false positives because the skill is Markdown guidance for offline memory analysis. Confirmed risks remain for privileged live memory acquisition, direct /dev/mem and /proc/kcore access, temporary storage of RAM images, process-memory dumping, and credential extraction guidance.
The skill includes a credential extraction section with hashdump, LSA secrets, cached domain credentials, and Mimikatz-style extraction from memory. This can expose reusable secrets if used outside authorized forensic investigations.
The section explicitly covers credential material extraction from memory dumps. The overall forensic context suggests legitimate use, but the data exposure risk is direct.
Capability review items (11)
These are real local capabilities that may be expected for this skill, so they require review but are not counted as confirmed malicious behavior.
The command loads a kernel memory acquisition module with sudo and writes a full RAM image. This requires elevated privileges and can expose secrets from the live host.
The command uses sudo to read /dev/mem into a raw memory image. Direct physical memory access is highly sensitive and can bypass normal data boundaries.
The command copies /proc/kcore with sudo, which can expose kernel and process memory. This is a legitimate forensic action only under strict authorization.
The command runs a macOS memory acquisition tool with sudo. It can capture sensitive system memory and should be limited to authorized evidence collection.
The line introduces /proc/kcore as a memory acquisition source, and the following line shows copying it. /proc/kcore can expose live kernel and process memory.
The command dumps a selected process memory map from a forensic image. This is legitimate for incident response but can expose credentials, keys, or executable payloads.
Most code fence, PowerShell, Cobalt Strike, rootkit, and reconnaissance alerts are false positives because the skill is Markdown guidance for offline memory analysis. Confirmed risks remain for privileged live memory acquisition, direct /dev/mem and /proc/kcore access, temporary storage of RAM images, process-memory dumping, and credential extraction guidance.
The skill includes a credential extraction section with hashdump, LSA secrets, cached domain credentials, and Mimikatz-style extraction from memory. This can expose reusable secrets if used outside authorized forensic investigations.
The section explicitly covers credential material extraction from memory dumps. The overall forensic context suggests legitimate use, but the data exposure risk is direct.
Capability review items (11)
These are real local capabilities that may be expected for this skill, so they require review but are not counted as confirmed malicious behavior.
The command loads a kernel memory acquisition module with sudo and writes a full RAM image. This requires elevated privileges and can expose secrets from the live host.
The command uses sudo to read /dev/mem into a raw memory image. Direct physical memory access is highly sensitive and can bypass normal data boundaries.
The command copies /proc/kcore with sudo, which can expose kernel and process memory. This is a legitimate forensic action only under strict authorization.
The command runs a macOS memory acquisition tool with sudo. It can capture sensitive system memory and should be limited to authorized evidence collection.
The line introduces /proc/kcore as a memory acquisition source, and the following line shows copying it. /proc/kcore can expose live kernel and process memory.
The command dumps a selected process memory map from a forensic image. This is legitimate for incident response but can expose credentials, keys, or executable payloads.
Most command-related findings are false positives caused by Markdown code fences in a documentation-only forensic guide. Confirmed risks remain for privileged live memory acquisition, raw /dev and /proc memory access, process memory dumping, and credential extraction guidance.
The skill documents hashdump, lsadump, cachedump, and Mimikatz-style credential extraction from memory. This is valid for authorized forensics but can also support credential theft if misused.
The credential extraction section explicitly lists memory plugins for hashes, LSA secrets, cached domain credentials, and Mimikatz-style extraction.
Capability review items (11)
These are real local capabilities that may be expected for this skill, so they require review but are not counted as confirmed malicious behavior.
The documented command uses sudo to load a kernel memory acquisition module and write a RAM image. That is privileged live-system access that can expose secrets and affect host stability.
The documented command uses sudo to read /dev/mem into a raw memory image. This directly accesses sensitive physical memory and can disclose credentials or private data.
The documented command uses sudo to copy /proc/kcore into an ELF memory image. That provides privileged access to kernel memory and can disclose sensitive host data.
The documented macOS acquisition command runs a memory capture tool with sudo. Live privileged memory capture can expose secrets and should require explicit authorization.
The section introduces /proc/kcore as a memory acquisition source. Accessing that interface is privileged kernel memory access with sensitive data exposure risk.
The acquisition example writes a full memory image under /tmp. Temporary directories can have weaker handling controls for highly sensitive RAM captures.
Static false positives ignored (2)
These static matches were dismissed by semantic review or matched schema-only tokens, so they are shown for transparency but do not drive the quality score.
The static external-command findings are mostly markdown examples for forensic tools, not hidden code execution. However, the skill gives dual-use guidance for privileged live memory acquisition and credential extraction from memory, so it should not be published without additional review and safeguards.
The skill documents hashdump, lsadump, cachedump, and Mimikatz-style credential extraction from memory. These commands can support incident response, but they can also enable credential theft if used without authorization.
The section is clearly about extracting hashes, LSA secrets, and cached credentials. The document frames this as forensic analysis, but the misuse potential is direct and high.
The skill references process injection, rootkit behavior, shellcode patterns, and a Cobalt Strike YARA rule. These references are presented as detection content, so the Cobalt Strike static blocker appears to be contextual rather than malicious.
The static keywords are present, but the surrounding text consistently describes detection and analysis. I did not find evidence of payload generation, deployment, or evasion instructions.
Capability review items (4)
These are real local capabilities that may be expected for this skill, so they require review but are not counted as confirmed malicious behavior.
The skill includes examples that load a kernel module, read /dev/mem, copy /proc/kcore, and run osxpmem with sudo. These are legitimate forensic techniques, but they require elevated access and can expose full system memory or affect a live host if misused.
The commands are explicit and require privileged access to live memory sources. The surrounding context is forensic acquisition, so the risk is dual-use rather than confirmed malicious.
Several examples dump process memory, suspicious executables, registry hives, and files from captured memory. This is normal memory forensics behavior, but dumped artifacts can contain secrets, private data, or malware samples.
The commands directly dump memory and artifacts. The risk is credible, but the examples are standard defensive forensic procedures.
Network and System Reconnaissance of Memory Images
The skill includes commands to enumerate processes, network connections, modules, mounts, environment variables, and command lines from memory images. These are expected forensic tasks, but they can reveal sensitive host and user data.
The commands clearly enumerate sensitive state from memory. They operate on memory captures rather than scanning third-party systems, which lowers the severity.
Many static external-command findings come from markdown code fences such as powershell, bash, c, python, and yara. These are examples in documentation, not executable Ruby backtick calls in code.
The flagged characters delimit markdown examples. There is no Ruby source file or executable wrapper in the skill.
Static false positives ignored (1)
These static matches were dismissed by semantic review or matched schema-only tokens, so they are shown for transparency but do not drive the quality score.
This is a legitimate defensive security documentation skill for memory forensics. All 86 static findings are false positives: command examples are documentation for forensic tools (Volatility, WinPmem, LiME), Cobalt Strike references are YARA detection rules for defensive use, and privilege escalation patterns are standard forensic acquisition techniques. Safe for marketplace publication.