Versioned security assessment

Report ID: SA-88A8E9A0

7/24/2026, 12:16:24 AM

gitops-workflow security assessment v6

Skill Security Certification Report

Audit History
Scanner version 3.0.0 Audit model: codex Latest published report
Skill name
gitops-workflow
Version
v6
Maintainer
sickn33
Source
github.com/sickn33/antigravity-awesome-skills/tree/main/skills/gitops-workflow
Coverage
3 Files scanned · 586 Lines analyzed
Policy version
skillstore-security-audit-policy-v1

Highest confirmed finding severity

High

2 confirmed security findings require attention.

Installation context

Check the current Skill page

This page summarizes report evidence only. The Skill page provides the canonical install advisory.

Open current Skill page

This report does not block or authorize the manifest or ZIP.

Most static command-execution alerts are false positives caused by Markdown fences, placeholder URLs, or benign temporary-directory handling. Confirmed risks include unpinned remote Kubernetes manifests and a downloaded Flux installer executed with sudo without integrity verification. The examples also expose credentials through terminal commands and enable automated pruning against a production path.

Report position

Latest published report

Latest refers to the report sequence, not to artifact currentness.

Audit attestation

Active attestation

A public attestation is available for this exact report.

Human verification

Not verified

No human verification is recorded for this report.

Coverage

3 Files scanned · 586 Lines analyzed

7 items shown for review

Limitations

This report does not claim runtime or sandbox execution and does not prove the absence of side effects.

Evidence chain

Follow the evidence from source binding to the install contract. Available evidence supports verification; it is not a safety guarantee.

  1. Source

    Commit and path bound

  2. Artifact

    Content and tree hashes bound

  3. Audit

    Complete

  4. Install contract

    Open manifest to verify

    Open manifest

Capabilities observed

Observed means this report recorded supporting evidence. Not recorded does not prove that a capability is absent.

Contains scripts

May execute code included with the Skill.

Not recorded by this audit

Network access

May connect to external services.

Observed in 14 evidence locations

Filesystem access

May read or write local files.

Observed in 1 evidence location

Env variables

May read values from the process environment.

Not recorded by this audit

External commands

May invoke commands or programs outside the Skill.

Observed in 36 evidence locations

Capability review items (5)
High
SKILL.md:148
sudo privilege escalation
sudo bash "$tmpdir/flux-install.sh"
The command executes a network-downloaded script as root without a checksum or signature check. Displaying the script first does not provide reliable integrity verification.
Medium
references/argocd-setup.md:8
Hardcoded URL
kubectl apply -n argocd -f https://raw.githubusercontent.com/argoproj/argo-cd/stable/manifests/insta
The command downloads a manifest from the mutable Argo CD stable branch and applies it directly to the cluster. It provides no release pin or integrity verification.
Medium
references/argocd-setup.md:13
Hardcoded URL
kubectl apply -n argocd -f https://raw.githubusercontent.com/argoproj/argo-cd/stable/manifests/ha/in
The high-availability manifest is fetched from a mutable stable branch and applied directly to the cluster. A compromised or changed upstream file would receive cluster permissions.
Medium
SKILL.md:60
Hardcoded URL
kubectl apply -n argocd -f https://raw.githubusercontent.com/argoproj/argo-cd/stable/manifests/insta
The example directly applies a Kubernetes manifest fetched from a mutable stable branch. It does not pin reviewed content or verify its integrity.
Medium
SKILL.md:146
Hardcoded URL
curl -fsSLo "$tmpdir/flux-install.sh" https://fluxcd.io/install.sh
The command downloads an executable installer from a mutable URL without a checksum or signature. The following example runs the downloaded content as root.

Risk findings

Confirmed security concerns are separated from items that still need review.

Confirmed security concerns (2)

RISK-001 High
SKILL.md:100-111
Production auto-sync enables destructive pruning
The example targets apps/production/my-app while enabling automated pruning and self-healing. Applying it unchanged can delete resources or bypass production approval controls.
The production path, automated synchronization, prune, and selfHeal settings appear together in one manifest and directly conflict with the safety guidance on line 41.
RISK-002 Medium
SKILL.md:62-63references/argocd-setup.md:29-30references/argocd-setup.md:72
Setup commands handle credentials unsafely
Examples print the initial admin password and pass a repository token as a CLI argument. Secrets can enter terminal logs, process listings, or shell history.
The commands explicitly decode or print an administrative password and place a token in a command argument. These are established credential exposure paths.

Remediation

Suggested fixes recorded by this audit. Applying them is the maintainer’s responsibility.

  1. FIX-001
    High
    The Flux example executes a downloaded installer with root privileges without cryptographic verification.
    Use a pinned package or release artifact, verify its checksum or signature, and avoid root execution when possible.
  2. FIX-002
    High
    The Argo CD example enables pruning and self-healing for a production path.
    Use a non-production path in examples and require an explicit approval gate before production pruning or synchronization.
  3. FIX-003
    Medium
    Argo CD manifests are applied from a mutable stable branch.
    Pin each manifest to a reviewed release tag or commit and verify the artifact before applying it.
  4. FIX-004
    Medium
    Setup examples print an admin password and pass a repository token through a command argument.
    Use secret prompts, environment-independent credential helpers, or protected secret references that avoid shell history and process arguments.

Expert evidence

Immutable subject identity, scanner metadata, dismissed matches, and source-level evidence.

Artifact subject

Marketplace commit
88a8e9a07f4c54ab105c1c41b6267c287146b07b
Content hash
0b227d0838c72a41bb4692bfa40818da55cb51194e291b051c43e190c10e7419
Tree hash
41ffad60f64fee1ebc607e42a1162f39aaaf5bfc73873c259e224858fdbf7f86
Skill path
skills/sickn33/gitops-workflow
Audit payload hash
aaf74f61c652e5a34f3a4cb3ca3208f8

Analysis metadata

Audit model: codex

Analysis state: Complete

Scope is limited to the recorded files, lines, methods, and evidence. No runtime or sandbox execution is claimed.

Verify and export

JSON report Signed attestation CITATION.cff SARIF 2.1.0 Signed installation manifest Source

The manifest and lockfile bind install artifacts to cryptographic hashes. This integrity claim is separate from the security assessment.

Audit attestation: active