Versioned security assessment

Report ID: SA-F9E2C34B

7/23/2026, 9:50:08 PM

defi-protocol-templates security assessment v5

Skill Security Certification Report

Audit History
Scanner version 3.0.0 Audit model: codex Latest published report
Skill name
defi-protocol-templates
Version
v5
Maintainer
sickn33
Source
github.com/sickn33/antigravity-awesome-skills/tree/main/skills/defi-protocol-templates
Coverage
1 Files scanned · 475 Lines analyzed
Policy version
skillstore-security-audit-policy-v1

Highest confirmed finding severity

High

5 confirmed security findings require attention.

Installation context

Check the current Skill page

This page summarizes report evidence only. The Skill page provides the canonical install advisory.

Open current Skill page

This report does not block or authorize the manifest or ZIP.

All 26 static findings are false positives caused by Solidity require statements and Markdown backticks, not dynamic loading, command execution, or reconnaissance. Semantic review found exploitable token-handling and receiver-authorization flaws, missing slippage protections, and a broken flash-loan repayment flow in examples described as production-ready.

Report position

Latest published report

Latest refers to the report sequence, not to artifact currentness.

Audit attestation

Active attestation

A public attestation is available for this exact report.

Human verification

Not verified

No human verification is recorded for this report.

Coverage

1 Files scanned · 475 Lines analyzed

5 items shown for review

Limitations

This report does not claim runtime or sandbox execution and does not prove the absence of side effects.

Evidence chain

Follow the evidence from source binding to the install contract. Available evidence supports verification; it is not a safety guarantee.

  1. Source

    Commit and path bound

  2. Artifact

    Content and tree hashes bound

  3. Audit

    Complete

  4. Install contract

    Open manifest to verify

    Open manifest

Capabilities observed

Observed means this report recorded supporting evidence. Not recorded does not prove that a capability is absent.

Contains scripts

May execute code included with the Skill.

Observed in 16 evidence locations

Network access

May connect to external services.

Not recorded by this audit

Filesystem access

May read or write local files.

Not recorded by this audit

Env variables

May read values from the process environment.

Not recorded by this audit

External commands

May invoke commands or programs outside the Skill.

Observed in 8 evidence locations

Risk findings

Confirmed security concerns are separated from items that still need review.

Confirmed security concerns (5)

RISK-001 High
SKILL.md:423-434
Unauthenticated Flash-Loan Callback Grants Token Allowance
The receiver accepts calls from any address and approves that caller to spend the requested asset. An attacker can request an allowance and drain held tokens.
The callback has no caller or asset validation and directly approves msg.sender for amount plus fee. This creates a clear unauthorized-spending path.
RISK-002 High
SKILL.md:92-104SKILL.md:108-112SKILL.md:151-169SKILL.md:174-187SKILL.md:192-211SKILL.md:390-401
Unsafe ERC20 Transfer and Accounting Assumptions
Several contracts ignore ERC20 return values and update accounting from requested amounts. Failed or fee-charging transfers can create unbacked balances, shares, or payouts.
The examples call transfer and transferFrom without SafeERC20 or return checks, while state changes use nominal inputs. Nonstandard ERC20 behavior makes the accounting unsafe.
RISK-003 High
SKILL.md:151-171SKILL.md:192-214
AMM Omits User Slippage and Deadline Controls
Liquidity and swap functions accept no minimum return or deadline. Users cannot constrain adverse price movement, enabling sandwich losses and stale execution.
The public AMM methods expose only amounts and token selection. No minimum shares, minimum output, maximum input, or transaction deadline is enforced.
RISK-004 Medium
SKILL.md:403-416SKILL.md:422-434
Flash-Loan Repayment Flow Is Inconsistent
The receiver grants an allowance, but the provider never pulls repayment. The sample receiver therefore leaves the provider balance unchanged and positive-fee loans revert.
The provider only checks its final balance, while the receiver only calls approve. No transferFrom or direct repayment connects those operations.
RISK-005 Medium
SKILL.md:9-11SKILL.md:453-461
Unaudited Examples Are Presented as Production-Ready
The skill calls these templates production-ready despite exploitable authorization and token-accounting flaws. This claim may encourage unsafe deployment without required hardening.
The production-ready claim is explicit, while the document itself recommends testing and professional audits and contains concrete exploitable flaws.

Remediation

Suggested fixes recorded by this audit. Applying them is the maintainer’s responsibility.

  1. FIX-001
    High
    The flash-loan receiver approves any caller for an arbitrary token amount.
    Store the trusted provider, require callbacks from that address, validate the asset, and limit approvals to the exact repayment.
  2. FIX-002
    High
    Contracts ignore ERC20 transfer return values and assume requested amounts equal received amounts.
    Use SafeERC20 and derive accounting from balance changes, or explicitly reject unsupported fee-on-transfer and rebasing tokens.
  3. FIX-003
    High
    AMM entry points provide no minimum-output, minimum-share, or deadline parameters.
    Add user-defined slippage bounds and deadlines, then test sandwich, stale-transaction, and fee-on-transfer scenarios.
  4. FIX-004
    Medium
    The sample receiver approves repayment, but the provider never collects the approved amount.
    Define one repayment model and implement it consistently. Pull repayment with SafeERC20.safeTransferFrom or require a direct transfer before returning.
  5. FIX-005
    Medium
    The skill labels unaudited examples as production-ready.
    Describe them as educational starting points and add explicit test, dependency-version, threat-model, and audit requirements.

Expert evidence

Immutable subject identity, scanner metadata, dismissed matches, and source-level evidence.

Artifact subject

Marketplace commit
f9e2c34b4f19c7f3e6b0a1e93227b5f77cc12526
Content hash
86aba0c690bd59ac2c112540874d0a3456f54d7cbb9acdb2369ae219283ec5d7
Tree hash
dc03c77116ea19ea66cd72f74394fbb5edea2f6972e0bf4bd072e77789d14ae5
Skill path
skills/sickn33/defi-protocol-templates
Audit payload hash
3ac3d8c15576f96cdf2c55cfce9210ee

Analysis metadata

Audit model: codex

Analysis state: Complete

Scope is limited to the recorded files, lines, methods, and evidence. No runtime or sandbox execution is claimed.

Verify and export

JSON report Signed attestation CITATION.cff SARIF 2.1.0 Signed installation manifest Source

The manifest and lockfile bind install artifacts to cryptographic hashes. This integrity claim is separate from the security assessment.

Audit attestation: active