Versioned security assessment

Report ID: SA-F9E2C34B

7/23/2026, 9:30:35 PM

convertkit-automation security assessment v5

Skill Security Certification Report

Audit History
Scanner version 3.0.0 Audit model: codex Latest published report
Skill name
convertkit-automation
Version
v5
Maintainer
sickn33
Source
github.com/sickn33/antigravity-awesome-skills/tree/main/skills/convertkit-automation
Coverage
1 Files scanned · 205 Lines analyzed
Policy version
skillstore-security-audit-policy-v1

Highest confirmed finding severity

Medium

3 confirmed security findings require attention.

Installation context

Check the current Skill page

This page summarizes report evidence only. The Skill page provides the canonical install advisory.

Open current Skill page

This report does not block or authorize the manifest or ZIP.

The 51 shell-execution alerts and seven reconnaissance alerts are Markdown false positives. The external MCP endpoint is a real trust boundary, and the skill exposes irreversible unsubscribe and broadcast deletion workflows without mandatory confirmation.

Report position

Latest published report

Latest refers to the report sequence, not to artifact currentness.

Audit attestation

Active attestation

A public attestation is available for this exact report.

Human verification

Not verified

No human verification is recorded for this report.

Coverage

1 Files scanned · 205 Lines analyzed

4 items shown for review

Limitations

This report does not claim runtime or sandbox execution and does not prove the absence of side effects.

Evidence chain

Follow the evidence from source binding to the install contract. Available evidence supports verification; it is not a safety guarantee.

  1. Source

    Commit and path bound

  2. Artifact

    Content and tree hashes bound

  3. Audit

    Complete

  4. Install contract

    Open manifest to verify

    Open manifest

Capabilities observed

Observed means this report recorded supporting evidence. Not recorded does not prove that a capability is absent.

Contains scripts

May execute code included with the Skill.

Not recorded by this audit

Network access

May connect to external services.

Observed in 1 evidence location

Filesystem access

May read or write local files.

Not recorded by this audit

Env variables

May read values from the process environment.

Not recorded by this audit

External commands

May invoke commands or programs outside the Skill.

Observed in 50 evidence locations

Capability review items (1)
Low
SKILL.md:21
Hardcoded URL
**Get Rube MCP**: Add `https://rube.app/mcp` as an MCP server in your client configuration. No API k
The setup explicitly directs users to connect the hardcoded https://rube.app/mcp endpoint. This creates an external network and trust boundary for Kit operations.

Risk findings

Confirmed security concerns are separated from items that still need review.

Confirmed security concerns (3)

RISK-001 Medium
SKILL.md:75-91
Subscriber unsubscribe lacks a confirmation gate
The workflow permanently unsubscribes a subscriber after lookup without requiring explicit confirmation immediately before execution.
The documented sequence invokes KIT_DELETE_SUBSCRIBER and states the action affects all communications. No confirmation step appears in this workflow.
RISK-002 Medium
SKILL.md:116-131
Broadcast deletion verification is optional
The workflow permits permanent broadcast deletion while marking identity verification as optional.
The workflow marks KIT_GET_BROADCAST as optional before KIT_DELETE_BROADCAST. The same section states deletion is permanent and cannot be undone.
RISK-003 Low
SKILL.md:11-26SKILL.md:31-54
Subscriber data crosses a third-party trust boundary
The skill connects Rube MCP to Kit and queries subscribers by email, placing subscriber data within a third-party integration boundary.
The setup requires the Rube MCP endpoint and Kit authentication. The subscriber workflow explicitly supports exact email queries through that integration.

Remediation

Suggested fixes recorded by this audit. Applying them is the maintainer’s responsibility.

  1. FIX-001
    Medium
    Subscriber unsubscribe can run without explicit confirmation.
    Require a preview of the matched subscriber and explicit user confirmation before calling KIT_DELETE_SUBSCRIBER.
  2. FIX-002
    Medium
    Broadcast verification is optional before permanent deletion.
    Require KIT_GET_BROADCAST, show identifying details, and obtain explicit confirmation before calling KIT_DELETE_BROADCAST.
  3. FIX-003
    Low
    Subscriber data passes through the Rube MCP integration.
    Disclose third-party processing and require users to review endpoint trust, permissions, retention, and applicable privacy requirements.

Expert evidence

Immutable subject identity, scanner metadata, dismissed matches, and source-level evidence.

Artifact subject

Marketplace commit
f9e2c34b4f19c7f3e6b0a1e93227b5f77cc12526
Content hash
91277c859aefe76b4418bd2455cd5418c8ecbd9874629d86b1ff571b1da445ed
Tree hash
45ca72ba5205a6c90983ec84b1396a0eb39424ffb38c60fca79cbf1c2d91da78
Skill path
skills/sickn33/convertkit-automation
Audit payload hash
f18e0495cb41985baacc6ec84f9a69dd

Analysis metadata

Audit model: codex

Analysis state: Complete

Scope is limited to the recorded files, lines, methods, and evidence. No runtime or sandbox execution is claimed.

Verify and export

JSON report Signed attestation CITATION.cff SARIF 2.1.0 Signed installation manifest Source

The manifest and lockfile bind install artifacts to cryptographic hashes. This integrity claim is separate from the security assessment.

Audit attestation: active