Versioned security assessment

Report ID: SA-01171B58

7/6/2026, 11:00:07 PM

bun-development security assessment v4

Skill Security Certification Report

Audit History
Audit model: codex Latest published report
Skill name
bun-development
Version
v4
Maintainer
sickn33
Coverage
1 Files scanned · 692 Lines analyzed
Policy version
Unavailable

Highest confirmed finding severity

Critical

3 confirmed security findings require attention.

Installation context

Check the current Skill page

This page summarizes report evidence only. The Skill page provides the canonical install advisory.

Open current Skill page

This report does not block or authorize the manifest or ZIP.

The audit found no prompt-injection content or hidden data-exfiltration intent in SKILL.md. Most static hits are Markdown fences, sample Bun server handlers, environment variable examples, or documentation links. Confirmed risks are pipe-to-shell install commands and a non-default npm registry example.

Report position

Latest published report

Latest refers to the report sequence, not to artifact currentness.

Audit attestation

Not attestable

The required immutable binding is incomplete.

Human verification

Not verified

No human verification is recorded for this report.

Coverage

1 Files scanned · 692 Lines analyzed

7 items shown for review

Limitations

This report does not claim runtime or sandbox execution and does not prove the absence of side effects.

Evidence chain

Follow the evidence from source binding to the install contract. Available evidence supports verification; it is not a safety guarantee.

  1. Source

    Commit and path bound

  2. Artifact

    Content and tree hashes bound

  3. Audit

    Complete

  4. Install contract

    Open manifest to verify

    Open manifest

Capabilities observed

Observed means this report recorded supporting evidence. Not recorded does not prove that a capability is absent.

Contains scripts

May execute code included with the Skill.

Not recorded by this audit

Network access

May connect to external services.

Observed in 13 evidence locations

Filesystem access

May read or write local files.

Observed in 1 evidence location

Env variables

May read values from the process environment.

Observed in 5 evidence locations

External commands

May invoke commands or programs outside the Skill.

Observed in 74 evidence locations

Capability review items (4)
High
PowerShell invocation
powershell -c "irm bun.sh/install.ps1 | iex"
The Windows install example invokes PowerShell and executes a remote install script through iex. This can run unreviewed code on the user system.
High
Hardcoded URL
bun add lodash --registry https://registry.npmmirror.com
The URL selects a third-party npm mirror with --registry, changing package trust boundaries. This is a real supply-chain exposure even though shown as an example.
Low
Hardcoded URL
curl -fsSL https://bun.sh/install | bash
The URL is used in a curl pipe-to-shell install command, which downloads remote code for execution. The official source lowers malicious intent but not remote execution risk.
Low
Hardcoded URL
curl -fsSL https://bun.sh/install | bash
The URL is used in a curl pipe-to-shell install command, which downloads remote code for execution. The official source lowers malicious intent but not remote execution risk.

Risk findings

Confirmed security concerns are separated from items that still need review.

Confirmed security concerns (3)

RISK-001 Critical
Pipe to shell pattern
curl -fsSL https://bun.sh/install | bash
The command pipes a remote install script directly into bash. This is a real remote code execution risk if the network, script, or source is compromised.
RISK-002 Critical
Pipe to shell pattern
curl -fsSL https://bun.sh/install | bash
The command pipes a remote install script directly into bash. This is a real remote code execution risk if the network, script, or source is compromised.
RISK-003 High
Non-standard NPM registry
bun add lodash --registry https://registry.npmmirror.com
The example installs from registry.npmmirror.com instead of the default npm registry. Changing registries can introduce dependency confusion and supply-chain trust risk.

Remediation

Suggested fixes recorded by this audit. Applying them is the maintainer’s responsibility.

  1. FIX-001
    Critical
    Remote install scripts are piped directly into bash.
    Replace pipe-to-shell examples with package manager installs, checksum verification, or instructions to inspect the script before execution.
  2. FIX-002
    High
    The Windows install example executes a remote PowerShell script through iex.
    Prefer a verified installer or package manager command, and warn users before executing remote PowerShell content.
  3. FIX-003
    High
    A dependency example uses a non-default npm registry mirror.
    Remove the mirror example or clearly state that users should only use trusted registries with integrity controls.

Expert evidence

Immutable subject identity, scanner metadata, dismissed matches, and source-level evidence.

Artifact subject

Marketplace commit
01171b582d636c013315c5e0d969c64f8d9cdff2
Content hash
f5ecf8a22f01be88194e0158003ee91ce8d7639f4db3b34497d5e6a8c103f107
Tree hash
8cb946e5ca2eb0e78adf1a91a4c5783c0aa459eb046395f04276b9d92863a667
Skill path
skills/sickn33/bun-development
Audit payload hash
378f609afe06ebc834e350ccb8a94416

Analysis metadata

Audit model: codex

Analysis state: Complete

Scope is limited to the recorded files, lines, methods, and evidence. No runtime or sandbox execution is claimed.

Verify and export

The manifest and lockfile bind install artifacts to cryptographic hashes. This integrity claim is separate from the security assessment.

Audit attestation: not_attestable