Versioned security assessment

Report ID: SA-5A26D1D6

8/14/2026, 10:00:08 AM

bash-defensive-patterns security assessment v5

Skill Security Certification Report

Audit History
Scanner version 3.0.0 Audit model: codex Latest published report
Skill name
bash-defensive-patterns
Version
v5
Maintainer
sickn33
Source
github.com/sickn33/antigravity-awesome-skills/tree/main/skills/bash-defensive-patterns
Coverage
2 Files scanned · 570 Lines analyzed
Policy version
skillstore-security-audit-policy-v1

Highest confirmed finding severity

Medium

1 confirmed security finding requires attention.

Installation context

Check the current Skill page

This page summarizes report evidence only. The Skill page provides the canonical install advisory.

Open current Skill page

This report does not block or authorize the manifest or ZIP.

All 41 static findings are false positives caused by inert Markdown examples, shell syntax, safe redirections, or inline code formatting. One semantic issue remains: two examples install destructive cleanup traps before safely initializing TMPDIR, creating a narrow arbitrary-deletion risk.

Report position

Latest published report

Latest refers to the report sequence, not to artifact currentness.

Audit attestation

Active attestation

A public attestation is available for this exact report.

Human verification

Not verified

No human verification is recorded for this report.

Coverage

2 Files scanned · 570 Lines analyzed

1 item shown for review

Limitations

This report does not claim runtime or sandbox execution and does not prove the absence of side effects.

Evidence chain

Follow the evidence from source binding to the install contract. Available evidence supports verification; it is not a safety guarantee.

  1. Source

    Commit and path bound

  2. Artifact

    Content and tree hashes bound

  3. Audit

    Complete

  4. Install contract

    Open manifest to verify

    Open manifest

Capabilities observed

Observed means this report recorded supporting evidence. Not recorded does not prove that a capability is absent.

Contains scripts

May execute code included with the Skill.

Not recorded by this audit

Network access

May connect to external services.

Not recorded by this audit

Filesystem access

May read or write local files.

Observed in 8 evidence locations

Env variables

May read values from the process environment.

Not recorded by this audit

External commands

May invoke commands or programs outside the Skill.

Observed in 30 evidence locations

Risk findings

Confirmed security concerns are separated from items that still need review.

Confirmed security concerns (1)

RISK-001 Medium
resources/implementation-playbook.md:28-31resources/implementation-playbook.md:146-149
Cleanup Trap Uses TMPDIR Before Trusted Initialization
Two examples install an rm -rf cleanup trap before assigning TMPDIR. An early exit or signal could make cleanup use an inherited environment value.
The trap is visibly registered before TMPDIR receives a trusted mktemp result, and its action recursively removes the expanded path.

Remediation

Suggested fixes recorded by this audit. Applying them is the maintainer’s responsibility.

  1. FIX-001
    Medium
    Cleanup traps can reference TMPDIR before the script assigns a trusted temporary directory.
    Initialize a private variable to an empty value, assign it with mktemp, then install a guarded cleanup trap that verifies the path.

Expert evidence

Immutable subject identity, scanner metadata, dismissed matches, and source-level evidence.

Artifact subject

Marketplace commit
5a26d1d61d694db29af9b138c661c1981076d9df
Content hash
ed2a096eb6f08d48ed0d7e9fa00ae7e9d4ab7b07f9575710453b527eb51177c8
Tree hash
f23b180dc0c267a9661df06118cae2e1c457b4809fd1f3077f105cf9709c12d5
Skill path
skills/sickn33/bash-defensive-patterns
Audit payload hash
5da4959c33f2a9f75cad2ba898e7d513

Analysis metadata

Audit model: codex

Analysis state: Complete

Scope is limited to the recorded files, lines, methods, and evidence. No runtime or sandbox execution is claimed.

Verify and export

JSON report Signed attestation CITATION.cff SARIF 2.1.0 Signed installation manifest Source

The manifest and lockfile bind install artifacts to cryptographic hashes. This integrity claim is separate from the security assessment.

Audit attestation: active