Skills aws-penetration-testing
📦
aws-penetration-testing
Content revision r2 Critical ⚙️ External commands🌐 Network access📁 Filesystem access🔑 Env variables
Assess AWS Security with Authorized Test Workflows
AWS attack paths span many services and permissions. This skill organizes authorized enumeration, exploitation validation, evidence collection, and remediation planning.
Supports: Claude Codex Code(CC)
Do not auto-install this skill.
The canonical policy requires operator review before any installation action.
Install with my Agent
Copy this request to your Agent. It includes the canonical Skill page and manifest.
Agent request
Review the Skillstore skill "aws-penetration-testing" from https://skillstore.io/skills/sickn33-aws-penetration-testing.md and its manifest at https://skillstore.io/api/skills/sickn33-aws-penetration-testing/manifest. Verify the artifact. Do not auto-install. Inspect the skill and report your findings, then wait for an operator or manual installation decision.Your Agent should still show its plan and request any confirmation required by the security policy.
Agent-readable resources
Use these links when an AI agent, crawler, or script needs clean context instead of reading the full page.
Test it
Using "aws-penetration-testing". Create a read-only assessment plan for an approved development account.
Expected outcome:
Scope: development account only. Sequence: identity, IAM, logging, storage, compute, and networking. Record timestamps, request identifiers, findings, and stop conditions.
Using "aws-penetration-testing". Review a role that can pass another role and launch EC2 instances.
Expected outcome:
High-risk path: the principal may launch compute with the passed role. Restrict PassRole resources, constrain launch actions, and alert on unusual combinations.
Using "aws-penetration-testing". Summarize remediation for a metadata credential exposure.
Expected outcome:
Require IMDSv2, limit hop count, block untrusted proxy destinations, reduce instance-role permissions, rotate exposed credentials, and review metadata access logs.
Security Audit
Criticalv5 • 7/23/2026 Open versioned report
Many Ruby backtick and ordinary documentation URL alerts are false positives caused by Markdown. Confirmed findings include metadata credential theft, privilege escalation, backdoors, secret retrieval, target-volume access, and defense evasion through CloudTrail suppression.
2
Files scanned
882
Lines analyzed
43
Review items
0
False positives ignored
Confirmed security concerns (27)
Critical
[HEURISTIC] DANGEROUS COMBINATION: Code execution + Network + Credential access
This combination is common in credential stealers and RATs
The combination is present in context: the skill teaches remote command execution, metadata credential theft, and network requests. The offensive workflow confirms the heuristic.
Critical
Defense Evasion and Audit Suppression
The skill instructs users to delete or weaken CloudTrail and avoid GuardDuty detection. These actions impair monitoring and incident investigation.
The source explicitly labels covering tracks, gives CloudTrail deletion commands, and recommends user-agent changes or log obfuscation to avoid detection.
High
Malware type keywords
### Lambda Backdooring
This heading introduces a Lambda backdooring workflow, and the following code grants administrator policies. The context confirms offensive persistence intent.
High
Malware type keywords
# Update function with backdoor
The comment explicitly directs updating a Lambda with a backdoor. It is followed by an executable AWS CLI command.
High
Malware type keywords
aws lambda update-function-code --function-name NAME --zip-file fileb://backdoor.zip
The command replaces Lambda code with backdoor.zip. This can establish persistence and execute attacker-controlled code under the function role.
High
Malware type keywords
# Invoke backdoored function
The instruction invokes the function after backdoor deployment. This confirms the modified function is intended for active use.
High
Malware type keywords
### Container Backdooring
This section introduces container backdooring and provides build and push steps. The context confirms a persistence and supply-chain compromise technique.
High
Malware type keywords
# Build backdoored image
The command builds an image explicitly described as backdoored, before tagging and pushing it to ECR. This can compromise downstream deployments.
Show all 27 confirmed findings
High
System reconnaissance
aws secretsmanager get-secret-value --secret-id ID
The AWS CLI command retrieves a Secrets Manager value, not only metadata. In this offensive workflow it can disclose protected credentials or application secrets.
High
Malware type keywords
- Leave persistent backdoors without documentation
The constraint forbids only undocumented persistent backdoors, leaving documented persistence permitted. That wording does not prevent a high-risk persistence workflow.
High
System reconnaissance
--parameters commands="whoami"
The command sends whoami through AWS Systems Manager to a target instance. This is remote command execution used to validate host access.
High
[HEURISTIC] SUSPICIOUS COMBINATION: Filesystem + Credentials + Network
This combination could indicate credential harvesting and exfiltration
The skill combines target-volume mounting, process environment reads, credential extraction, and network access. The surrounding penetration workflow confirms the combined risk.
High
Explicit Compromise and Persistence Objectives
The declared deliverables include extracted credentials, compromised resources, and persistence mechanisms. This frames harmful outcomes as expected skill results.
The outputs section directly lists credential extraction, compromised EC2, Lambda, and S3 resources, and persistence mechanisms.
Low
System reconnaissance
aws apigateway get-rest-api --rest-api-id ID
The AWS CLI command enumerates APIs, policies, secrets, or cryptographic resources in an offensive assessment workflow. It can expose sensitive account structure.
Low
System reconnaissance
aws apigateway get-resources --rest-api-id ID
The AWS CLI command enumerates APIs, policies, secrets, or cryptographic resources in an offensive assessment workflow. It can expose sensitive account structure.
Low
System reconnaissance
aws apigateway get-method --rest-api-id ID --resource-id RES_ID --http-method GET
The AWS CLI command enumerates APIs, policies, secrets, or cryptographic resources in an offensive assessment workflow. It can expose sensitive account structure.
Low
System reconnaissance
aws apigateway get-stages --rest-api-id ID
The AWS CLI command enumerates APIs, policies, secrets, or cryptographic resources in an offensive assessment workflow. It can expose sensitive account structure.
Low
System reconnaissance
aws secretsmanager describe-secret --secret-id NAME
The AWS CLI command enumerates APIs, policies, secrets, or cryptographic resources in an offensive assessment workflow. It can expose sensitive account structure.
Low
System reconnaissance
aws secretsmanager get-resource-policy --secret-id ID
The AWS CLI command enumerates APIs, policies, secrets, or cryptographic resources in an offensive assessment workflow. It can expose sensitive account structure.
Low
System reconnaissance
aws kms describe-key --key-id ID
The AWS CLI command enumerates APIs, policies, secrets, or cryptographic resources in an offensive assessment workflow. It can expose sensitive account structure.
Low
System reconnaissance
aws kms list-key-policies --key-id ID
The AWS CLI command enumerates APIs, policies, secrets, or cryptographic resources in an offensive assessment workflow. It can expose sensitive account structure.
Low
System reconnaissance
aws kms get-key-policy --policy-name NAME --key-id ID
The AWS CLI command enumerates APIs, policies, secrets, or cryptographic resources in an offensive assessment workflow. It can expose sensitive account structure.
Low
System reconnaissance
aws iam get-policy-version --policy-arn POLICY_ARN --version-id v1
The AWS CLI command enumerates APIs, policies, secrets, or cryptographic resources in an offensive assessment workflow. It can expose sensitive account structure.
Low
System reconnaissance
aws ssm list-command-invocations --command-id "CMD-ID" \
The command retrieves output from a remotely executed SSM command. It supports target-host command execution and result collection.
Low
System reconnaissance
aws ec2 create-snapshot --volume-id vol-xxx --description "Audit"
This command is part of a target-volume snapshot, copy, and attachment workflow. It enables access to another instance's disk data.
Low
System reconnaissance
aws ec2 create-volume --snapshot-id snap-xxx --availability-zone us-east-1a
This command is part of a target-volume snapshot, copy, and attachment workflow. It enables access to another instance's disk data.
Low
System reconnaissance
aws ec2 attach-volume --volume-id vol-xxx --instance-id i-xxx --device /dev/xvdf
This command is part of a target-volume snapshot, copy, and attachment workflow. It enables access to another instance's disk data.
Capability review items (43)
These are real local capabilities that may be expected for this skill, so they require review but are not counted as confirmed malicious behavior.
Critical
AWS/Azure metadata endpoint
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/
The endpoint appears in an explicit SSRF and credential-extraction workflow. Accessing it can disclose AWS role credentials from EC2 metadata.
Critical
AWS/Azure metadata endpoint
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/
The endpoint appears in an explicit SSRF and credential-extraction workflow. Accessing it can disclose AWS role credentials from EC2 metadata.
Critical
AWS/Azure metadata endpoint
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/ROLE-NAME
The endpoint appears in an explicit SSRF and credential-extraction workflow. Accessing it can disclose AWS role credentials from EC2 metadata.
Critical
AWS/Azure metadata endpoint
"http://169.254.169.254/latest/api/token")
The endpoint appears in an explicit SSRF and credential-extraction workflow. Accessing it can disclose AWS role credentials from EC2 metadata.
Critical
AWS/Azure metadata endpoint
"http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/"
The endpoint appears in an explicit SSRF and credential-extraction workflow. Accessing it can disclose AWS role credentials from EC2 metadata.
Critical
AWS/Azure metadata endpoint
| Get metadata | `curl http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/` |
The endpoint appears in an explicit SSRF and credential-extraction workflow. Accessing it can disclose AWS role credentials from EC2 metadata.
Critical
AWS/Azure metadata endpoint
https://app.com/proxy?url=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/
The endpoint appears in an explicit SSRF and credential-extraction workflow. Accessing it can disclose AWS role credentials from EC2 metadata.
Critical
AWS/Azure metadata endpoint
https://app.com/proxy?url=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/AdminRole
The endpoint appears in an explicit SSRF and credential-extraction workflow. Accessing it can disclose AWS role credentials from EC2 metadata.
High
Linux /proc filesystem access
https://apigateway/prod/system?cmd=file:///proc/self/environ
The file-read payload targets /proc/self/environ to expose process environment values. In Lambda, those values may include credentials and secrets.
High
Shell command substitution
TOKEN=$(curl -X PUT -H "X-aws-ec2-metadata-token-ttl-seconds: 21600" \
The shell command requests an IMDSv2 token and stores it for metadata credential requests. The surrounding workflow explicitly targets temporary AWS credentials.
High
sudo privilege escalation
sudo mkdir /mnt/stolen
The command uses sudo to create a mount point named stolen in an EBS extraction workflow. It requires elevated local privileges.
High
sudo privilege escalation
sudo mount /dev/xvdf1 /mnt/stolen
The command uses sudo to mount a target EBS volume under /mnt/stolen. This enables privileged access to another system's disk contents.
High
Linux /proc filesystem access
/proc/self/environ
The instructions read /proc/self/environ specifically to locate a container credential path. This can expose credentials from the running workload.
High
Non-standard device file access
aws ec2 attach-volume --volume-id vol-xxx --instance-id i-xxx --device /dev/xvdf
The command attaches a copied target volume as /dev/xvdf in an exploitation workflow. This prepares access to another instance's data.
High
Non-standard device file access
sudo mount /dev/xvdf1 /mnt/stolen
The command mounts /dev/xvdf1 under /mnt/stolen. The surrounding steps explicitly use the device to access target disk contents.
High
AWS credential environment variables
export AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=ASIA...
The workflow exports an access key obtained through metadata SSRF. Even with placeholder text, it directs use of stolen temporary credentials.
High
AWS credential environment variables
export AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=...
The workflow exports the secret access key from stolen metadata credentials. This is credential handling in an offensive access sequence.
High
AWS credential environment variables
export AWS_SESSION_TOKEN=...
The workflow exports the stolen session token before verifying account access. This completes a usable temporary AWS credential set.
Medium
Shell command substitution
TOKEN=$(aws rds generate-db-auth-token \
The code block executes AWS CLI and stores an RDS authentication token for a database connection. It is operational shell guidance, although arguments are placeholders.
Medium
Hardcoded IP address
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/
The address is an AWS workload metadata or container credential endpoint used by the skill to retrieve credentials. The context is offensive credential access.
Medium
Hardcoded IP address
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/
The address is an AWS workload metadata or container credential endpoint used by the skill to retrieve credentials. The context is offensive credential access.
Medium
Hardcoded IP address
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/ROLE-NAME
The address is an AWS workload metadata or container credential endpoint used by the skill to retrieve credentials. The context is offensive credential access.
Medium
Hardcoded IP address
"http://169.254.169.254/latest/api/token")
The address is an AWS workload metadata or container credential endpoint used by the skill to retrieve credentials. The context is offensive credential access.
Medium
Hardcoded IP address
"http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/"
The address is an AWS workload metadata or container credential endpoint used by the skill to retrieve credentials. The context is offensive credential access.
Medium
Hardcoded IP address
http://169.254.170.2/v2/credentials/CREDENTIAL-PATH
The address is an AWS workload metadata or container credential endpoint used by the skill to retrieve credentials. The context is offensive credential access.
Medium
Hardcoded IP address
| Get metadata | `curl http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/` |
The address is an AWS workload metadata or container credential endpoint used by the skill to retrieve credentials. The context is offensive credential access.
Medium
Hardcoded IP address
https://app.com/proxy?url=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/
The address is an AWS workload metadata or container credential endpoint used by the skill to retrieve credentials. The context is offensive credential access.
Medium
Hardcoded IP address
https://app.com/proxy?url=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/AdminRole
The address is an AWS workload metadata or container credential endpoint used by the skill to retrieve credentials. The context is offensive credential access.
Low
Hardcoded URL
https://apigateway/prod/system?cmd=env
The example URL invokes a command endpoint to return environment variables. Following this pattern can expose credentials and secrets from a target Lambda.
Low
Hardcoded URL
https://apigateway/prod/example?url=http://localhost:9001/2018-06-01/runtime/invocation/
The example uses SSRF to reach Lambda's local runtime API. This is an offensive request pattern against an internal service.
Low
Hardcoded URL
https://apigateway/prod/system?cmd=file:///proc/self/environ
The URL combines command execution and a file read of /proc/self/environ. It is intended to disclose process environment data.
Low
Hardcoded URL
curl https://API_ID.execute-api.REGION.amazonaws.com/STAGE/ENDPOINT
The curl target invokes the API endpoint immediately after instructions to deploy a backdoored Lambda. The network request activates that modified function.
Low
Hardcoded URL
https://website.com/rce.php?cmd=ls /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount
The URL sends an RCE command that lists Kubernetes service-account secret files. This is an actionable credential-discovery technique.
Low
Hardcoded URL
https://website.com/rce.php?cmd=cat /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token
The URL sends an RCE command that reads a Kubernetes service-account token. This directly retrieves an authentication secret.
Low
Hardcoded URL
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/
The URL is part of an offensive request workflow that targets metadata, credentials, command execution, or a modified cloud function.
Low
Hardcoded URL
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/
The URL is part of an offensive request workflow that targets metadata, credentials, command execution, or a modified cloud function.
Low
Hardcoded URL
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/ROLE-NAME
The URL is part of an offensive request workflow that targets metadata, credentials, command execution, or a modified cloud function.
Low
Hardcoded URL
"http://169.254.169.254/latest/api/token")
The URL is part of an offensive request workflow that targets metadata, credentials, command execution, or a modified cloud function.
Low
Hardcoded URL
"http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/"
The URL is part of an offensive request workflow that targets metadata, credentials, command execution, or a modified cloud function.
Low
Hardcoded URL
http://169.254.170.2/v2/credentials/CREDENTIAL-PATH
The URL is part of an offensive request workflow that targets metadata, credentials, command execution, or a modified cloud function.
Low
Hardcoded URL
| Get metadata | `curl http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/` |
The URL is part of an offensive request workflow that targets metadata, credentials, command execution, or a modified cloud function.
Low
Hardcoded URL
https://app.com/proxy?url=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/
The URL is part of an offensive request workflow that targets metadata, credentials, command execution, or a modified cloud function.
Low
Hardcoded URL
https://app.com/proxy?url=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/AdminRole
The URL is part of an offensive request workflow that targets metadata, credentials, command execution, or a modified cloud function.
Risk Factors
⚙️ External commands (50)
references/advanced-aws-pentesting.md:353-357 SKILL.md:40 SKILL.md:41 SKILL.md:42 SKILL.md:43 SKILL.md:44 SKILL.md:45 SKILL.md:55-67 SKILL.md:67-71 SKILL.md:71-91 SKILL.md:91-97 SKILL.md:97-114 SKILL.md:114-118 SKILL.md:118-126 SKILL.md:126-130 SKILL.md:130-137 SKILL.md:137-149 SKILL.md:149-150 SKILL.md:150-151 SKILL.md:151-152 SKILL.md:152-153 SKILL.md:153-154 SKILL.md:154 SKILL.md:155-159 SKILL.md:159-161 SKILL.md:161-165 SKILL.md:165-168 SKILL.md:168-172 SKILL.md:172-176 SKILL.md:176-180 SKILL.md:180-191 SKILL.md:191-193 SKILL.md:193-197 SKILL.md:197-205 SKILL.md:205-213 SKILL.md:213-217 SKILL.md:217-226 SKILL.md:226-230 SKILL.md:230-232 SKILL.md:232-238 SKILL.md:238-248 SKILL.md:248-256 SKILL.md:256-268 SKILL.md:268-276 SKILL.md:276-289 SKILL.md:289-293 SKILL.md:293-300 SKILL.md:300-308 SKILL.md:308-313 SKILL.md:313-321
🌐 Network access (41)
references/advanced-aws-pentesting.md:40 references/advanced-aws-pentesting.md:61 references/advanced-aws-pentesting.md:68 references/advanced-aws-pentesting.md:149 references/advanced-aws-pentesting.md:152 references/advanced-aws-pentesting.md:155 references/advanced-aws-pentesting.md:183 references/advanced-aws-pentesting.md:313 references/advanced-aws-pentesting.md:316 SKILL.md:99 SKILL.md:102 SKILL.md:105 SKILL.md:121 SKILL.md:125 SKILL.md:348 SKILL.md:377 SKILL.md:381 SKILL.md:40 SKILL.md:44 SKILL.md:99 SKILL.md:102 SKILL.md:105 SKILL.md:121 SKILL.md:125 SKILL.md:136 SKILL.md:211 SKILL.md:212 SKILL.md:231 SKILL.md:309 SKILL.md:348 SKILL.md:377 SKILL.md:381 SKILL.md:99 SKILL.md:102 SKILL.md:105 SKILL.md:121 SKILL.md:125 SKILL.md:136 SKILL.md:348 SKILL.md:377 SKILL.md:381
📁 Filesystem access (5)
🔑 Env variables (3)
Detected Patterns
Malware type keywords×7System reconnaissance×16[HEURISTIC] DANGEROUS COMBINATION: Code execution + Network + Credential access
Audited by: codex View Audit History →
Share & cite this report
Share the versioned assessment report, neutral badge, embed card, and citations. Skillstore reports evidence without deciding whether this Skill is safe.
Copy report link
https://skillstore.io/skills/sickn33-aws-penetration-testing/audits/5?utm_source=security_passport&utm_medium=share&utm_campaign=versioned_reportMarkdown badge
[](https://skillstore.io/skills/sickn33-aws-penetration-testing?utm_source=security_passport_badge)HTML badge
<a href="https://skillstore.io/skills/sickn33-aws-penetration-testing?utm_source=security_passport_badge"><img src="https://skillstore.io/badges/skills/sickn33-aws-penetration-testing/security.svg" alt="Skillstore security assessment" loading="lazy"></a>Embed card
<iframe src="https://skillstore.io/embed/skills/sickn33-aws-penetration-testing.html" title="Skillstore Security Assessment" sandbox="allow-popups allow-popups-to-escape-sandbox" loading="lazy" referrerpolicy="no-referrer" width="420" height="180"></iframe>Academic citations (APA · BibTeX · CFF)
APA citation
zebbern. (2026). aws-penetration-testing security audit report (audit version 5) [Author version unspecified]. Skillstore. https://skillstore.io/skills/sickn33-aws-penetration-testing/audits/5BibTeX citation
@techreport{zebbern-sickn33-aws-penetration-testing-2026,
author = {zebbern},
title = {aws-penetration-testing security audit report (audit version 5)},
institution = {Skillstore},
year = {2026},
number = {5},
url = {https://skillstore.io/skills/sickn33-aws-penetration-testing/audits/5},
note = {Author version unspecified}
}CITATION.cff
cff-version: 1.2.0
message: "If you use this Skill, cite its author and this versioned security audit report."
title: "aws-penetration-testing security audit report (audit version 5)"
version: "unspecified"
type: report
authors:
- name: "zebbern"
date-released: "2026-07-23"
url: "https://skillstore.io/skills/sickn33-aws-penetration-testing/audits/5"
identifiers:
- type: other
value: "skillstore:sickn33-aws-penetration-testing:audit:5"
description: "Skillstore immutable audit report identifier"
Skillstore Score
Why this score Evidence Confidence: Medium 41
Architecture
85
Maintainability
87
Content
69
Community
83
Spec Compliance
What You Can Build
Validate a Cloud Security Review
Create a scoped checklist for read-only AWS enumeration and evidence collection.
Analyze IAM Attack Paths
Review authorized IAM policies for escalation paths and least-privilege fixes.
Prepare Detection Exercises
Translate approved AWS techniques into monitored lab scenarios and defensive validation steps.
Try These Prompts
Create a Read-Only Checklist
Review this authorized AWS lab scope. Create a read-only enumeration checklist with required permissions, evidence, and stop conditions.
Review IAM Escalation Paths
Analyze these authorized IAM policies. Identify escalation paths, affected principals, safe validation steps, and least-privilege remediations.
Plan a Controlled SSRF Test
Plan an approved SSRF test using mock metadata responses. Define evidence, monitoring, cleanup, and controls that prevent real credential retrieval.
Correlate Cross-Service Findings
Correlate these authorized IAM, Lambda, S3, EKS, RDS, and VPC findings. Prioritize attack paths, detection gaps, and defensive fixes.
Best Practices
- Obtain written authorization, define exact accounts and resources, and stop when scope is uncertain.
- Prefer read-only validation, isolated labs, least-privilege test identities, and synthetic secrets.
- Capture evidence, monitor detections, restore changed resources, and document cleanup.
Avoid
- Do not retrieve real credentials or secrets when mock evidence can validate the finding.
- Do not disable CloudTrail, GuardDuty, or other controls during marketplace-driven workflows.
- Do not create persistence, alter production identities, or mount target volumes without explicit approval.
Frequently Asked Questions
Does this skill require authorization?
Yes. Use it only with written permission, defined scope, approved timing, and accountable oversight.
Can it run an AWS assessment automatically?
No. It provides commands and workflows, but it does not enforce scope, approvals, rollback, or evidence handling.
Which AWS services are covered?
It covers IAM, EC2, S3, Lambda, SSM, EBS, ECS, EKS, ECR, RDS, DynamoDB, KMS, Secrets Manager, and VPC.
Can I use it in production?
Use read-only checks first. Any state-changing test needs explicit approval, monitoring, backups, stop conditions, and a rollback plan.
Does it include defensive guidance?
Yes. It includes a security checklist and can support remediation planning, although much of the source material is offensive.
How should credentials be handled?
Use dedicated temporary test credentials with minimal permissions. Never place real secrets in prompts, reports, shell history, or shared logs.
Developer Details
Author
zebbernLicense
MIT
Skillstore revision
r2
Version notice
The author did not declare a version.
Repository
https://github.com/sickn33/antigravity-awesome-skills/tree/main/skills/aws-penetration-testingRef
86d877f219e2131f05dd5b37c5e329c71c7b8ec4
Maintenance freshness
7/26/2026
Usage
9 downloads · 121 views
File structure