Versioned security assessment

Report ID: SA-979BDB6C

7/5/2026, 10:32:53 PM

agent-manager-skill security assessment v3

Skill Security Certification Report

Audit History
Audit model: codex Historical report
Skill name
agent-manager-skill
Version
v3
Maintainer
sickn33
Source
github.com/sickn33/antigravity-awesome-skills/tree/main/skills/agent-manager-skill
Coverage
1 Files scanned · 41 Lines analyzed
Policy version
Unavailable

Highest confirmed finding severity

Medium

1 confirmed security finding requires attention.

Installation context

Historical evidence

This report may not describe the currently installable artifact. Open the current Skill page for install guidance.

Open current Skill page

This report does not block or authorize the manifest or ZIP.

Most static command findings are Markdown formatting false positives, but two ranges contain actual git and python command examples. The network finding is confirmed because the install step clones an external GitHub repository, and a semantic supply-chain concern exists because that URL points outside the audited skill source. No prompt-injection language or data-exfiltration intent was found in SKILL.md.

Report position

Historical report

Open audit history before using this report to install.

Audit attestation

Not attestable

The required immutable binding is incomplete.

Human verification

Not verified

No human verification is recorded for this report.

Coverage

1 Files scanned · 41 Lines analyzed

4 items shown for review

Limitations

This report does not claim runtime or sandbox execution and does not prove the absence of side effects.

Evidence chain

Follow the evidence from source binding to the install contract. Available evidence supports verification; it is not a safety guarantee.

  1. Source

    Binding unavailable

  2. Artifact

    Identity incomplete

  3. Audit

    Complete

  4. Install contract

    Open manifest to verify

    Open manifest

Capabilities observed

Observed means this report recorded supporting evidence. Not recorded does not prove that a capability is absent.

Contains scripts

May execute code included with the Skill.

Not recorded by this audit

Network access

May connect to external services.

Observed in 1 evidence location

Filesystem access

May read or write local files.

Not recorded by this audit

Env variables

May read values from the process environment.

Not recorded by this audit

External commands

May invoke commands or programs outside the Skill.

Observed in 6 evidence locations

Capability review items (3)
Medium
SKILL.md:21-23
Ruby/shell backtick execution
```bash
Although the snippet is the opening fence, the finding range includes line 22, which asks the user to execute git clone against an external repository. This is real shell command guidance with supply-chain exposure.
Medium
SKILL.md:27-35
Ruby/shell backtick execution
```bash
The range contains shell examples that run local python3 agent-manager scripts and assign work to agents. This is legitimate functionality, but it directs external process execution.
Low
SKILL.md:22
Hardcoded URL
git clone https://github.com/fractalmind-ai/agent-manager-skill.git
Line 22 instructs cloning code from a GitHub URL, which creates a network dependency and pulls remote code. GitHub is not inherently malicious, but the network action is real.

Risk findings

Confirmed security concerns are separated from items that still need review.

Confirmed security concerns (1)

RISK-001 Medium
SKILL.md:22
Installation Command Points to External Repository
The installation command clones https://github.com/fractalmind-ai/agent-manager-skill.git, while the audited package source is the marketplace skill at sickn33/antigravity-awesome-skills. Users may run code from a repository that was not part of the one-file audit.
The URL is explicit on line 22 and differs from the audited source URL in the report metadata. I did not inspect that external repository, so the risk is supply-chain exposure rather than proven malicious behavior.

Remediation

Suggested fixes recorded by this audit. Applying them is the maintainer’s responsibility.

  1. FIX-001
    Medium
    External repository install command
    Ensure the cloned repository matches the audited marketplace source, or document that the external repository is separately reviewed before use.
  2. FIX-002
    Medium
    Local command execution workflow
    Add clear review and confirmation steps before running python3 agent-manager scripts or assigning tasks to agents.
  3. FIX-003
    Low
    Operational safeguards are not documented
    Document sandboxing, allowed agent actions, log locations, and cron failure handling for recurring work.

Expert evidence

Immutable subject identity, scanner metadata, dismissed matches, and source-level evidence.

Artifact subject

Marketplace commit
Unavailable
Content hash
Unavailable
Tree hash
Unavailable
Skill path
Unavailable
Audit payload hash
Unavailable

Analysis metadata

Audit model: codex

Analysis state: Complete

Scope is limited to the recorded files, lines, methods, and evidence. No runtime or sandbox execution is claimed.

Verify and export

JSON report CITATION.cff SARIF 2.1.0 Signed installation manifest

The manifest and lockfile bind install artifacts to cryptographic hashes. This integrity claim is separate from the security assessment.

Audit attestation: not_attestable