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Audit History

agent-framework-azure-ai-py - 5 audits

Version comparison

Capability and finding changes across audited versions, newest first.

VersionDateResultReview itemsChange vs previous
v5 LatestJul 23, 2026, 08:09 PM No confirmed findings1No capability change
v4 Jul 8, 2026, 07:04 AM No confirmed findings0No capability change
v3 Jul 5, 2026, 10:30 PM No confirmed findings0No capability change
v2 Jun 30, 2026, 11:21 AM No confirmed findings2No capability change
v1 Feb 24, 2026, 04:22 PM No confirmed findings0Baseline

Jul 23, 2026, 08:09 PM

Most static alerts are false positives caused by Markdown fences, inline code, Python imports, and Python async context managers. The installation example presents one medium supply-chain risk because it installs unpinned prerelease packages.

1
Files scanned
344
Lines analyzed
4
Review items
0
False positives ignored
Capability review items (1)

These are real local capabilities that may be expected for this skill, so they require review but are not counted as confirmed malicious behavior.

Medium
Ruby/shell backtick execution
```bash
The fenced bash example installs unpinned prerelease packages with pip. Executing it downloads and runs package installation code without a reviewed version lock.
Audited by: codex

Jun 30, 2026, 11:21 AM

Most static findings are false positives caused by Markdown fences, Python imports, and Python async context managers in documentation examples. The skill is still medium risk because it instructs users to configure hosted code execution, web search, and MCP network tools for Azure AI agents.

1
Files scanned
334
Lines analyzed
5
Review items
0
False positives ignored
Capability review items (2)

These are real local capabilities that may be expected for this skill, so they require review but are not counted as confirmed malicious behavior.

Medium
Hosted Code, Web Search, and MCP Tool Enablement
The skill demonstrates hosted code execution, Bing web search, and MCP network tooling inside Azure AI agents. This is legitimate agent development guidance, but deployments should restrict tool permissions, review outbound endpoints, and avoid sending sensitive data to hosted tools.
The referenced examples explicitly configure hosted code, web search, and MCP tools. The intent appears educational rather than malicious, so the concern is operational risk rather than confirmed abuse.
Low
Hardcoded Example Service URLs
The skill includes an Azure project endpoint placeholder and a Microsoft Learn MCP endpoint in examples. These are not evidence of credential exfiltration, but users should verify endpoints before production use.
The URLs are visible in documentation examples and point to Azure or Microsoft services. No evidence found that they collect secrets or route traffic to an unrelated destination.
Audited by: codex