Most static alerts are Markdown formatting false positives, including endpoint names, prompt examples, and API path placeholders. I confirmed intended RunComfy CLI commands and outbound Model API requests. They execute local tools and send user data to RunComfy. No prompt injection text or covert malicious intent was found in SKILL.md.
1
Files scanned
212
Lines analyzed
14
Review items
0
False positives ignored
Capability review items (11)
These are real local capabilities that may be expected for this skill, so they require review but are not counted as confirmed malicious behavior.
(Flux 2 / Nano Banana Pro / Seedream) instead. Calls `runcomfy run
The front matter says the skill calls the local RunComfy CLI. That is intended behavior, but it executes a local binary and can transmit user prompts or images to RunComfy.
openai/gpt-image-2/text-to-image` or `/edit` through the local
The front matter continues the RunComfy CLI endpoint reference. This is intended, but local CLI execution and external model submission remain security-relevant.
The fenced shell example installs the skill globally with npx from a GitHub source. The command is user-initiated documentation, but it carries supply-chain and local execution risk if copied.
The prerequisite tells users to install the RunComfy CLI globally with npm. This is expected setup, but global package installation executes third-party code on the user machine.
The prerequisite runs the RunComfy login command. That starts a local authentication flow and creates credential-handling risk, even though it is expected for this service.
1. The skill invokes `runcomfy run openai/gpt-image-2/<endpoint>` with a JSON body matching the sche
The implementation description states that the skill invokes runcomfy run for GPT Image 2 endpoints. This confirms intentional local CLI execution as part of normal operation.
2. The CLI POSTs to `https://model-api.runcomfy.net/v1/models/openai/gpt-image-2/<endpoint>` with th
The How it works section names the RunComfy Model API endpoint and says requests use the user bearer token. This is expected, but prompts, URLs, and auth metadata leave the local machine.
Most static alerts are Markdown formatting false positives, including endpoint names, prompt examples, and API path placeholders. I confirmed intended RunComfy CLI commands and outbound Model API requests. They execute local tools and send user data to RunComfy. No prompt injection text or covert malicious intent was found in SKILL.md.
1
Files scanned
212
Lines analyzed
14
Review items
0
False positives ignored
Capability review items (11)
These are real local capabilities that may be expected for this skill, so they require review but are not counted as confirmed malicious behavior.
(Flux 2 / Nano Banana Pro / Seedream) instead. Calls `runcomfy run
The front matter says the skill calls the local RunComfy CLI. That is intended behavior, but it executes a local binary and can transmit user prompts or images to RunComfy.
openai/gpt-image-2/text-to-image` or `/edit` through the local
The front matter continues the RunComfy CLI endpoint reference. This is intended, but local CLI execution and external model submission remain security-relevant.
The fenced shell example installs the skill globally with npx from a GitHub source. The command is user-initiated documentation, but it carries supply-chain and local execution risk if copied.
The prerequisite tells users to install the RunComfy CLI globally with npm. This is expected setup, but global package installation executes third-party code on the user machine.
The prerequisite runs the RunComfy login command. That starts a local authentication flow and creates credential-handling risk, even though it is expected for this service.
1. The skill invokes `runcomfy run openai/gpt-image-2/<endpoint>` with a JSON body matching the sche
The implementation description states that the skill invokes runcomfy run for GPT Image 2 endpoints. This confirms intentional local CLI execution as part of normal operation.
2. The CLI POSTs to `https://model-api.runcomfy.net/v1/models/openai/gpt-image-2/<endpoint>` with th
The How it works section names the RunComfy Model API endpoint and says requests use the user bearer token. This is expected, but prompts, URLs, and auth metadata leave the local machine.
The review confirmed documented RunComfy CLI execution, a POST to the RunComfy Model API, and local RunComfy token storage. Most other detections are Markdown formatting, example placeholders, REST path abbreviations, or sample prompts with no execution behavior. No prompt injection or covert data exfiltration intent was found.
1
Files scanned
212
Lines analyzed
17
Review items
0
False positives ignored
Capability review items (14)
These are real local capabilities that may be expected for this skill, so they require review but are not counted as confirmed malicious behavior.
- **Token storage**: `runcomfy login` writes the API token to `~/.config/runcomfy/token.json` with m
Line 207 documents RunComfy token storage at a hidden home-directory path. Credential storage is security-sensitive even when owner-only permissions are used.
(Flux 2 / Nano Banana Pro / Seedream) instead. Calls `runcomfy run
The front matter says the skill calls the local RunComfy CLI endpoints. This is expected behavior, but it is real external command use that sends prompts to a remote service.
openai/gpt-image-2/text-to-image` or `/edit` through the local
The front matter names the RunComfy CLI endpoint used by the skill. This confirms external command use, even though the text is documentation rather than executable code.
The prerequisite instructs users to install the RunComfy CLI globally with npm. Global package installation is a real external command with supply-chain impact.
The prerequisite instructs users to run runcomfy login. This is a legitimate authentication command, but it invokes a local CLI and starts a credential flow.
- **Token storage**: `runcomfy login` writes the API token to `~/.config/runcomfy/token.json` with m
The security section documents runcomfy login as a command with credential storage side effects. This is legitimate, but still a real external command risk.
2. The CLI POSTs to `https://model-api.runcomfy.net/v1/models/openai/gpt-image-2/<endpoint>` with th
The How it works section documents an outbound POST to the RunComfy Model API with the user bearer token. This is expected, but it is real network transmission.
The review confirmed documented RunComfy CLI execution, a POST to the RunComfy Model API, and local RunComfy token storage. Most other detections are Markdown formatting, example placeholders, REST path abbreviations, or sample prompts with no execution behavior. No prompt injection or covert data exfiltration intent was found.
1
Files scanned
212
Lines analyzed
17
Review items
0
False positives ignored
Capability review items (14)
These are real local capabilities that may be expected for this skill, so they require review but are not counted as confirmed malicious behavior.
- **Token storage**: `runcomfy login` writes the API token to `~/.config/runcomfy/token.json` with m
Line 207 documents RunComfy token storage at a hidden home-directory path. Credential storage is security-sensitive even when owner-only permissions are used.
(Flux 2 / Nano Banana Pro / Seedream) instead. Calls `runcomfy run
The front matter says the skill calls the local RunComfy CLI endpoints. This is expected behavior, but it is real external command use that sends prompts to a remote service.
openai/gpt-image-2/text-to-image` or `/edit` through the local
The front matter names the RunComfy CLI endpoint used by the skill. This confirms external command use, even though the text is documentation rather than executable code.
The prerequisite instructs users to install the RunComfy CLI globally with npm. Global package installation is a real external command with supply-chain impact.
The prerequisite instructs users to run runcomfy login. This is a legitimate authentication command, but it invokes a local CLI and starts a credential flow.
- **Token storage**: `runcomfy login` writes the API token to `~/.config/runcomfy/token.json` with m
The security section documents runcomfy login as a command with credential storage side effects. This is legitimate, but still a real external command risk.
2. The CLI POSTs to `https://model-api.runcomfy.net/v1/models/openai/gpt-image-2/<endpoint>` with th
The How it works section documents an outbound POST to the RunComfy Model API with the user bearer token. This is expected, but it is real network transmission.
Static analysis correctly found external command, network, and filesystem indicators, but most individual hits are Markdown backticks, command examples, URL placeholders, or prose. No prompt injection or confirmed malicious intent was found; the real risk is that the skill directs users to run the RunComfy CLI, send prompts and image URLs to RunComfy endpoints, store or provide a bearer token, and write generated files locally.
1
Files scanned
212
Lines analyzed
7
Review items
3
False positives ignored
Capability review items (4)
These are real local capabilities that may be expected for this skill, so they require review but are not counted as confirmed malicious behavior.
The skill instructs users to install and run the RunComfy CLI, including commands that submit image jobs and download results. This is expected for the skill, but it is a real external command dependency with network and local output effects.
The commands are explicitly documented and use the runcomfy executable. The risk is operational rather than malicious because the examples are static CLI invocations and not hidden code execution.
The skill documents RUNCOMFY_TOKEN for CI and states that login stores an API token under the user home configuration directory. This is legitimate credential handling, but marketplace users should understand that a local secret is created or supplied.
The file directly documents token storage and environment-token usage. The stated mode 0600 lowers risk, but credential handling remains sensitive.
The skill sends prompts and image URL references to RunComfy model endpoints for remote processing. This is the intended service model, but it has privacy implications for prompts, reference assets, and generated outputs.
The documentation clearly states that API calls and remote URL fetching occur. There is no evidence of unexpected endpoints beyond the documented RunComfy service.
Hardcoded URLs point to RunComfy website, documentation, GitHub, model API endpoints, or example public image URLs. This is expected documentation for a hosted image model skill.
The URLs align with the declared RunComfy integration and model workflow. No unrelated collection endpoint or suspicious third-party callback is present.
Static false positives ignored (3)
These static matches were dismissed by semantic review or matched schema-only tokens, so they are shown for transparency but do not drive the quality score.
Markdown Backticks Misclassified as Ruby Execution
The external command detections are largely Markdown inline code or fenced command examples, not Ruby shell backtick execution. They still identify a CLI-based workflow, but the specific Ruby execution label is a false positive.
The cited lines are Markdown front matter, tables, and prompt examples. No Ruby source file or executable Ruby syntax is present.
The path traversal detections are URL ellipses such as request status and result paths, not filesystem traversal sequences. No evidence found that the skill reads or writes parent directories through these placeholders.
The suspicious sequences appear inside documented HTTP endpoint paths. They are explanatory placeholders and not local file path operations.
Weak Cryptography and Reconnaissance False Positives
The weak cryptography and system reconnaissance alerts appear to match ordinary prose, front matter, headings, or exit-code documentation. No evidence found of cryptographic code, host reconnaissance, or system inventory behavior.
The lines contain description metadata, an exit-code heading, and a jq example for request IDs. They do not implement cryptography or reconnaissance.
User prompts and image URLs are transmitted to RunComfy's model API (model-api.runcomfy.net) for processing. This is the intended function but users should be aware their data leaves the local environment.
Skill requires installation of @runcomfy/cli via npm. This introduces a supply chain dependency on an external package not controlled by the skill author.
RunComfy CLI stores authentication token in ~/.config/runcomfy/token.json. Documented as using mode 0600 permissions which provides adequate local protection.