Versioned security assessment

Report ID: SA-1D3BBA61

5/28/2026, 9:27:43 AM

codex-pet security assessment v1

Skill Security Certification Report

Audit History
Audit model: claude Historical report
Skill name
codex-pet
Version
v1
Maintainer
runcomfy-com
Source
github.com/runcomfy-com/skills/tree/main/codex-pet/
Coverage
1 Files scanned · 348 Lines analyzed
Policy version
Unavailable

Highest confirmed finding severity

Low

1 confirmed security finding requires attention.

Installation context

Historical evidence

This report may not describe the currently installable artifact. Open the current Skill page for install guidance.

Open current Skill page

This report does not block or authorize the manifest or ZIP.

This is a legitimate Codex Pet generator that uses RunComfy CLI and ImageMagick to create animated pet spritesheets. The static analysis flagged many patterns (97 command usages, filesystem access) but these are all legitimate tool invocations. The external commands (`runcomfy run`, `magick`) use hardcoded arguments derived from skill logic, not user-controlled shell input. Network calls go only to runcomfy.net endpoints. Path traversal in PET_NAME is a low concern as writes are scoped to the ~/.codex/pets sandbox. Environment variable access is explicit and documented (RUNCOMFY_TOKEN). No credential exfiltration, no data theft patterns, no command injection vectors confirmed. Skill performs exactly what it claims: generates pet spritesheets via API + ImageMagick transforms.

Report position

Historical report

Open audit history before using this report to install.

Audit attestation

Not attestable

The required immutable binding is incomplete.

Human verification

Not verified

No human verification is recorded for this report.

Coverage

1 Files scanned · 348 Lines analyzed

3 items shown for review

Limitations

This report does not claim runtime or sandbox execution and does not prove the absence of side effects.

Evidence chain

Follow the evidence from source binding to the install contract. Available evidence supports verification; it is not a safety guarantee.

  1. Source

    Binding unavailable

  2. Artifact

    Identity incomplete

  3. Audit

    Complete

  4. Install contract

    Open manifest to verify

    Open manifest

Capabilities observed

Observed means this report recorded supporting evidence. Not recorded does not prove that a capability is absent.

Contains scripts

May execute code included with the Skill.

Not recorded by this audit

Network access

May connect to external services.

Observed in 2 evidence locations

Filesystem access

May read or write local files.

Observed in 2 evidence locations

Env variables

May read values from the process environment.

Observed in 2 evidence locations

External commands

May invoke commands or programs outside the Skill.

Observed in 6 evidence locations

Capability review items (2)
Medium
SKILL.md:242-245
Path Injection via PET_NAME in mkdir/cp Commands
PET_NAME user input is interpolated into mkdir and cp paths without sanitization. A malicious PET_NAME like '../../etc' could escape the intended ~/.codex/pets/ directory. This is a LOW-to-MEDIUM risk because: (1) writes are scoped to local filesystem only, (2) no privilege escalation apparent, (3) Codex pet directories are user-controlled workspace. However, the shell commands at lines 242-245 concatenate PET_NAME directly into mkdir/cp with no validation.
Pattern confirmed: PET_NAME from user input concatenated into mkdir -p DEST path at line 242. However, scope is sandboxed to ~/.codex/pets/ which limits blast radius. Low practical exploitability for remote scenarios.
Low
SKILL.md:342
Hidden File in Home Directory Access
Skill accesses ~/.config/runcomfy/token.json to store API credentials. This is standard configuration file access for authenticated CLI tools, documented openly in the Security & Privacy section. Not a security vulnerability but worth noting for transparency.
Standard credential storage pattern for CLI tools. Token file with mode 0600 is appropriate security practice.

Risk findings

Confirmed security concerns are separated from items that still need review.

Confirmed security concerns (1)

RISK-001 Low
SKILL.md:114
External URL fetch in Image Processing Pipeline
The skill accepts a SOURCE_URL parameter and fetches external images. This is standard for image generation workflows but introduces a data boundary concern: external images are processed by RunComfy's servers. Documented as a known risk.
Image URL processing is a legitimate workflow requirement. Risk is properly documented in Security & Privacy section at line 344.

Expert evidence

Immutable subject identity, scanner metadata, dismissed matches, and source-level evidence.

Artifact subject

Marketplace commit
Unavailable
Content hash
Unavailable
Tree hash
Unavailable
Skill path
Unavailable
Audit payload hash
Unavailable

Analysis metadata

Audit model: claude

Analysis state: Complete

Scope is limited to the recorded files, lines, methods, and evidence. No runtime or sandbox execution is claimed.

Verify and export

JSON report CITATION.cff SARIF 2.1.0 Signed installation manifest

The manifest and lockfile bind install artifacts to cryptographic hashes. This integrity claim is separate from the security assessment.

Audit attestation: not_attestable