Skills prisma-compute Audit History
📦

Audit History

prisma-compute - 7 audits

Version comparison

Capability and finding changes across audited versions, newest first.

VersionDateResultReview itemsChange vs previous
v7 LatestJul 23, 2026, 05:35 PM 43 confirmed16No capability change
v6 Jul 21, 2026, 10:21 AM 1 confirmed0No capability change
v5 Jul 21, 2026, 10:21 AM 1 confirmed0No capability change
v4 Jul 21, 2026, 10:21 AM 1 confirmed0No capability change
v3 Jul 21, 2026, 10:21 AM 1 confirmed0No capability change
v2 Jul 21, 2026, 10:21 AM 1 confirmed0No capability change
v1 Jul 21, 2026, 10:21 AM 1 confirmed0Baseline

Jul 23, 2026, 05:35 PM

No prompt injection or malicious collection endpoint was found; most static matches are Markdown or deployment documentation. The skill still handles secret-bearing environment files, executes mutable package versions, and documents non-interactive production mutations.

7
Files scanned
1,901
Lines analyzed
63
Review items
0
False positives ignored

Confirmed security concerns (43)

High
Environment file access
bunx @prisma/cli@latest project env add --file .env --role production
The guidance configures a local .env file as deployment input, causing secret-bearing values to be read and potentially uploaded to Prisma Compute. This is intended but security-sensitive behavior.
High
Environment file access
bunx @prisma/cli@latest project env add --file .env.preview --role preview
The guidance configures a local .env file as deployment input, causing secret-bearing values to be read and potentially uploaded to Prisma Compute. This is intended but security-sensitive behavior.
High
Environment file access
bunx @prisma/cli@latest project env update --file .env --role production
The guidance configures a local .env file as deployment input, causing secret-bearing values to be read and potentially uploaded to Prisma Compute. This is intended but security-sensitive behavior.
High
Environment file access
`app deploy --env .env` loads environment variables from a file for the deployment. A config-backed
The guidance configures a local .env file as deployment input, causing secret-bearing values to be read and potentially uploaded to Prisma Compute. This is intended but security-sensitive behavior.
High
Environment file access
--env .env
The guidance configures a local .env file as deployment input, causing secret-bearing values to be read and potentially uploaded to Prisma Compute. This is intended but security-sensitive behavior.
High
Environment file access
--env .env.preview
The guidance configures a local .env file as deployment input, causing secret-bearing values to be read and potentially uploaded to Prisma Compute. This is intended but security-sensitive behavior.
High
Environment file access
--env .env
The guidance configures a local .env file as deployment input, causing secret-bearing values to be read and potentially uploaded to Prisma Compute. This is intended but security-sensitive behavior.
High
Environment file access
--env .env
The guidance configures a local .env file as deployment input, causing secret-bearing values to be read and potentially uploaded to Prisma Compute. This is intended but security-sensitive behavior.
High
Environment file access
--env .env
The guidance configures a local .env file as deployment input, causing secret-bearing values to be read and potentially uploaded to Prisma Compute. This is intended but security-sensitive behavior.
High
Environment file access
--env .env.preview
The guidance configures a local .env file as deployment input, causing secret-bearing values to be read and potentially uploaded to Prisma Compute. This is intended but security-sensitive behavior.
High
Environment file access
--env .env
The guidance configures a local .env file as deployment input, causing secret-bearing values to be read and potentially uploaded to Prisma Compute. This is intended but security-sensitive behavior.
High
Environment file access
bunx @prisma/cli@latest app deploy api --prod --yes --env .env
The guidance configures a local .env file as deployment input, causing secret-bearing values to be read and potentially uploaded to Prisma Compute. This is intended but security-sensitive behavior.
High
Environment file access
env: ".env",
The guidance configures a local .env file as deployment input, causing secret-bearing values to be read and potentially uploaded to Prisma Compute. This is intended but security-sensitive behavior.
High
Environment file access
file: [".env", ".env.production"],
The guidance configures a local .env file as deployment input, causing secret-bearing values to be read and potentially uploaded to Prisma Compute. This is intended but security-sensitive behavior.
High
Environment file access
env: "apps/web/.env",
The guidance configures a local .env file as deployment input, causing secret-bearing values to be read and potentially uploaded to Prisma Compute. This is intended but security-sensitive behavior.
High
Environment file access
file: "apps/api/.env",
The guidance configures a local .env file as deployment input, causing secret-bearing values to be read and potentially uploaded to Prisma Compute. This is intended but security-sensitive behavior.
High
Environment variant files
file: [".env", ".env.production"],
The configuration explicitly loads .env and .env.production files. These variants commonly contain deployment secrets and therefore require deliberate scope and repository controls.
High
Environment file access
- a `.env` file containing `DATABASE_URL`
The guidance configures a local .env file as deployment input, causing secret-bearing values to be read and potentially uploaded to Prisma Compute. This is intended but security-sensitive behavior.
High
Environment file access
- an initial Compute deployment with env vars loaded from `.env`
The guidance configures a local .env file as deployment input, causing secret-bearing values to be read and potentially uploaded to Prisma Compute. This is intended but security-sensitive behavior.
High
Environment file access
bunx @prisma/cli@latest app deploy --framework nextjs --env .env
The guidance configures a local .env file as deployment input, causing secret-bearing values to be read and potentially uploaded to Prisma Compute. This is intended but security-sensitive behavior.
High
Environment file access
--env .env
The guidance configures a local .env file as deployment input, causing secret-bearing values to be read and potentially uploaded to Prisma Compute. This is intended but security-sensitive behavior.
High
Environment file access
env: ".env",
The guidance configures a local .env file as deployment input, causing secret-bearing values to be read and potentially uploaded to Prisma Compute. This is intended but security-sensitive behavior.
High
Environment file access
bunx @prisma/cli@latest app deploy --framework nestjs --env .env
The guidance configures a local .env file as deployment input, causing secret-bearing values to be read and potentially uploaded to Prisma Compute. This is intended but security-sensitive behavior.
High
Environment file access
env: ".env",
The guidance configures a local .env file as deployment input, causing secret-bearing values to be read and potentially uploaded to Prisma Compute. This is intended but security-sensitive behavior.
High
Environment file access
bunx @prisma/cli@latest app deploy --framework tanstack-start --env .env
The guidance configures a local .env file as deployment input, causing secret-bearing values to be read and potentially uploaded to Prisma Compute. This is intended but security-sensitive behavior.
High
Environment file access
bunx @prisma/cli@latest app deploy --framework nuxt --env .env
The guidance configures a local .env file as deployment input, causing secret-bearing values to be read and potentially uploaded to Prisma Compute. This is intended but security-sensitive behavior.
High
Environment file access
env: ".env",
The guidance configures a local .env file as deployment input, causing secret-bearing values to be read and potentially uploaded to Prisma Compute. This is intended but security-sensitive behavior.
High
Environment file access
bunx @prisma/cli@latest app deploy --framework astro --env .env
The guidance configures a local .env file as deployment input, causing secret-bearing values to be read and potentially uploaded to Prisma Compute. This is intended but security-sensitive behavior.
High
Environment file access
env: ".env",
The guidance configures a local .env file as deployment input, causing secret-bearing values to be read and potentially uploaded to Prisma Compute. This is intended but security-sensitive behavior.
High
Environment file access
--env .env
The guidance configures a local .env file as deployment input, causing secret-bearing values to be read and potentially uploaded to Prisma Compute. This is intended but security-sensitive behavior.
High
Environment file access
env: ".env",
The guidance configures a local .env file as deployment input, causing secret-bearing values to be read and potentially uploaded to Prisma Compute. This is intended but security-sensitive behavior.
High
Environment file access
env: "packages/db/.env",
The guidance configures a local .env file as deployment input, causing secret-bearing values to be read and potentially uploaded to Prisma Compute. This is intended but security-sensitive behavior.
High
Environment file access
--env packages/db/.env
The guidance configures a local .env file as deployment input, causing secret-bearing values to be read and potentially uploaded to Prisma Compute. This is intended but security-sensitive behavior.
High
Environment file access
bunx @prisma/cli@latest project env add --file .env.preview --branch feature/foo
The guidance configures a local .env file as deployment input, causing secret-bearing values to be read and potentially uploaded to Prisma Compute. This is intended but security-sensitive behavior.
High
Environment file access
test -f .env && sed -n 's/=.*/=<redacted>/p' .env
The command reads a local .env file and prints variable names while redacting values. Redaction reduces exposure, but access to a secret-bearing file is real.
High
Environment file access
bunx @prisma/cli@latest app deploy --json --no-interactive --prod --yes --env .env
The guidance configures a local .env file as deployment input, causing secret-bearing values to be read and potentially uploaded to Prisma Compute. This is intended but security-sensitive behavior.
High
Environment file access
1. Put a real production-ready `DATABASE_URL` in `.env` or project env.
The guidance configures a local .env file as deployment input, causing secret-bearing values to be read and potentially uploaded to Prisma Compute. This is intended but security-sensitive behavior.
High
Environment file access
4. Redeploy with `--env .env` or project env configured.
The guidance configures a local .env file as deployment input, causing secret-bearing values to be read and potentially uploaded to Prisma Compute. This is intended but security-sensitive behavior.
High
Environment file access
bunx @prisma/cli@latest app deploy --prod --yes --env .env
The guidance configures a local .env file as deployment input, causing secret-bearing values to be read and potentially uploaded to Prisma Compute. This is intended but security-sensitive behavior.
High
Environment file access
bunx @prisma/cli@latest app deploy --branch feature/foo --env .env.preview
The guidance configures a local .env file as deployment input, causing secret-bearing values to be read and potentially uploaded to Prisma Compute. This is intended but security-sensitive behavior.
High
Environment file access
- `env-deploy-loads-dotenv` - Generated deploy scripts may load env via `prisma.compute.ts` or `--en
The guidance configures a local .env file as deployment input, causing secret-bearing values to be read and potentially uploaded to Prisma Compute. This is intended but security-sensitive behavior.
High
Unpinned Remote Package Execution
Commands repeatedly execute @prisma/cli@latest and create-prisma@latest through package runners. A compromised or unexpectedly changed release would execute with the agent's local privileges.
The cited commands explicitly use the mutable latest tag with bunx. Package runners download and execute that resolved release.
High
Production Mutation Confirmation Bypass
The skill documents production deploy, promotion, rollback, removal, and other remote mutations with non-interactive confirmation flags. Incorrect target inference could alter live infrastructure.
The cited guidance explicitly combines production operations with --yes. Intent guardrails are present, but the commands bypass interactive confirmation once run.
Capability review items (16)

These are real local capabilities that may be expected for this skill, so they require review but are not counted as confirmed malicious behavior.

High
Database connection strings
bunx @prisma/cli@latest project env add DATABASE_URL=postgresql://... --branch feature/foo
The guidance permits a database URL in command arguments, so substituted credentials can enter shell history or process listings. The example is legitimate but security-sensitive.
High
Database connection strings
bunx @prisma/cli@latest project env update DATABASE_URL=postgresql://... --branch feature/foo
The guidance permits a database URL in command arguments, so substituted credentials can enter shell history or process listings. The example is legitimate but security-sensitive.
High
Database connection strings
- Existing database env values supplied through `--env DATABASE_URL=...`, `--env DIRECT_URL=...`, an
The guidance permits a database URL in command arguments, so substituted credentials can enter shell history or process listings. The example is legitimate but security-sensitive.
High
Database connection strings
- a `.env` file containing `DATABASE_URL`
The documented workflow creates, reads, stores, or transmits a real DATABASE_URL. This is intended deployment behavior, but the value is a credential requiring strict redaction and scope controls.
High
Database connection strings
const databaseUrl = process.env.DATABASE_URL
The documented workflow creates, reads, stores, or transmits a real DATABASE_URL. This is intended deployment behavior, but the value is a credential requiring strict redaction and scope controls.
High
Database connection strings
if (!databaseUrl) throw new Error("DATABASE_URL is required")
The documented workflow creates, reads, stores, or transmits a real DATABASE_URL. This is intended deployment behavior, but the value is a credential requiring strict redaction and scope controls.
High
Database connection strings
envVars: { DATABASE_URL: databaseUrl },
The documented workflow creates, reads, stores, or transmits a real DATABASE_URL. This is intended deployment behavior, but the value is a credential requiring strict redaction and scope controls.
High
Database connection strings
1. Put a real production-ready `DATABASE_URL` in `.env` or project env.
The documented workflow creates, reads, stores, or transmits a real DATABASE_URL. This is intended deployment behavior, but the value is a credential requiring strict redaction and scope controls.
Medium
Hidden file access
env: "apps/web/.env",
The configuration or command explicitly references a hidden .env file as deployment input. That file commonly contains credentials and is read during the intended workflow.
Medium
Hidden file access
file: "apps/api/.env",
The configuration or command explicitly references a hidden .env file as deployment input. That file commonly contains credentials and is read during the intended workflow.
Medium
Hidden file access
env: "packages/db/.env",
The configuration or command explicitly references a hidden .env file as deployment input. That file commonly contains credentials and is read during the intended workflow.
Medium
Hidden file access
--env packages/db/.env
The configuration or command explicitly references a hidden .env file as deployment input. That file commonly contains credentials and is read during the intended workflow.
Medium
Environment variable access (dot notation)
token: process.env.PRISMA_API_TOKEN,
The SDK example reads PRISMA_API_TOKEN from the process environment and supplies it to an authenticated client. This is legitimate secret access that requires redaction and least privilege.
Medium
Environment variable access (dot notation)
const databaseUrl = process.env.DATABASE_URL
The SDK example reads DATABASE_URL from the process environment before deployment. This is legitimate credential handling, but accidental logging or broad process access could expose it.
Medium
Environment variable object
token: process.env.PRISMA_API_TOKEN,
The SDK example reads PRISMA_API_TOKEN from the process environment and supplies it to an authenticated client. This is legitimate secret access that requires redaction and least privilege.
Medium
Environment variable object
const databaseUrl = process.env.DATABASE_URL
The SDK example reads DATABASE_URL from the process environment before deployment. This is legitimate credential handling, but accidental logging or broad process access could expose it.

Risk Factors

🌐 Network access (6)
🔑 Env variables (40)
📁 Filesystem access (5)
⚙️ External commands (50)
Audited by: codex

Jul 21, 2026, 10:21 AM

All 226 static findings are false positives caused by documentation examples, Markdown backticks, deployment configuration, and benign scoped checks. No prompt injection, secret exfiltration, or malicious automation was found. The skill does recommend executing unpinned latest-tag packages, which creates a medium supply-chain risk.

7
Files scanned
1,901
Lines analyzed
5
Review items
0
False positives ignored

Confirmed security concerns (1)

Medium
Unpinned Remote Package Execution Guidance
The skill recommends running packages through bunx with the latest tag. It also documents an installer that shells out to skills@latest. A compromised or changed upstream release could execute unexpected code.
The cited documentation explicitly uses @latest package execution and describes a secondary latest-tag installer. This is a clear supply-chain exposure, although it is not evidence of a current compromise.

Risk Factors

🌐 Network access (6)
🔑 Env variables (40)
📁 Filesystem access (5)
⚙️ External commands (50)
Audited by: claude

Jul 21, 2026, 10:21 AM

All 226 static findings are false positives caused by documentation examples, Markdown backticks, deployment configuration, and benign scoped checks. No prompt injection, secret exfiltration, or malicious automation was found. The skill does recommend executing unpinned latest-tag packages, which creates a medium supply-chain risk.

7
Files scanned
1,901
Lines analyzed
5
Review items
0
False positives ignored

Confirmed security concerns (1)

Medium
Unpinned Remote Package Execution Guidance
The skill recommends running packages through bunx with the latest tag. It also documents an installer that shells out to skills@latest. A compromised or changed upstream release could execute unexpected code.
The cited documentation explicitly uses @latest package execution and describes a secondary latest-tag installer. This is a clear supply-chain exposure, although it is not evidence of a current compromise.

Risk Factors

🌐 Network access (6)
🔑 Env variables (40)
📁 Filesystem access (5)
⚙️ External commands (50)
Audited by: claude

Jul 21, 2026, 10:21 AM

All 226 static findings are false positives caused by documentation examples, Markdown backticks, deployment configuration, and benign scoped checks. No prompt injection, secret exfiltration, or malicious automation was found. The skill does recommend executing unpinned latest-tag packages, which creates a medium supply-chain risk.

7
Files scanned
1,901
Lines analyzed
5
Review items
0
False positives ignored

Confirmed security concerns (1)

Medium
Unpinned Remote Package Execution Guidance
The skill recommends running packages through bunx with the latest tag. It also documents an installer that shells out to skills@latest. A compromised or changed upstream release could execute unexpected code.
The cited documentation explicitly uses @latest package execution and describes a secondary latest-tag installer. This is a clear supply-chain exposure, although it is not evidence of a current compromise.

Risk Factors

🌐 Network access (6)
🔑 Env variables (40)
📁 Filesystem access (5)
⚙️ External commands (50)
Audited by: claude

Jul 21, 2026, 10:21 AM

All 226 static findings are false positives caused by documentation examples, Markdown backticks, deployment configuration, and benign scoped checks. No prompt injection, secret exfiltration, or malicious automation was found. The skill does recommend executing unpinned latest-tag packages, which creates a medium supply-chain risk.

7
Files scanned
1,901
Lines analyzed
5
Review items
0
False positives ignored

Confirmed security concerns (1)

Medium
Unpinned Remote Package Execution Guidance
The skill recommends running packages through bunx with the latest tag. It also documents an installer that shells out to skills@latest. A compromised or changed upstream release could execute unexpected code.
The cited documentation explicitly uses @latest package execution and describes a secondary latest-tag installer. This is a clear supply-chain exposure, although it is not evidence of a current compromise.

Risk Factors

🌐 Network access (6)
🔑 Env variables (40)
📁 Filesystem access (5)
⚙️ External commands (50)
Audited by: claude

Jul 21, 2026, 10:21 AM

All 226 static findings are false positives caused by documentation examples, Markdown backticks, deployment configuration, and benign scoped checks. No prompt injection, secret exfiltration, or malicious automation was found. The skill does recommend executing unpinned latest-tag packages, which creates a medium supply-chain risk.

7
Files scanned
1,901
Lines analyzed
5
Review items
0
False positives ignored

Confirmed security concerns (1)

Medium
Unpinned Remote Package Execution Guidance
The skill recommends running packages through bunx with the latest tag. It also documents an installer that shells out to skills@latest. A compromised or changed upstream release could execute unexpected code.
The cited documentation explicitly uses @latest package execution and describes a secondary latest-tag installer. This is a clear supply-chain exposure, although it is not evidence of a current compromise.

Risk Factors

🌐 Network access (6)
🔑 Env variables (40)
📁 Filesystem access (5)
⚙️ External commands (50)
Audited by: claude

Jul 21, 2026, 10:21 AM

All 226 static findings are false positives caused by documentation examples, Markdown backticks, deployment configuration, and benign scoped checks. No prompt injection, secret exfiltration, or malicious automation was found. The skill does recommend executing unpinned latest-tag packages, which creates a medium supply-chain risk.

7
Files scanned
1,901
Lines analyzed
5
Review items
0
False positives ignored

Confirmed security concerns (1)

Medium
Unpinned Remote Package Execution Guidance
The skill recommends running packages through bunx with the latest tag. It also documents an installer that shells out to skills@latest. A compromised or changed upstream release could execute unexpected code.
The cited documentation explicitly uses @latest package execution and describes a secondary latest-tag installer. This is a clear supply-chain exposure, although it is not evidence of a current compromise.

Risk Factors

🌐 Network access (6)
🔑 Env variables (40)
📁 Filesystem access (5)
⚙️ External commands (50)
Audited by: claude