Versioned security assessment

Report ID: SA-02BE9409

8/9/2026, 9:56:16 AM

project-development security assessment v8

Skill Security Certification Report

Audit History
Scanner version 3.0.0 Audit model: codex Latest published report
Skill name
project-development
Version
v8
Maintainer
muratcankoylan
Source
github.com/muratcankoylan/Agent-Skills-for-Context-Engineering/tree/main/skills/project-development
Coverage
4 Files scanned · 2,102 Lines analyzed
Policy version
skillstore-security-audit-policy-v1

Highest confirmed finding severity

Medium

3 confirmed security findings require attention.

Installation context

Check the current Skill page

This page summarizes report evidence only. The Skill page provides the canonical install advisory.

Open current Skill page

This report does not block or authorize the manifest or ZIP.

Most static findings are false positives caused by Markdown formatting, documentation examples, benign citations, and mislabeled text. The executable template has medium-risk path traversal, HTML injection, and indirect prompt injection weaknesses. These issues should be fixed before marketplace publication.

Report position

Latest published report

Latest refers to the report sequence, not to artifact currentness.

Audit attestation

Active attestation

A public attestation is available for this exact report.

Human verification

Not verified

No human verification is recorded for this report.

Coverage

4 Files scanned · 2,102 Lines analyzed

9 items shown for review

Limitations

This report does not claim runtime or sandbox execution and does not prove the absence of side effects.

Evidence chain

Follow the evidence from source binding to the install contract. Available evidence supports verification; it is not a safety guarantee.

  1. Source

    Commit and path bound

  2. Artifact

    Content and tree hashes bound

  3. Audit

    Complete

  4. Install contract

    Open manifest to verify

    Open manifest

Capabilities observed

Observed means this report recorded supporting evidence. Not recorded does not prove that a capability is absent.

Contains scripts

May execute code included with the Skill.

Not recorded by this audit

Network access

May connect to external services.

Observed in 2 evidence locations

Filesystem access

May read or write local files.

Observed in 12 evidence locations

Env variables

May read values from the process environment.

Not recorded by this audit

External commands

May invoke commands or programs outside the Skill.

Observed in 18 evidence locations

Capability review items (6)
Medium
scripts/pipeline_template.py:182
Python file write/append
with open(raw_file, "w") as f:
This executable write uses a path derived from an unvalidated batch identifier. Absolute or traversal values can redirect pipeline output outside the intended directory.
Medium
scripts/pipeline_template.py:246
Python file write/append
with open(prompt_file, "w") as f:
This executable write uses a path derived from an unvalidated batch identifier. Absolute or traversal values can redirect pipeline output outside the intended directory.
Medium
scripts/pipeline_template.py:314
Python file write/append
with open(response_file, "w") as f:
This executable write uses a path derived from an unvalidated batch identifier. Absolute or traversal values can redirect pipeline output outside the intended directory.
Medium
scripts/pipeline_template.py:404
Python file write/append
with open(parsed_file, "w") as f:
This executable write uses a path derived from an unvalidated batch identifier. Absolute or traversal values can redirect pipeline output outside the intended directory.
Medium
scripts/pipeline_template.py:417
Python file write/append
with open(agg_file, "w") as f:
This executable write uses a path derived from an unvalidated batch identifier. Absolute or traversal values can redirect pipeline output outside the intended directory.
Medium
scripts/pipeline_template.py:547
Python file write/append
with open(output_file, "w") as f:
This executable write uses a path derived from an unvalidated batch identifier. Absolute or traversal values can redirect pipeline output outside the intended directory.

Risk findings

Confirmed security concerns are separated from items that still need review.

Confirmed security concerns (3)

RISK-001 Medium
scripts/pipeline_template.py:132-153scripts/pipeline_template.py:603-652scripts/pipeline_template.py:767-773
Unvalidated Identifiers Permit Path Traversal
Batch and item identifiers are joined without validation. Absolute or traversal paths can redirect writes and cleanup deletions outside intended directories.
The CLI value reaches Path joins without confinement checks, and cleanup unlinks files beneath the resulting path.
RISK-002 Medium
scripts/pipeline_template.py:571-596scripts/pipeline_template.py:767-770
Generated HTML Includes Unescaped Batch Identifier
The batch identifier is inserted into title and heading markup without escaping. A crafted identifier can inject active content when the report opens.
The CLI-controlled batch_id is interpolated directly into two HTML contexts while other displayed strings are explicitly escaped.
RISK-003 Medium
scripts/pipeline_template.py:256-264scripts/pipeline_template.py:306-315
Untrusted Source Content Can Manipulate Model Instructions
Acquired title and content are inserted directly into the model prompt. Malicious source text can alter requested behavior or corrupt structured output.
The template interpolates source fields without trust-boundary controls, then passes the complete prompt to the configured LLM call.

Remediation

Suggested fixes recorded by this audit. Applying them is the maintainer’s responsibility.

  1. FIX-001
    Medium
    Batch and item identifiers can escape configured data and output directories.
    Reject absolute paths and separators, allow only a strict identifier pattern, and verify every resolved path remains under its configured root.
  2. FIX-002
    Medium
    The generated HTML interpolates batch_id without escaping.
    Escape batch_id with html.escape before every HTML insertion, and add a test containing markup characters.
  3. FIX-003
    Medium
    Acquired content shares the instruction channel with pipeline directions.
    Mark source text as untrusted data, isolate it with provider-supported message boundaries, validate outputs, and test adversarial source content.

Expert evidence

Immutable subject identity, scanner metadata, dismissed matches, and source-level evidence.

Artifact subject

Marketplace commit
02be9409c79ca1183f7844009c14d9df684d0cf9
Content hash
acfeda3048cf6213be2d0c4699c1884914a1a044ca2707094483ca6423d17a11
Tree hash
f621cb6c830c6a2b424e8fb65911329b9338ae6da65e619dd634891bd930125d
Skill path
skills/muratcankoylan/project-development
Audit payload hash
26a7aba013db219c808c8a2635ba7c6a

Analysis metadata

Audit model: codex

Analysis state: Complete

Scope is limited to the recorded files, lines, methods, and evidence. No runtime or sandbox execution is claimed.

Verify and export

JSON report Signed attestation CITATION.cff SARIF 2.1.0 Signed installation manifest Source

The manifest and lockfile bind install artifacts to cryptographic hashes. This integrity claim is separate from the security assessment.

Audit attestation: active