Versioned security assessment

Report ID: SA-02BE9409

8/9/2026, 8:43:46 AM

gif-sticker-maker security assessment v5

Skill Security Certification Report

Audit History
Scanner version 3.0.0 Audit model: codex Latest published report
Skill name
gif-sticker-maker
Version
v1.2
Maintainer
MiniMax-AI
Source
github.com/MiniMax-AI/skills/tree/main/skills/gif-sticker-maker
Coverage
8 Files scanned · 683 Lines analyzed
Policy version
skillstore-security-audit-policy-v1

Highest confirmed finding severity

Medium

3 confirmed security findings require attention.

Installation context

Check the current Skill page

This page summarizes report evidence only. The Skill page provides the canonical install advisory.

Open current Skill page

This report does not block or authorize the manifest or ZIP.

Most static findings are false positives caused by documented credential handling, expected output writes, Markdown formatting, and shell-safe FFmpeg calls. Confirmed risks involve external transmission of prompts and photos, unrestricted endpoint configuration, and unvalidated remote downloads. No prompt injection or malicious system-reconnaissance intent was found.

Report position

Latest published report

Latest refers to the report sequence, not to artifact currentness.

Audit attestation

Active attestation

A public attestation is available for this exact report.

Human verification

Not verified

No human verification is recorded for this report.

Coverage

8 Files scanned · 683 Lines analyzed

9 items shown for review

Limitations

This report does not claim runtime or sandbox execution and does not prove the absence of side effects.

Evidence chain

Follow the evidence from source binding to the install contract. Available evidence supports verification; it is not a safety guarantee.

  1. Source

    Commit and path bound

  2. Artifact

    Content and tree hashes bound

  3. Audit

    Complete

  4. Install contract

    Open manifest to verify

    Open manifest

Capabilities observed

Observed means this report recorded supporting evidence. Not recorded does not prove that a capability is absent.

Contains scripts

May execute code included with the Skill.

Not recorded by this audit

Network access

May connect to external services.

Observed in 10 evidence locations

Filesystem access

May read or write local files.

Observed in 7 evidence locations

Env variables

May read values from the process environment.

Observed in 13 evidence locations

External commands

May invoke commands or programs outside the Skill.

Observed in 20 evidence locations

Capability review items (6)
Medium
scripts/minimax_image.py:74
Python HTTP libraries
resp = requests.post(
This request sends prompts, optional reference-image data, and a bearer credential to the configured API endpoint, creating an intentional external data-disclosure boundary.
Medium
scripts/minimax_image.py:92
Python HTTP libraries
resp = requests.get(url, timeout=60)
The script downloads an API-provided URL without validating its scheme or host, so a compromised or nonstandard endpoint can direct requests to unintended locations.
Medium
scripts/minimax_video.py:98
Python HTTP libraries
resp = requests.post(
This request sends the animation prompt, optional base64 source image, and bearer credential to the configured API endpoint.
Medium
scripts/minimax_video.py:163
Python HTTP libraries
video_resp = requests.get(download_url, timeout=300)
The script fetches an API-provided download URL without scheme, host, redirect, or response-size validation, permitting unintended network access or resource exhaustion.
Low
scripts/minimax_video.py:118
Python HTTP libraries
resp = requests.get(
This is an intentional authenticated network request that repeatedly sends the task identifier to the configured external API.
Low
scripts/minimax_video.py:148
Python HTTP libraries
resp = requests.get(
This authenticated request sends a generated file identifier to the configured external API to obtain a download location.

Risk findings

Confirmed security concerns are separated from items that still need review.

Confirmed security concerns (3)

RISK-001 Medium
scripts/minimax_image.py:24-35scripts/minimax_image.py:74-78scripts/minimax_video.py:28-53scripts/minimax_video.py:98-103
Configurable API Endpoint Receives Credentials and User Media
MINIMAX_API_BASE accepts any configured destination. The scripts send the bearer key, prompts, and reference images to that destination without enforcing official HTTPS hosts.
The endpoint is taken directly from the environment and the same endpoint receives authenticated requests containing generation inputs.
RISK-002 Medium
scripts/minimax_image.py:90-96scripts/minimax_video.py:158-168
Unrestricted Remote Media Downloads
Download URLs from API responses are fetched without host validation, streaming, or size limits. A malicious endpoint can trigger internal requests or excessive memory use.
Both download paths accept remote URLs and buffer complete response bodies without validating destinations or enforcing byte limits.
RISK-003 Medium
SKILL.md:55-57scripts/minimax_image.py:119-133scripts/minimax_video.py:188-193
Personal Photos Are Disclosed to an External Generation Service
The workflow preserves facial likeness by encoding user photos into generation requests. Users need clear consent and retention guidance before processing personal images.
The documented workflow explicitly preserves facial likeness, and both scripts encode local images for submission to the configured service.

Remediation

Suggested fixes recorded by this audit. Applying them is the maintainer’s responsibility.

  1. FIX-001
    Medium
    Bearer credentials and user media can be sent to any MINIMAX_API_BASE value.
    Require HTTPS and allowlist official MiniMax API hosts, or require explicit confirmation before using a custom host.
  2. FIX-002
    Medium
    API-provided media URLs are downloaded without destination or size validation.
    Validate HTTPS hosts and redirects, stream downloads, set byte limits, and reject private or loopback destinations.
  3. FIX-003
    Medium
    The workflow sends personal photos to an external generation provider.
    Obtain explicit user consent and disclose the provider, purpose, and applicable retention policy before uploading images.

Expert evidence

Immutable subject identity, scanner metadata, dismissed matches, and source-level evidence.

Artifact subject

Marketplace commit
02be9409c79ca1183f7844009c14d9df684d0cf9
Content hash
57002b47b7aaffb784acedae2750e14a75dc18ba58edb003f846755d7eb0c447
Tree hash
37c300e7b8a7e9b9d06851161046f865f42dc75c671b103462dca6a692f41c8b
Skill path
skills/minimax-ai/gif-sticker-maker
Audit payload hash
e7239e51f415e846f2d172ee9c034577

Analysis metadata

Audit model: codex

Analysis state: Complete

Scope is limited to the recorded files, lines, methods, and evidence. No runtime or sandbox execution is claimed.

Verify and export

JSON report Signed attestation CITATION.cff SARIF 2.1.0 Signed installation manifest Source

The manifest and lockfile bind install artifacts to cryptographic hashes. This integrity claim is separate from the security assessment.

Audit attestation: active