Versioned security assessment

Report ID: SA-E9011940

6/30/2026, 8:10:29 AM

design-to-code security assessment v2

Skill Security Certification Report

Audit History
Audit model: codex Historical report
Skill name
design-to-code
Version
v2
Maintainer
MigoXLab
Source
github.com/MigoXLab/coderio/tree/main/skills/design-to-code/
Coverage
4 Files scanned · 671 Lines analyzed
Policy version
Unavailable

Highest confirmed finding severity

Medium

3 confirmed security findings require attention.

Installation context

Historical evidence

This report may not describe the currently installable artifact. Open the current Skill page for install guidance.

Open current Skill page

This report does not block or authorize the manifest or ZIP.

Static analysis reported many high and critical matches, but most are false positives from license text, Markdown code fences, and words such as design or code. Confirmed risk remains medium because the skill uses a local Node helper that fetches Figma data with a user token, writes project files, and saves generated component code.

Report position

Historical report

Open audit history before using this report to install.

Audit attestation

Not attestable

The required immutable binding is incomplete.

Human verification

Not verified

No human verification is recorded for this report.

Coverage

4 Files scanned · 671 Lines analyzed

3 items shown for review

Limitations

This report does not claim runtime or sandbox execution and does not prove the absence of side effects.

Evidence chain

Follow the evidence from source binding to the install contract. Available evidence supports verification; it is not a safety guarantee.

  1. Source

    Binding unavailable

  2. Artifact

    Identity incomplete

  3. Audit

    Complete

  4. Install contract

    Open manifest to verify

    Open manifest

Capabilities observed

Observed means this report recorded supporting evidence. Not recorded does not prove that a capability is absent.

Contains scripts

May execute code included with the Skill.

Observed in 2 evidence locations

Network access

May connect to external services.

Observed in 2 evidence locations

Filesystem access

May read or write local files.

Observed in 4 evidence locations

Env variables

May read values from the process environment.

Not recorded by this audit

External commands

May invoke commands or programs outside the Skill.

Observed in 4 evidence locations

Risk findings

Confirmed security concerns are separated from items that still need review.

Confirmed security concerns (3)

RISK-001 Medium
SKILL.md:58-60scripts/coderio-skill.mjs:110-125
Figma Token Used by Network Fetch Workflow
The skill instructs users to pass a Figma URL and token to the helper script. The script parses the URL, calls coderio Figma helpers, downloads a thumbnail, and writes processed design data. This is expected behavior, but users must understand that a personal access token is handled by local script and dependency code.
The network workflow is explicit and semantically tied to Figma fetching. I found no evidence of unrelated exfiltration, so the risk is controlled but real.
RISK-002 Medium
scripts/coderio-skill.mjs:19-21scripts/coderio-skill.mjs:120-125scripts/coderio-skill.mjs:145-153scripts/coderio-skill.mjs:273-287
Generated Data and Code Written to Workspace
The helper creates process, scripts, and asset directories, writes processed Figma data, saves protocol files, and stores generated component code under the project source tree. This is necessary for the skill, but it can overwrite or introduce files if inputs or generated protocol data are wrong.
The file writes are direct and repeated across the helper workflow. The writes target expected project paths, so this is a moderate operational risk, not confirmed malicious behavior.
RISK-003 Medium
scripts/coderio-skill.mjs:273-287SKILL.md:136-144
AI-Generated Component Paths Influence Code Save Target
The save-code command reads generated output and protocol data, resolves a component path, and writes the resulting code. Because protocol content is derived from design data and model-generated files, users should review paths and code before saving into a project.
The save target depends on protocol data and a resolver from coderio. I did not find evidence that it escapes the project, but the path is not hardcoded in this file.

Expert evidence

Immutable subject identity, scanner metadata, dismissed matches, and source-level evidence.

Artifact subject

Marketplace commit
Unavailable
Content hash
Unavailable
Tree hash
Unavailable
Skill path
Unavailable
Audit payload hash
Unavailable

Analysis metadata

Audit model: codex

Analysis state: Complete

Scope is limited to the recorded files, lines, methods, and evidence. No runtime or sandbox execution is claimed.

Static false positives ignored (3)
Low
SKILL.md:33-42SKILL.md:49-60SKILL.md:69-81SKILL.md:131-144
Markdown Command Blocks Trigger External Command Matches
The SKILL.md detections mostly point to fenced shell examples and inline node commands that users intentionally run during the workflow. These are not hidden command execution inside the skill, but they should remain visible in marketplace risk labels.
The flagged lines are documentation examples, not calls to a process execution API. They still matter because users are asked to run the commands manually.
Low
LICENSE.txt:3LICENSE.txt:195scripts/coderio-skill.mjs:8-10SKILL.md:1-8
License and Keyword Matches Are False Positives
The Apache license URLs are ordinary license references. The weak cryptography and Windows SAM detections are caused by words in license text, Markdown, or imported identifier names, not actual cryptographic or credential access code.
The reviewed context shows license prose and benign identifiers, with no crypto API or Windows credential database access. No prompt-injection text was found in the searched files.
Low
scripts/coderio-skill.mjs:174scripts/coderio-skill.mjs:191-192scripts/coderio-skill.mjs:260-266scripts/coderio-skill.mjs:283-287
Template Literals Misclassified as Shell Backticks
Several script detections identify JavaScript template literals used for messages, prompts, paths, and errors. These are not Ruby or shell backtick execution.
The code uses template strings inside JavaScript expressions and prompt text. I found no child_process, exec, spawn, or equivalent shell execution in the helper file.

Verify and export

JSON report CITATION.cff SARIF 2.1.0 Signed installation manifest

The manifest and lockfile bind install artifacts to cryptographic hashes. This integrity claim is separate from the security assessment.

Audit attestation: not_attestable