Versioned security assessment

Report ID: SA-EBDFE608

7/23/2026, 6:24:16 PM

longbridge-technical security assessment v5

Skill Security Certification Report

Audit History
Scanner version 3.0.0 Audit model: codex Historical report
Skill name
longbridge-technical
Version
v1.0.0
Maintainer
longbridge
Source
github.com/longbridge/skills/tree/main/skills/longbridge-technical
Coverage
10 Files scanned · 1,735 Lines analyzed
Policy version
skillstore-security-audit-policy-v1

Highest confirmed finding severity

Medium

1 confirmed security finding requires attention.

Installation context

Historical evidence

This report may not describe the currently installable artifact. Open the current Skill page for install guidance.

Open current Skill page

This report does not block or authorize the manifest or ZIP.

Most static matches are Markdown syntax, prose, calculations, or safe device redirection. Confirmed risks include predictable shared temporary files, shell commands with a user-derived symbol, unpinned package installation, and automatic access to sensitive brokerage data.

Report position

Historical report

Open audit history before using this report to install.

Audit attestation

Attestation superseded

A newer attestation exists.

Human verification

Not verified

No human verification is recorded for this report.

Coverage

10 Files scanned · 1,735 Lines analyzed

10 items shown for review

Limitations

This report does not claim runtime or sandbox execution and does not prove the absence of side effects.

Evidence chain

Follow the evidence from source binding to the install contract. Available evidence supports verification; it is not a safety guarantee.

  1. Source

    Commit and path bound

  2. Artifact

    Content and tree hashes bound

  3. Audit

    Complete

  4. Install contract

    Open manifest to verify

    Open manifest

Capabilities observed

Observed means this report recorded supporting evidence. Not recorded does not prove that a capability is absent.

Contains scripts

May execute code included with the Skill.

Not recorded by this audit

Network access

May connect to external services.

Not recorded by this audit

Filesystem access

May read or write local files.

Observed in 5 evidence locations

Env variables

May read values from the process environment.

Observed in 4 evidence locations

External commands

May invoke commands or programs outside the Skill.

Observed in 16 evidence locations

Capability review items (9)
Medium
references/elliott-wave.md:31
Temp directory access
- Always redirect CLI output to a temp file (e.g. `/tmp/kline_day.json`) — the CLI may
The workflow directs agents to store market data in a predictable shared /tmp path. Another local process could replace or read that file through a collision or symbolic link.
Medium
references/elliott-wave.md:55
Temp directory access
python3 scripts/signal_engine.py --kline /tmp/kline_day.json --symbol SYMBOL
The command reads the predictable /tmp/kline_day.json path created earlier. Shared temporary paths can expose the analysis to tampered input.
Medium
references/elliott-wave.md:280
Temp directory access
python3 scripts/signal_engine.py --kline /tmp/kline_day.json --symbol AAPL.US
The usage example again consumes a fixed file in the shared temporary directory. It does not establish private creation, ownership checks, or cleanup.
Medium
SKILL.md:34-36
Ruby/shell backtick execution
```bash
The Bash example runs the Longbridge CLI with a symbol derived from user input. Without strict validation and argument-safe invocation, crafted symbol text could alter the shell command.
Medium
SKILL.md:40
Ruby/shell backtick execution
- **If `longbridge` CLI is installed** (via `longbridge-market-data` or standalone): run the command
The instruction tells the agent to run the earlier shell command directly. Its symbol placeholder originates from user input and the root instructions provide no strict validation rule.
Medium
SKILL.md:79-82
Ruby/shell backtick execution
Auto-detect fractal (分型), bi (笔), zhongshu (中枢), buy/sell signals (1/2/3 buy). Requires `pip install
The skill recommends installing the unpinned czsc package from PyPI. Package installation executes third-party setup code and creates a supply-chain exposure.
Medium
SKILL.md:82-89
Ruby/shell backtick execution
BOS (Break of Structure), ChoCH, FVG (Fair Value Gap), Order Block detection. Requires `pip install
The skill recommends an unpinned smartmoneyconcepts installation. Installing an unresolved package version can execute unreviewed third-party code.
Medium
SKILL.md:96
Ruby/shell backtick execution
| `ModuleNotFoundError: czsc` | Run `pip install czsc` before using Chan Theory |
The error guidance explicitly tells users or agents to run an unpinned pip install for czsc. That operation executes code from a mutable third-party package.
Medium
SKILL.md:97
Ruby/shell backtick execution
| `ModuleNotFoundError: smartmoneyconcepts` | Run `pip install smartmoneyconcepts` before using SMC
The error guidance explicitly recommends an unpinned smartmoneyconcepts installation. This introduces third-party package execution without version or hash verification.

Risk findings

Confirmed security concerns are separated from items that still need review.

Confirmed security concerns (1)

RISK-001 Medium
SKILL.md:10-14references/turtle-signal.md:101-106references/turtle-signal.md:250-252references/turtle-signal.md:276-289
Undisclosed Automatic Brokerage Data Access
The metadata claims no login is required, but the Turtle workflow automatically reads net assets, positions, and order history. A prohibition on unauthorized access exists, yet the workflow contains no explicit consent gate.
The cited workflow explicitly prioritizes automatic account queries while the root metadata says no login is required. The only consent language is a prohibition, not an implemented confirmation step.

Remediation

Suggested fixes recorded by this audit. Applying them is the maintainer’s responsibility.

  1. FIX-001
    Medium
    The Elliott Wave workflow uses a predictable file under /tmp.
    Create a private temporary file with mktemp, restrict permissions, pass its path explicitly, and delete it after analysis.
  2. FIX-002
    Medium
    A user-derived market symbol is placed in commands that agents are told to run.
    Validate symbols with a strict market-specific pattern and invoke the CLI with an argument array instead of shell interpolation.
  3. FIX-003
    Medium
    The skill recommends installing unpinned third-party Python packages.
    Pin reviewed package versions, publish expected hashes, and require explicit approval before any installation.
  4. FIX-004
    Medium
    The Turtle workflow can read net assets, positions, and order history before an explicit consent step.
    Ask for separate consent before each sensitive account query and display the active account type before reading data.

Expert evidence

Immutable subject identity, scanner metadata, dismissed matches, and source-level evidence.

Artifact subject

Marketplace commit
ebdfe608f5de2b66ff37ab4af12af8ac4f5e8006
Content hash
f500e315d333a3d1ab8c19dde28324da08d21756964936b1c829daccbbcd19c6
Tree hash
4a56b09e85dafc222fbd2d59e4030f3b21174919a4f567123af0f7160b043793
Skill path
skills/longbridge/longbridge-technical
Audit payload hash
bc9ce16a69ef6544306f43240b24a10a

Analysis metadata

Audit model: codex

Analysis state: Complete

Scope is limited to the recorded files, lines, methods, and evidence. No runtime or sandbox execution is claimed.

Verify and export

JSON report Signed attestation CITATION.cff SARIF 2.1.0 Signed installation manifest Source

The manifest and lockfile bind install artifacts to cryptographic hashes. This integrity claim is separate from the security assessment.

Audit attestation: superseded