Versioned security assessment

Report ID: SA-F6F2B181

6/30/2026, 5:56:15 AM

string-database security assessment v5

Skill Security Certification Report

Audit History
Audit model: codex Historical report
Skill name
string-database
Version
v5
Maintainer
K-Dense-AI
Source
github.com/K-Dense-AI/claude-scientific-skills/tree/main/scientific-skills/string-database
Coverage
3 Files scanned · 1,360 Lines analyzed
Policy version
Unavailable

Highest confirmed finding severity

Low

2 confirmed security findings require attention.

Installation context

Historical evidence

This report may not describe the currently installable artifact. Open the current Skill page for install guidance.

Open current Skill page

This report does not block or authorize the manifest or ZIP.

AI review found no prompt injection, malicious intent, shell execution, credential theft, or weak cryptography implementation. The main confirmed risk is intentional external network access to the STRING API, which can disclose submitted protein identifiers; publish with a clear network-use warning.

Report position

Historical report

Open audit history before using this report to install.

Audit attestation

Not attestable

The required immutable binding is incomplete.

Human verification

Not verified

No human verification is recorded for this report.

Coverage

3 Files scanned · 1,360 Lines analyzed

5 items shown for review

Limitations

This report does not claim runtime or sandbox execution and does not prove the absence of side effects.

Evidence chain

Follow the evidence from source binding to the install contract. Available evidence supports verification; it is not a safety guarantee.

  1. Source

    Binding unavailable

  2. Artifact

    Identity incomplete

  3. Audit

    Complete

  4. Install contract

    Open manifest to verify

    Open manifest

Capabilities observed

Observed means this report recorded supporting evidence. Not recorded does not prove that a capability is absent.

Contains scripts

May execute code included with the Skill.

Observed in 2 evidence locations

Network access

May connect to external services.

Observed in 5 evidence locations

Filesystem access

May read or write local files.

Observed in 3 evidence locations

Env variables

May read values from the process environment.

Not recorded by this audit

External commands

May invoke commands or programs outside the Skill.

Not recorded by this audit

Capability review items (3)
Medium
scripts/string_api.py:54-66scripts/string_api.py:116-119scripts/string_api.py:248-251references/string_reference.md:17-19
External API Transmission of Protein Identifiers
The helper functions intentionally send supplied protein identifiers and species data to string-db.org through urllib requests. This is core functionality, but unpublished protein lists or sensitive research targets could be disclosed to an external service.
Network calls to the documented STRING host are directly present in executable helper functions. The intent is legitimate research access, so the risk is data disclosure rather than malicious exfiltration.
Medium
scripts/string_api.py:356-369
Standalone Script Performs Live API Calls
Running the helper module directly triggers example calls to STRING version, identifier mapping, and network endpoints. This is transparent example behavior, but users should know that direct execution contacts the external API.
The __main__ block explicitly calls functions that perform urllib requests. It only runs when the script is executed directly, which limits the impact.
Low
scripts/string_api.py:145-149SKILL.md:113-115SKILL.md:296-297
Local Image File Write Examples
Documentation and helper examples write returned PNG network images to fixed local filenames. The filenames are hardcoded examples and do not use user-controlled paths, so path traversal evidence was not found.
The file writes are visible and limited to fixed PNG filenames in examples. The risk is low because there is no evidence of arbitrary path input.

Risk findings

Confirmed security concerns are separated from items that still need review.

Confirmed security concerns (2)

RISK-001 Low
SKILL.md:43-55SKILL.md:275-278references/string_reference.md:23-29
Dismissed Shell Execution Detections in Markdown
The numerous Ruby or shell backtick detections are markdown inline code, code fences, API endpoint names, and Python import examples. No evidence found of shell command execution in the reviewed files.
The cited lines are documentation markup or static Python import examples, not executable shell backticks. Targeted review found no subprocess, os.system, or shell invocation evidence.
RISK-002 Low
SKILL.md:275-278SKILL.md:306-308SKILL.md:371-373
Dismissed Dynamic Import Detections
The import-related static hits in SKILL.md are ordinary documented Python import statements inside examples. No evidence found of dynamic import expressions or runtime module loading logic.
The cited examples import named helper functions from a local script. They are documentation examples, not dynamic import calls with computed module names.

Expert evidence

Immutable subject identity, scanner metadata, dismissed matches, and source-level evidence.

Artifact subject

Marketplace commit
Unavailable
Content hash
Unavailable
Tree hash
Unavailable
Skill path
Unavailable
Audit payload hash
Unavailable

Analysis metadata

Audit model: codex

Analysis state: Complete

Scope is limited to the recorded files, lines, methods, and evidence. No runtime or sandbox execution is claimed.

Static false positives ignored (1)
Low
SKILL.md:3scripts/string_api.py:4-10references/string_reference.md:347-356
Dismissed Weak Crypto and Secret Access Detections
The weak cryptography alerts match STRING terminology, database words, identifiers, or endpoint text rather than cryptographic APIs. The secret-key alert points to documentation for a STRING API endpoint, not environment-variable access or credential harvesting.
The reviewed locations contain prose and documented endpoint paths, with no hashlib, crypto primitive use, process environment access, or stored secrets. The confidence is high because direct file context contradicts the static labels.

Verify and export

JSON report CITATION.cff SARIF 2.1.0 Signed installation manifest

The manifest and lockfile bind install artifacts to cryptographic hashes. This integrity claim is separate from the security assessment.

Audit attestation: not_attestable