Skills using-sops
📦

using-sops

Content revision r1 Critical ⚙️ External commands🌐 Network access📁 Filesystem access🔑 Env variables

Manage SOPS Secrets in Repositories

Encrypted repository secrets require careful commands, keys, and environment handling. This skill guides SOPS workflows through an existing pnpm secrets wrapper.

Supports: Claude Codex Code(CC)
⚠️ 38 Poor

Install with my Agent

Copy this request to your Agent. It includes the canonical Skill page and manifest.

Agent request
Review the Skillstore skill "using-sops" from https://skillstore.io/skills/jssblck-using-sops.md and its manifest at https://skillstore.io/api/skills/jssblck-using-sops/manifest. Verify the artifact. Do not auto-install. Inspect the skill and report your findings, then wait for an operator or manual installation decision.

Your Agent should still show its plan and request any confirmation required by the security policy.

Agent-readable resources

Use these links when an AI agent, crawler, or script needs clean context instead of reading the full page.

Markdown detail GET /skills/jssblck-using-sops.md Signed manifest GET /api/skills/jssblck-using-sops/manifest Signed lockfile GET /api/skills/jssblck-using-sops/lockfile

Test it

Using "using-sops". Retrieve the development Stripe key without showing other secrets.

Expected outcome:

The assistant identifies the repository wrapper, requests confirmation, retrieves only the named value, and avoids echoing unrelated decrypted data.

Using "using-sops". Add a required API endpoint to every accessible environment.

Expected outcome:

  • The development secret and environment schema are updated.
  • Production remains unchanged because elevation is unavailable.
  • The deployment requirement is recorded for review.

Using "using-sops". Rotate a lost production recipient.

Expected outcome:

The assistant lists recipient replacement, file re-encryption, value rotation, deployment updates, verification, and encrypted history exposure.

Security Audit

Critical
v1 • 8/23/2026 Open versioned report

The skill intentionally grants agents broad access to encrypted development secrets and supports persistent production elevation. The most serious design stores a shared private key in persistent cloud environment variables, creating cross-project credential exposure.

4
Files scanned
272
Lines analyzed
8
Review items
0
False positives ignored

Confirmed security concerns (8)

Critical
references/setup.md:53-65references/sops-notes.md:51-56
Private Key Stored in Non-Secret Cloud Variables
The setup places a reusable age private key in persistent cloud environment variables, including fields documented as unsuitable for credentials. Redaction limitations are acknowledged.
The instructions explicitly require SOPS_AGE_KEY in persistent environment variables and state that one platform advises against credentials there.
High
SKILL.md:3
Environment file access
description: Use when a repo has .sops.yaml and secrets/<env>.env, or a pnpm secrets script. Covers
The skill's declared purpose includes reading and writing encrypted environment secrets. This is intentional sensitive-data access with substantial impact if misused.
High
SKILL.md:21
Environment file access
| `agent` | user-wide | `~/.config/sops/age/keys.txt` on every machine agents run on; `SOPS_AGE
The line places an age private key in SOPS_AGE_KEY for cloud agents. Environment exposure can reveal a credential that decrypts multiple projects.
High
SKILL.md:45
Environment file access
Prod secrets need elevation. When a task requires reading or writing `prod.env`:
The workflow enables reading and writing production secrets after elevation. This is a real high-impact capability even though user participation is required.
High
SKILL.md:54
Environment file access
When you add a variable, add it to the env schema and to every `secrets/<env>.env` you can
The instruction directs the agent to modify every decryptable environment secret file. A mistaken or malicious change can affect multiple deployments.
High
SKILL.md:32-40
Unprompted Bulk Development Secret Access
The skill authorizes agents to show, modify, delete, and execute with all development secrets without user confirmation. This can expose or corrupt credentials beyond the immediate task.
The instruction explicitly says agents may manage development secrets without asking and includes a command that reveals everything decrypted.
High
SKILL.md:21-28references/setup.md:49-51
Shared Cross-Project Decryption Identity
One agent private key is shared across every project and installed for all agent sessions. Compromise of one machine or session exposes every development file using that recipient.
Both files explicitly describe a user-wide identity shared by every project and accessible to any agent session on the machine.
High
SKILL.md:45-52references/setup.md:118-119
Persistent Production Elevation Artifact
Production elevation remains active until a checkout file is manually deleted. A stale or copied checkout can retain production decryption access longer than intended.
The workflow states that elevation persists until manual deletion and has no timeout, session binding, or automatic cleanup.
Capability review items (8)

These are real local capabilities that may be expected for this skill, so they require review but are not counted as confirmed malicious behavior.

High
references/setup.md:81
sudo privilege escalation
sudo mkdir -p /etc/credstore.encrypted
This command creates a root-owned system credential directory with sudo. It is legitimate administration, but it changes privileged host state.
High
references/setup.md:82
sudo privilege escalation
printf '%s' 'AGE-SECRET-KEY-1...' | sudo systemd-creds encrypt --name=age-prod - /etc/credstore.encr
This sudo command installs a production age private key as a system credential. Substituting the real key can expose it through shell history.
High
references/setup.md:13
Hardcoded URL
curl -fsSL https://github.com/FiloSottile/age/releases/download/v1.3.1/age-v1.3.1-linux-amd64.tar.gz
The command streams a remote archive directly into tar without integrity verification. A compromised response could write attacker-controlled files before review.
High
references/setup.md:44
Hidden file in home directory
install -m 600 /dev/stdin ~/.config/sops/age/keys.txt <<'EOF'
This instruction persists an age private key in the user's SOPS configuration. Mode 600 limits access, but every process running as that user can use the key.
High
references/setup.md:44
Hidden file access
install -m 600 /dev/stdin ~/.config/sops/age/keys.txt <<'EOF'
This instruction persists an age private key in the user's SOPS configuration. Mode 600 limits access, but every process running as that user can use the key.
High
SKILL.md:21
Hidden file in home directory
| `agent` | user-wide | `~/.config/sops/age/keys.txt` on every machine agents run on; `SOPS_AGE
The documented path stores a shared decryption key on every agent machine. Any agent process under that user can decrypt development secrets across projects.
High
SKILL.md:21
Hidden file access
| `agent` | user-wide | `~/.config/sops/age/keys.txt` on every machine agents run on; `SOPS_AGE
The skill explicitly relies on agents reading the user-wide SOPS key location. This grants broad filesystem-mediated access to development secrets.
Medium
references/setup.md:11
Hardcoded URL
curl -fsSL -o ~/.local/bin/sops https://github.com/getsops/sops/releases/download/v3.13.3/sops-v3.13
The instructions download an executable from GitHub and immediately mark it executable without checksum or signature verification. A compromised release path could execute attacker code.

Risk Factors

⚙️ External commands (25)
references/setup.md:81 references/setup.md:82 SKILL.md:9 SKILL.md:10 SKILL.md:14 SKILL.md:21 SKILL.md:22 SKILL.md:23 SKILL.md:25 SKILL.md:26 SKILL.md:27 SKILL.md:34-40 SKILL.md:40-42 SKILL.md:42-43 SKILL.md:43-45 SKILL.md:45-47 SKILL.md:47-49 SKILL.md:49-51 SKILL.md:51-54 SKILL.md:54-58 SKILL.md:58 SKILL.md:63 SKILL.md:65-68 SKILL.md:68-69 SKILL.md:69
🌐 Network access (2)
references/setup.md:11 references/setup.md:13
📁 Filesystem access (15)
references/setup.md:11 references/setup.md:12 references/setup.md:14 references/setup.md:42 references/setup.md:44 references/setup.md:11 references/setup.md:12 references/setup.md:14 references/setup.md:42 references/setup.md:44 references/setup.md:44 references/sops-notes.md:7 references/sops-notes.md:7 SKILL.md:21 SKILL.md:21
🔑 Env variables (3)
references/sops-notes.md:31 SKILL.md:9 SKILL.md:69
Audited by: codex
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Security Assessment

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Academic citations (APA · BibTeX · CFF)

APA citation

jssblck. (2026). using-sops security audit report (audit version 1) [Author version unspecified]. Skillstore. https://skillstore.io/skills/jssblck-using-sops/audits/1

BibTeX citation

@techreport{jssblck-jssblck-using-sops-2026, author = {jssblck}, title = {using-sops security audit report (audit version 1)}, institution = {Skillstore}, year = {2026}, number = {1}, url = {https://skillstore.io/skills/jssblck-using-sops/audits/1}, note = {Author version unspecified} }

CITATION.cff

cff-version: 1.2.0 message: "If you use this Skill, cite its author and this versioned security audit report." title: "using-sops security audit report (audit version 1)" version: "unspecified" type: report authors: - name: "jssblck" date-released: "2026-08-23" url: "https://skillstore.io/skills/jssblck-using-sops/audits/1" identifiers: - type: other value: "skillstore:jssblck-using-sops:audit:1" description: "Skillstore immutable audit report identifier"

Skillstore Score

Why this score Evidence Confidence: Low
41
Architecture
85
Maintainability
87
Content
65
Community
83
Spec Compliance

What You Can Build

Update Development Configuration

Inspect or change an encrypted development variable through the repository wrapper.

Configure Deployment Secrets

Prepare production decryption and service startup while keeping the key outside application files.

Rotate SOPS Recipients

Replace a lost or compromised age recipient and re-encrypt affected secret files.

Try These Prompts

Inspect One Development Variable 
Use the repository secrets wrapper to retrieve [VARIABLE] from development. Explain the command first and avoid displaying unrelated values.
Add a Development Secret 
Add [VARIABLE] to the development secrets and environment schema. Confirm before changing files and report any environment you cannot decrypt.
Run a Command With Secrets 
Run [COMMAND] with development secrets through the repository wrapper. Verify the command scope and do not print decrypted values.
Plan Recipient Rotation 
Review the SOPS recipients for [PROJECT]. Propose a rotation plan for [COMPROMISED_RECIPIENT], including affected files, approvals, re-encryption, and credential replacement.

Best Practices

  • Use the repository wrapper instead of calling SOPS directly.
  • Request approval before revealing, changing, or executing with any secret.
  • Rotate both recipients and decrypted values after a private key leak.

Avoid

  • Do not print complete decrypted files when one variable is sufficient.
  • Do not place personal or production private keys in tracked files, logs, or cloud agent environments.
  • Do not leave production elevation active after the approved operation.

Frequently Asked Questions

What repository layout does this skill expect?
It expects .sops.yaml, encrypted secrets files, and a pnpm secrets wrapper such as tools/secrets.ts.
Can it work without an age private key?
It can create files for configured public recipients, but decryption and editing require an authorized private key.
Does it call SOPS directly?
It instructs agents to use the repository wrapper when one exists.
How are production secrets protected?
Production uses a project-specific identity and requires checkout elevation. The documented elevation remains active until manually removed.
Can it rotate a compromised recipient?
It guides recipient replacement, SOPS updatekeys, commit review, and rotation of every value exposed by the old key.
Is cloud agent key storage safe?
The documented environment-variable approach is high risk. Use scoped, short-lived credentials in a supported secret store instead.

Developer Details

Author

jssblck

License

MIT

Skillstore revision

r1

Version notice

The author did not declare a version.

Repository

https://github.com/jssblck/agents/tree/4658295e88faed205cc134edf987f7ea4e0c8ea4/skills/using-sops

Ref

0139ec01bdea5a1eaac3b0e3c90753dbfe65aaa1

Maintenance freshness

8/23/2026

Usage

0 downloads · 0 views

File structure

📁 agents/

📄 openai.yaml

📁 references/

📄 setup.md

📄 sops-notes.md

📄 SKILL.md

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