Skills starknet-defi Audit History
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Audit History

starknet-defi - 3 audits

Version comparison

Capability and finding changes across audited versions, newest first.

VersionDateResultReview itemsChange vs previous
v3 LatestAug 7, 2026, 08:53 AM 2 confirmed1No capability change
v2 Jul 21, 2026, 04:34 AM 1 confirmed0No capability change
v1 Jul 10, 2026, 12:17 AM 3 confirmed9Baseline

Aug 7, 2026, 08:53 AM

The static catalog is mostly false positive noise from Markdown fences, documentation URLs, configuration examples, and a relative documentation link. The required signing key is a genuine high-risk credential, and the transaction examples lack an explicit confirmation and safety-control layer.

3
Files scanned
370
Lines analyzed
7
Review items
0
False positives ignored

Confirmed security concerns (2)

High
Crypto seed/private key mention
signer: privateKey,
The account example passes privateKey as the signer, which gives the executing process authority to sign DeFi transactions and requires strict key isolation.
High
Unconfirmed Financial Transaction Execution
Examples directly execute swaps with approvals, create recurring DCA orders, and stake funds without showing a mandatory confirmation, simulation, or transaction limit.
The cited examples call state-changing AVNU operations directly, set executeApprove to true, and provide no visible confirmation or bounded execution policy.
Capability review items (1)

These are real local capabilities that may be expected for this skill, so they require review but are not counted as confirmed malicious behavior.

High
Generic API/secret keys
| `STARKNET_PRIVATE_KEY` | Agent's signing key | Required |
A Starknet private key is signing authority for the funded account. If exposed, an attacker can authorize irreversible asset transfers.
Audited by: codex

Jul 21, 2026, 04:34 AM

All 56 static findings are false positives caused by Markdown formatting, documented endpoints, or named configuration reads. The skill has one confirmed financial-safety concern: it can retry a failed swap with doubled slippage without renewed approval. No prompt injection or credential-exfiltration intent was found.

2
Files scanned
348
Lines analyzed
5
Review items
0
False positives ignored

Confirmed security concerns (1)

High
Automatic Slippage Increase Can Execute a Worse Trade
The error handler retries a failed swap with twice the requested slippage without obtaining fresh user approval. This can weaken the original price-protection limit.
The code explicitly multiplies slippage by two and calls executeSwap again after a slippage-related error. The retry has no confirmation step.
Audited by: claude

Jul 10, 2026, 12:17 AM

Most static command findings are false positives caused by Markdown code fences and inline code. The meaningful risks are the skill's use of a funded Starknet private key, real DeFi transaction execution, external AVNU endpoints, and an example that retries swaps with higher slippage.

2
Files scanned
348
Lines analyzed
16
Review items
0
False positives ignored

Confirmed security concerns (3)

High
Crypto seed/private key mention
signer: privateKey,
The account is constructed with signer: privateKey, directly using a wallet signing secret for transaction execution. This is a real high-impact risk if the agent or environment is compromised.
High
Autonomous DeFi Transaction Execution With Funded Wallet
The skill is designed for swaps, DCA orders, staking, and other Starknet DeFi actions using a funded account. These flows can move or lock funds, so transaction signing must require explicit human approval.
The documentation explicitly frames the skill around DeFi execution and includes examples that call executeSwap, executeCreateDca, and executeStake. These are real financial transaction paths, not only read-only queries.
High
Automatic Slippage Increase on Swap Retry
The error handling example retries a failed swap with doubled slippage after a slippage error. Without a hard cap and renewed user confirmation, this can execute trades at worse terms than the user intended.
The sample checks for slippage errors and immediately calls executeSwap again with slippage multiplied by two. The shown flow does not add a cap, simulation, or approval step before retrying.
Capability review items (9)

These are real local capabilities that may be expected for this skill, so they require review but are not counted as confirmed malicious behavior.

High
Generic API/secret keys
| `STARKNET_PRIVATE_KEY` | Agent's signing key | Required |
The skill requires STARKNET_PRIVATE_KEY for a funded account, which is a signing secret that can authorize real transfers and DeFi transactions. Exposure or misuse would directly risk user funds.
High
Generic API/secret keys
| `AVNU_API_KEY` | Optional avnu integrator key | None |
The configuration table mentions AVNU_API_KEY, an API credential that could be sensitive if placed in an agent environment. The risk is lower than the wallet key but still real credential exposure.
Low
Hardcoded URL
// Mainnet: https://starknet.paymaster.avnu.fi
The skill documents AVNU paymaster endpoints used for gasless Starknet transactions. This is expected for the domain, but it creates a real dependency on external transaction infrastructure.
Low
Hardcoded URL
// Sepolia: https://sepolia.paymaster.avnu.fi
The skill documents AVNU paymaster endpoints used for gasless Starknet transactions. This is expected for the domain, but it creates a real dependency on external transaction infrastructure.
Low
Hardcoded URL
nodeUrl: process.env.AVNU_PAYMASTER_URL || "https://starknet.paymaster.avnu.fi",
The sample constructs a PaymasterRpc with a default AVNU URL, so transaction execution may depend on an external service. Users should verify the endpoint before signing transactions.
Low
Hardcoded URL
| `AVNU_BASE_URL` | avnu API base URL | `https://starknet.api.avnu.fi` |
The URL appears in configuration for AVNU API or paymaster services used by the skill. The endpoint is legitimate but still represents an external network trust dependency.
Low
Hardcoded URL
| `AVNU_PAYMASTER_URL` | avnu paymaster URL | `https://starknet.paymaster.avnu.fi` |
The URL appears in configuration for AVNU API or paymaster services used by the skill. The endpoint is legitimate but still represents an external network trust dependency.
Low
Hardcoded URL
| Mainnet | `https://starknet.api.avnu.fi` | `https://starknet.paymaster.avnu.fi` |
The URL appears in configuration for AVNU API or paymaster services used by the skill. The endpoint is legitimate but still represents an external network trust dependency.
Low
Hardcoded URL
| Sepolia | `https://sepolia.api.avnu.fi` | `https://sepolia.paymaster.avnu.fi` |
The URL appears in configuration for AVNU API or paymaster services used by the skill. The endpoint is legitimate but still represents an external network trust dependency.
Audited by: codex