Skills AgentLink Skill
📦

AgentLink Skill

Content revision r1 High Risk

Verify Agent Identity with AgentLink

AI agents need trusted identity before partner services can verify them. AgentLink guides setup, biomapping, registry checks, and signed request headers on Base.

Supports: Claude Codex Code(CC)
⚠️ 38 Poor

Install with my Agent

Copy this request to your Agent. It includes the canonical Skill page and manifest.

Agent request
Review the Skillstore skill "AgentLink Skill" from https://skillstore.io/skills/internet-court-humanode-agentlink.md and its manifest at https://skillstore.io/api/skills/internet-court-humanode-agentlink/manifest. Verify the artifact. Stop and obtain explicit user consent before installing or changing files.

Your Agent should still show its plan and request any confirmation required by the security policy.

Agent-readable resources

Use these links when an AI agent, crawler, or script needs clean context instead of reading the full page.

Markdown detail GET /skills/internet-court-humanode-agentlink.md Signed manifest GET /api/skills/internet-court-humanode-agentlink/manifest Signed lockfile GET /api/skills/internet-court-humanode-agentlink/lockfile

Test it

Using "AgentLink Skill". I need to confirm whether my agent is ready to use AgentLink.

Expected outcome:

  • Confirm the human owner completed biomapping and bridged it to Base.
  • Generate the Linker URL for the owner address and have the owner sign it.
  • Check that the registry status reports both linked and active before using partner endpoints.

Using "AgentLink Skill". I want to integrate request signing without exposing my key.

Expected outcome:

  • Use an external signer when the key is held in a KMS, HSM, or secret manager.
  • Pass the agent public address and a signing callback to the AgentLink client.
  • Log request outcomes without logging private keys, signatures, or signed headers.

Using "AgentLink Skill". I want to call a freemium partner endpoint.

Expected outcome:

The response should identify the endpoint, confirm the required AgentLink header, check active registry status, and describe retry handling for rejected signatures.

Security Audit

High Risk
v2 • 7/19/2026 Open versioned report

The Markdown backtick and reconnaissance alerts are false positives. Genuine risks include raw wallet-key handling, unpinned npm execution, signed third-party requests, and an endpoint advertising coordinated X activity.

1
Files scanned
181
Lines analyzed
12
Review items
0
False positives ignored

Confirmed security concerns (7)

High
SKILL.md:26
Crypto seed/private key mention
Run the CLI with `npx` (no global install needed) and store your agent private key. No on-chain writ
The workflow asks users to store an agent private key through an npm CLI. Package or host compromise could disclose a wallet signing credential.
High
SKILL.md:29
Crypto seed/private key mention
# Store the agent private key in the encrypted local keystore.
The CLI receives a private key before placing it in an encrypted keystore. Security depends on the package and local host remaining trustworthy.
High
SKILL.md:86
Crypto seed/private key mention
**Option A — raw private key.** Simplest for a self-hosted agent that keeps its key in an environmen
The guide explicitly offers a raw private-key integration. Exposure would allow unauthorized request signatures and potentially wallet operations.
High
SKILL.md:93
Crypto seed/private key mention
privateKey: process.env.AGENT_PRIVATE_KEY as `0x${string}`,
The example passes a raw wallet private key into SDK code. This is a genuine high-impact secret-handling operation.
High
SKILL.md:126
Crypto seed/private key mention
privateKey: process.env.AGENT_PRIVATE_KEY as `0x${string}`,
The header builder receives the raw wallet private key. Dependency compromise or accidental logging could expose it.
High
SKILL.md:26-37SKILL.md:78-93
Unpinned Package Handles Wallet Private Key
The guide runs unpinned npm packages and supplies an agent private key to them. A compromised release could steal the key.
The documented npx and npm commands omit versions, and the same workflow gives the installed software a wallet private key.
Medium
SKILL.md:163-170
Coordinated Social Platform Activity
The advertised WURK endpoint can commission an X raid. This can enable coordinated platform manipulation without consent controls.
The skill explicitly describes the endpoint as commissioning an X raid, and no safeguards or consent requirements are stated.
Capability review items (12)

These are real local capabilities that may be expected for this skill, so they require review but are not counted as confirmed malicious behavior.

High
SKILL.md:93
Generic API/secret keys
privateKey: process.env.AGENT_PRIVATE_KEY as `0x${string}`,
A raw wallet private key is passed from the environment into a third-party SDK. Compromise could enable unauthorized signatures and wallet actions.
High
SKILL.md:126
Generic API/secret keys
privateKey: process.env.AGENT_PRIVATE_KEY as `0x${string}`,
The SDK receives the raw private key to build authentication headers. Dependency or process compromise could expose the signing credential.
Low
SKILL.md:111
Hardcoded URL
const response = await agentFetch('https://api.xona-agent.com/base-main/image/nano-banana', {
The example sends a signed HTTPS POST to an external XONA service. This exposes authentication metadata and request content to that operator.
Low
SKILL.md:143
Hardcoded URL
agentlink request https://api.xona-agent.com/base-main/image/nano-banana --network base
The CLI command sends a signed agentlink header to the external XONA domain. Users must trust that service with authentication metadata.
Low
SKILL.md:158
Hardcoded URL
| `POST https://api.xona-agent.com/base-main/video/short-generation` | Generate a short video from a
The skill advertises an external XONA video endpoint that receives signed requests and user prompts. That creates a third-party trust boundary.
Low
SKILL.md:159
Hardcoded URL
| `POST https://api.xona-agent.com/base-main/image/nano-banana` | Generate an image from a text prom
The external XONA image endpoint receives signed authentication and prompt data. Its operation depends on an unaudited third party.
Low
SKILL.md:169
Hardcoded URL
| `GET https://wurkapi.fun/base/agentlink/xraid/xverified/small` | Commission an X (Twitter) raid |
The skill advertises a WURK endpoint for commissioning X activity. Use sends authentication to an external operator.
Low
SKILL.md:170
Hardcoded URL
| `GET https://wurkapi.fun/base/agentlink/agenttohuman` | Commission an agent-to-human job |
The agent-to-human job endpoint is operated by an external WURK domain. Signed use creates an explicit third-party trust boundary.
Low
SKILL.md:93
Environment variable access (dot notation)
privateKey: process.env.AGENT_PRIVATE_KEY as `0x${string}`,
The example reads AGENT_PRIVATE_KEY from the process environment. This is intentional credential access with meaningful exposure if dependencies or logs are compromised.
Low
SKILL.md:126
Environment variable access (dot notation)
privateKey: process.env.AGENT_PRIVATE_KEY as `0x${string}`,
The header-building example reads the wallet private key from process.env. Any code in the process can potentially access the same secret.
Low
SKILL.md:93
Environment variable object
privateKey: process.env.AGENT_PRIVATE_KEY as `0x${string}`,
The code directly accesses the process environment to obtain a signing key. The operation is legitimate but security-sensitive.
Low
SKILL.md:126
Environment variable object
privateKey: process.env.AGENT_PRIVATE_KEY as `0x${string}`,
The code directly accesses process.env for a wallet credential. This creates real secret-exposure risk within the application process.
Audited by: codex View Audit History →
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Open versioned report
Security Assessment

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Academic citations (APA · BibTeX · CFF)

APA citation

internet-court. (2026). AgentLink Skill security audit report (audit version 2) [Author version unspecified]. Skillstore. https://skillstore.io/skills/internet-court-humanode-agentlink/audits/2

BibTeX citation

@techreport{internet-court-internet-court-humanode-agentlink-2026, author = {internet-court}, title = {AgentLink Skill security audit report (audit version 2)}, institution = {Skillstore}, year = {2026}, number = {2}, url = {https://skillstore.io/skills/internet-court-humanode-agentlink/audits/2}, note = {Author version unspecified} }

CITATION.cff

cff-version: 1.2.0 message: "If you use this Skill, cite its author and this versioned security audit report." title: "AgentLink Skill security audit report (audit version 2)" version: "unspecified" type: report authors: - name: "internet-court" date-released: "2026-07-19" url: "https://skillstore.io/skills/internet-court-humanode-agentlink/audits/2" identifiers: - type: other value: "skillstore:internet-court-humanode-agentlink:audit:2" description: "Skillstore immutable audit report identifier"

Skillstore Score

Why this score Evidence Confidence: Medium
55
Architecture
85
Maintainability
87
Content
65
Community
65
Spec Compliance

What You Can Build

Prepare a verified agent wallet

Set up the steps needed before an AI agent can appear as linked and active in the registry.

Review identity and signing flow

Check how a human owner, agent wallet, registry status, and signed request header work together.

Plan freemium endpoint access

Map which partner endpoints require AgentLink headers and what operational checks should happen first.

Try These Prompts

Check setup readiness 
Help me prepare to use AgentLink. I have an agent wallet and need the steps to link it to a biomapped owner on Base.
Create a linker checklist 
Create a checklist for generating an AgentLink Linker URL for owner address {owner_address} and confirming active registry status.
Choose a signing approach 
Compare raw private key signing and external signer integration for my agent. Recommend the safer option for this deployment: {deployment_context}.
Plan endpoint integration 
Build an implementation plan for calling {partner_endpoint} with an AgentLink signed header. Include verification, secret handling, and failure handling.

Best Practices

  • Use an external signer or secret manager when production keys must stay outside the process.
  • Verify linked and active registry status before sending signed requests to partner endpoints.
  • Keep signed headers, private keys, and owner wallet details out of logs and shared prompts.

Avoid

  • Committing an agent private key or signed header to source control.
  • Assuming an agent stays active after the owner no longer meets biomapping requirements.
  • Sending AgentLink signed headers to endpoints that do not need or trust AgentLink.

Frequently Asked Questions

What does AgentLink verify?
It links an agent wallet to a biomapped human owner and lets services verify signed agent requests.
Can the agent complete biomapping alone?
No. The human owner must complete biomapping and sign the link transaction.
Which network does this skill focus on?
The guide focuses on Base mainnet and the AgentLink registry profile for that network.
Does this skill provide executable code?
No. It is a markdown guide that describes CLI commands, SDK usage, and endpoint requirements.
How should private keys be handled?
Use a secret manager or external signer when possible, and never log or commit private keys.
Can Claude, Codex, or Claude Code use this skill?
Yes. The report marks the skill as compatible with Claude, Codex, and Claude Code.

Developer Details

License

MIT

Skillstore revision

r1

Version notice

The author did not declare a version.

Repository

https://github.com/internet-court/internet-court-skill/tree/main/vendored/humanode/humanode-agentlink

Ref

3f6e026a3363e0954ede7bef0cfe88d4475de137

Maintenance freshness

7/18/2026

Usage

1 downloads · 0 views

File structure

📄 SKILL.md

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