Versioned security assessment

Report ID: SA-F3FE9D79

7/9/2026, 11:41:44 PM

genlayer-cli security assessment v1

Skill Security Certification Report

Audit History
Audit model: codex Historical report
Skill name
genlayer-cli
Version
v1
Maintainer
internet-court
Source
github.com/internet-court/internet-court-skill/tree/main/vendored/genlayer/genlayer-cli
Coverage
2 Files scanned · 227 Lines analyzed
Policy version
Unavailable

Highest confirmed finding severity

High

2 confirmed security findings require attention.

Installation context

Historical evidence

This report may not describe the currently installable artifact. Open the current Skill page for install guidance.

Open current Skill page

This report does not block or authorize the manifest or ZIP.

Most static external-command findings are Markdown documentation false positives, but several documented CLI actions are real state-changing or secret-handling risks. The highest concern is guidance around private keys and passwords in command-line workflows.

Report position

Historical report

Open audit history before using this report to install.

Audit attestation

Not attestable

The required immutable binding is incomplete.

Human verification

Not verified

No human verification is recorded for this report.

Coverage

2 Files scanned · 227 Lines analyzed

16 items shown for review

Limitations

This report does not claim runtime or sandbox execution and does not prove the absence of side effects.

Evidence chain

Follow the evidence from source binding to the install contract. Available evidence supports verification; it is not a safety guarantee.

  1. Source

    Binding unavailable

  2. Artifact

    Identity incomplete

  3. Audit

    Complete

  4. Install contract

    Open manifest to verify

    Open manifest

Capabilities observed

Observed means this report recorded supporting evidence. Not recorded does not prove that a capability is absent.

Contains scripts

May execute code included with the Skill.

Not recorded by this audit

Network access

May connect to external services.

Observed in 1 evidence location

Filesystem access

May read or write local files.

Not recorded by this audit

Env variables

May read values from the process environment.

Not recorded by this audit

External commands

May invoke commands or programs outside the Skill.

Observed in 53 evidence locations

Capability review items (14)
High
SKILL.md:38-52
Ruby/shell backtick execution
```bash
This account-management block includes commands for account creation, private-key import, unlocking, and token transfer. These commands can expose key material or move funds if run without careful confirmation.
High
SKILL.md:58
Ruby/shell backtick execution
`account create`, `account import`, and `account send` accept `--password <password>` to skip intera
The text recommends non-interactive password arguments for account commands. Passwords in command arguments can appear in shell history, process listings, and logs.
High
SKILL.md:60-63
Ruby/shell backtick execution
```bash
This command block shows placeholder passwords and a private-key import in command-line arguments. The pattern can train users or agents to place secrets in shell history and observable process arguments.
High
SKILL.md:67-69
Ruby/shell backtick execution
```bash
This command block pipes a password into a deployment command. Echoing secrets can leak through shell history, logs, or terminal capture even when the example uses a placeholder.
Medium
SKILL.md:15-17
Ruby/shell backtick execution
```bash
This block instructs users to run a global npm installation for the GenLayer CLI. Installing global packages executes third-party package code and changes the host environment.
Medium
SKILL.md:21-26
Ruby/shell backtick execution
```bash
This block instructs users to run GenLayer network configuration commands. Changing the active network can redirect later deployments or transactions to a different chain.
Medium
SKILL.md:89-96
Ruby/shell backtick execution
```bash
This block instructs users to deploy GenLayer contracts. Deployment is a state-changing external command that can spend funds or publish contract code to the selected network.
Medium
SKILL.md:107-110
Ruby/shell backtick execution
```bash
This block instructs users to send write transactions to contracts. Write calls are state-changing external commands and can affect on-chain or local network state.
Medium
SKILL.md:170-172
Ruby/shell backtick execution
```bash
This block instructs users to appeal a transaction result. Appeals are external state-changing actions that can trigger validator re-evaluation.
Medium
SKILL.md:176-182
Ruby/shell backtick execution
```bash
This block includes local Studio management commands, including a database reset option. These commands can start services or delete local development state.
Medium
SKILL.md:186-193
Ruby/shell backtick execution
```bash
This block includes local validator creation, update, and deletion commands. These commands can materially change local consensus test configuration.
Medium
SKILL.md:204-208
Ruby/shell backtick execution
6. **Appeal if needed**: `genlayer appeal <txHash>` (re-run consensus)
The debugging workflow includes an appeal command as a possible next action. That command can change transaction handling by triggering validator re-evaluation.
Medium
SKILL.md:208-211
Ruby/shell backtick execution
```bash
This block instructs users to create a new GenLayer project from a template. It writes files to the local filesystem and should be confirmed before execution.
Medium
SKILL.md:215-220
Ruby/shell backtick execution
```bash
This block includes configuration set and reset commands. Changing CLI configuration can affect later deployments, calls, and transaction submissions.

Risk findings

Confirmed security concerns are separated from items that still need review.

Confirmed security concerns (2)

RISK-001 High
SKILL.md:46
Crypto seed/private key mention
# Import from private key or keystore
The account import section explicitly introduces private-key and keystore import flows. Handling these secrets in an AI-assisted shell workflow creates a real risk of key disclosure.
RISK-002 High
SKILL.md:58-68
Insecure Secret Handling Guidance
The skill recommends command-line password arguments and echoing a password into a signing command. These patterns can expose secrets through shell history, process listings, logs, or copied prompts.
The guidance directly shows non-interactive password handling for account import and deployment flows. The risk is clear even though the examples use placeholder values.

Remediation

Suggested fixes recorded by this audit. Applying them is the maintainer’s responsibility.

  1. FIX-001
    High
    Password and private-key examples encourage command-line secret handling.
    Recommend keychain, keystore prompts, or secret managers. Warn users not to place real private keys or passwords in prompts, shell history, or process arguments.
  2. FIX-002
    Medium
    State-changing commands can deploy contracts, send funds, appeal transactions, reset local databases, or modify validators.
    Add explicit confirmation guidance before deploy, write, send, appeal, reset, validator delete, and configuration changes.
  3. FIX-003
    Medium
    Global package installation changes the user environment and runs third-party package code.
    Suggest verifying the package source and version before installation, and prefer project-local or sandboxed installation when possible.
  4. FIX-004
    Low
    The faucet URL is hardcoded in documentation.
    Tell users to verify the official GenLayer domain before using faucet pages or entering addresses.

Expert evidence

Immutable subject identity, scanner metadata, dismissed matches, and source-level evidence.

Artifact subject

Marketplace commit
Unavailable
Content hash
Unavailable
Tree hash
Unavailable
Skill path
Unavailable
Audit payload hash
Unavailable

Analysis metadata

Audit model: codex

Analysis state: Complete

Scope is limited to the recorded files, lines, methods, and evidence. No runtime or sandbox execution is claimed.

Verify and export

JSON report CITATION.cff SARIF 2.1.0 Signed installation manifest

The manifest and lockfile bind install artifacts to cryptographic hashes. This integrity claim is separate from the security assessment.

Audit attestation: not_attestable