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Audit History
altllm-portal-auth - 2 audits
Version comparison
Capability and finding changes across audited versions, newest first.
Audit version 2 Latest
Jul 21, 2026, 02:33 AM
The skill documents wallet authentication, including access to private keys and storage of a local Portal session. The primary risks are intentional credential handling, an explicitly unsafe argv option, and unreviewed shared instructions outside this package. Hardcoded URLs and Markdown command formatting are benign in context.
2
Files scanned
168
Lines analyzed
17
Review items
0
False positives ignored
Confirmed security concerns (4)
High
Crypto seed/private key mention
| `login-wallet --private-key-env <name>` | Sign in with a locally available private key from an env
The workflow authorizes use of a wallet private key from an environment variable. A compromised environment can expose the wallet credential.
High
Crypto seed/private key mention
| `login-wallet --private-key-file <path>` | Sign in with a locally available private key from a fil
The workflow authorizes reading a wallet private key from a file. The key file must be selected and protected carefully.
High
Crypto seed/private key mention
| `login-wallet --private-key <hex> --allow-unsafe-private-key-argv` | Sign in with an inline privat
The workflow permits an inline private key in command arguments when an unsafe flag is supplied. Arguments can leak through process listings and shell history.
Medium
Unreviewed Shared-Instruction Dependency
The skill instructs agents to read two parent-directory shared files before use, but those files are outside the audited package. Their contents could introduce unsafe commands or prompt-injection instructions after publication.
The explicit precondition to read external shared files is present, while the audit covers only two package files. Their content and safety cannot be verified from this skill.
Capability review items (9)
These are real local capabilities that may be expected for this skill, so they require review but are not counted as confirmed malicious behavior.
High
Generic API/secret keys
ALTLLM_WALLET_PRIVATE_KEY=<private-key> \
The command reads a wallet private key from an environment variable to sign in. A private key is highly sensitive and exposure can compromise the wallet.
High
Generic API/secret keys
--private-key-env ALTLLM_WALLET_PRIVATE_KEY
The command explicitly selects an environment variable containing a wallet private key. This is sensitive credential access, even though it is a safer input method than argv.
High
Generic API/secret keys
- `ALTLLM_WALLET_PRIVATE_KEY=<private-key>` with the default `--private-key-env ALTLLM_WALLET_PRIVAT
The reference documents private-key environment-variable input. Handling this credential presents a material wallet-compromise risk if the environment is exposed.
High
Path traversal sequence
> - `../_shared/preflight.md`
The skill directs the agent to read a file outside the skill directory. The referenced content is not included in this audit, so it creates an unreviewed instruction dependency.
High
Path traversal sequence
> - `../_shared/session-and-target.md`
The skill directs the agent to read a second parent-directory file. Its unreviewed content could alter behavior outside the audited package.
High
Hidden file in home directory
- Save the resulting session to `~/.altllm/portal-cli-session.json` unless overridden.
The skill directs storage of an authenticated Portal session under the user home directory. Session credentials require restrictive permissions and explicit user consent.
Medium
Hidden file access · 2 occurrences
"sessionFile": "/Users/<user>/.altllm/portal-cli-session.json",
The documented workflow stores an authentication session in a hidden home-directory file. Session-token storage is sensitive and requires secure permissions and user awareness.
Medium
Hidden file access
- Save the resulting session to `~/.altllm/portal-cli-session.json` unless overridden.
The skill directs storage of an authenticated Portal session in a hidden file. This is sensitive local authentication state.
Risk Factors
🌐 Network access (6)
📁 Filesystem access (6)
🔑 Env variables (3)
Audited by: claude
Jul 9, 2026, 11:44 PM
The skill supports a legitimate AltLLM Portal wallet-auth workflow, but it handles high-value wallet and session material. I confirmed risks around private-key input paths, unsafe argv private-key usage, hidden session-file persistence, and parent-directory shared-file references. No prompt-injection text or covert exfiltration intent was found.
2
Files scanned
168
Lines analyzed
19
Review items
0
False positives ignored
Confirmed security concerns (3)
High
Crypto seed/private key mention
| `login-wallet --private-key-env <name>` | Sign in with a locally available private key from an env
The command supports signing in with a locally available wallet private key from an environment variable. This is direct handling of high-value crypto key material.
High
Crypto seed/private key mention
| `login-wallet --private-key-file <path>` | Sign in with a locally available private key from a fil
The command supports signing in with a private key read from a file. Reading wallet keys from local files is sensitive and must be tightly controlled.
High
Crypto seed/private key mention
| `login-wallet --private-key <hex> --allow-unsafe-private-key-argv` | Sign in with an inline privat
The command supports passing a private key inline with an explicit unsafe argv flag. Inline private keys can leak through command history and process listings.
Capability review items (12)
These are real local capabilities that may be expected for this skill, so they require review but are not counted as confirmed malicious behavior.
High
Generic API/secret keys
ALTLLM_WALLET_PRIVATE_KEY=<private-key> \
The line demonstrates placing a wallet private key in an environment variable. Wallet private keys are high-value secrets and can be exposed through process environment handling or logs.
High
Generic API/secret keys
--private-key-env ALTLLM_WALLET_PRIVATE_KEY
The command reads a private key from an environment variable for wallet login. This is expected for the feature, but it is still real handling of a high-value secret.
High
Generic API/secret keys
- `ALTLLM_WALLET_PRIVATE_KEY=<private-key>` with the default `--private-key-env ALTLLM_WALLET_PRIVAT
The documentation presents an environment-variable private-key input path. Even as a safer option than argv, it still requires careful secret handling and user consent.
High
Ruby/shell backtick execution
| `login-wallet --private-key-env <name>` | Sign in with a locally available private key from an env
This command path logs in using a wallet private key from an environment variable. It is a real local CLI action that handles high-value secret material.
High
Ruby/shell backtick execution
| `login-wallet --private-key-file <path>` | Sign in with a locally available private key from a fil
This command path logs in using a wallet private key from a file. It is a real local CLI action that reads sensitive key material from the filesystem.
High
Ruby/shell backtick execution
| `login-wallet --private-key <hex> --allow-unsafe-private-key-argv` | Sign in with an inline privat
This command path allows an inline wallet private key in argv after an unsafe-use flag. Command-line private keys can leak through shell history and process listings.
High
Path traversal sequence
> - `../_shared/preflight.md`
The skill instructs the agent to read a parent-directory shared file before running commands. This crosses the skill directory boundary and can import instructions outside the reviewed skill file.
High
Path traversal sequence
> - `../_shared/session-and-target.md`
The skill instructs the agent to read another parent-directory shared file before running commands. This boundary-crossing reference should be packaged or reviewed explicitly.
High
Hidden file in home directory
- Save the resulting session to `~/.altllm/portal-cli-session.json` unless overridden.
The skill directs saving the Portal session to a hidden file under the user home directory. Persisted session material needs restrictive permissions and clear user consent.
Medium
Ruby/shell backtick execution
| `login-wallet --nonce <nonce> --signature <sig>` | Verify an externally signed challenge and save
The verify command completes authentication and saves a local session. It is user-directed, but it has real authentication side effects and should be treated carefully.
Medium
Ruby/shell backtick execution
- Save the resulting session to `~/.altllm/portal-cli-session.json` unless overridden.
The line directs saving the resulting authentication session to a local hidden file. This is expected behavior, but it persists sensitive session material on disk.
Medium
Hidden file access
- Save the resulting session to `~/.altllm/portal-cli-session.json` unless overridden.
The line documents writing session state to a hidden local path. This is expected for the CLI, but it is real hidden-file access involving authentication material.
Risk Factors
🌐 Network access (6)
📁 Filesystem access (6)
🔑 Env variables (3)
Audited by: codex