Versioned security assessment

Report ID: SA-58DB0914

7/9/2026, 11:39:04 PM

alkahest-developer security assessment v1

Skill Security Certification Report

Audit History
Audit model: codex Historical report
Skill name
alkahest-developer
Version
v1
Maintainer
internet-court
Source
github.com/internet-court/internet-court-skill/tree/main/vendored/arkhai/alkahest-developer
Coverage
5 Files scanned · 1,327 Lines analyzed
Policy version
Unavailable

Highest confirmed finding severity

High

2 confirmed security findings require attention.

Installation context

Historical evidence

This report may not describe the currently installable artifact. Open the current Skill page for install guidance.

Open current Skill page

This report does not block or authorize the manifest or ZIP.

Most static findings are markdown or SDK reference false positives, including code fences, TypeScript template literal types, and blockchain UID fields. The audit confirms repeated inline private-key placeholders in setup examples as a real copy-paste safety risk for wallet code. No prompt injection, data-exfiltration intent, or unauthorized command execution evidence was found.

Report position

Historical report

Open audit history before using this report to install.

Audit attestation

Not attestable

The required immutable binding is incomplete.

Human verification

Not verified

No human verification is recorded for this report.

Coverage

5 Files scanned · 1,327 Lines analyzed

13 items shown for review

Limitations

This report does not claim runtime or sandbox execution and does not prove the absence of side effects.

Evidence chain

Follow the evidence from source binding to the install contract. Available evidence supports verification; it is not a safety guarantee.

  1. Source

    Binding unavailable

  2. Artifact

    Identity incomplete

  3. Audit

    Complete

  4. Install contract

    Open manifest to verify

    Open manifest

Capabilities observed

Observed means this report recorded supporting evidence. Not recorded does not prove that a capability is absent.

Contains scripts

May execute code included with the Skill.

Observed in 4 evidence locations

Network access

May connect to external services.

Observed in 13 evidence locations

Filesystem access

May read or write local files.

Not recorded by this audit

Env variables

May read values from the process environment.

Observed in 12 evidence locations

External commands

May invoke commands or programs outside the Skill.

Observed in 50 evidence locations

Capability review items (11)
High
references/python-api.md:13
Generic API/secret keys
client = PyAlkahestClient("0xPRIVATE_KEY", "https://rpc-url")
The example passes private-key material as an inline string during wallet or client setup. The value is a placeholder, not a leaked key, but the copy-paste pattern is unsafe for blockchain wallet code.
High
references/python-api.md:27
Generic API/secret keys
client = PyAlkahestClient("0xPRIVATE_KEY", "https://rpc-url", config)
The example passes private-key material as an inline string during wallet or client setup. The value is a placeholder, not a leaked key, but the copy-paste pattern is unsafe for blockchain wallet code.
High
references/rust-api.md:10
Generic API/secret keys
"0xPRIVATE_KEY",
The example passes private-key material as an inline string during wallet or client setup. The value is a placeholder, not a leaked key, but the copy-paste pattern is unsafe for blockchain wallet code.
High
references/rust-api.md:18
Generic API/secret keys
"0xPRIVATE_KEY",
The example passes private-key material as an inline string during wallet or client setup. The value is a placeholder, not a leaked key, but the copy-paste pattern is unsafe for blockchain wallet code.
High
references/rust-api.md:24
Generic API/secret keys
let bare = AlkahestClient::new("0xPRIVATE_KEY", "https://rpc-url").await?;
The example passes private-key material as an inline string during wallet or client setup. The value is a placeholder, not a leaked key, but the copy-paste pattern is unsafe for blockchain wallet code.
High
SKILL.md:36
Generic API/secret keys
account: privateKeyToAccount("0xPRIVATE_KEY"),
The example passes private-key material as an inline string during wallet or client setup. The value is a placeholder, not a leaked key, but the copy-paste pattern is unsafe for blockchain wallet code.
High
SKILL.md:61
Generic API/secret keys
"0xPRIVATE_KEY",
The example passes private-key material as an inline string during wallet or client setup. The value is a placeholder, not a leaked key, but the copy-paste pattern is unsafe for blockchain wallet code.
High
SKILL.md:69
Generic API/secret keys
"0xPRIVATE_KEY",
The example passes private-key material as an inline string during wallet or client setup. The value is a placeholder, not a leaked key, but the copy-paste pattern is unsafe for blockchain wallet code.
High
SKILL.md:75
Generic API/secret keys
let bare = AlkahestClient::new("0xPRIVATE_KEY", "https://rpc-url").await?;
The example passes private-key material as an inline string during wallet or client setup. The value is a placeholder, not a leaked key, but the copy-paste pattern is unsafe for blockchain wallet code.
High
SKILL.md:85
Generic API/secret keys
client = PyAlkahestClient("0xPRIVATE_KEY", "https://rpc-url")
The example passes private-key material as an inline string during wallet or client setup. The value is a placeholder, not a leaked key, but the copy-paste pattern is unsafe for blockchain wallet code.
High
SKILL.md:90
Generic API/secret keys
client = PyAlkahestClient("0xPRIVATE_KEY", "https://rpc-url", config)
The example passes private-key material as an inline string during wallet or client setup. The value is a placeholder, not a leaked key, but the copy-paste pattern is unsafe for blockchain wallet code.

Risk findings

Confirmed security concerns are separated from items that still need review.

Confirmed security concerns (2)

RISK-001 High
references/typescript-api.md:12
Crypto seed/private key mention
account: privateKeyToAccount("0xKEY"),
The example passes private-key material as an inline string during wallet or client setup. The value is a placeholder, not a leaked key, but the copy-paste pattern is unsafe for blockchain wallet code.
RISK-002 High
SKILL.md:36
Crypto seed/private key mention
account: privateKeyToAccount("0xPRIVATE_KEY"),
The example passes private-key material as an inline string during wallet or client setup. The value is a placeholder, not a leaked key, but the copy-paste pattern is unsafe for blockchain wallet code.

Remediation

Suggested fixes recorded by this audit. Applying them is the maintainer’s responsibility.

  1. FIX-001
    High
    Inline private-key placeholders appear in setup examples.
    Replace literal private-key arguments with environment-variable or secret-manager examples, and add a warning against committing wallet keys.
  2. FIX-002
    Low
    RPC URLs are shown as literal placeholders in client setup.
    State that RPC endpoints are user-provided configuration values and should not include committed credentials.

Expert evidence

Immutable subject identity, scanner metadata, dismissed matches, and source-level evidence.

Artifact subject

Marketplace commit
Unavailable
Content hash
Unavailable
Tree hash
Unavailable
Skill path
Unavailable
Audit payload hash
Unavailable

Analysis metadata

Audit model: codex

Analysis state: Complete

Scope is limited to the recorded files, lines, methods, and evidence. No runtime or sandbox execution is claimed.

Verify and export

JSON report CITATION.cff SARIF 2.1.0 Signed installation manifest

The manifest and lockfile bind install artifacts to cryptographic hashes. This integrity claim is separate from the security assessment.

Audit attestation: not_attestable