Versioned security assessment

Report ID: SA-3F6E026A

7/21/2026, 2:25:52 AM

agent-wallet security assessment v2

Skill Security Certification Report

Audit History
Scanner version 3.0.0 Audit model: claude Latest published report
Skill name
agent-wallet
Version
v2
Maintainer
internet-court
Source
github.com/internet-court/internet-court-skill/tree/main/vendored/chaingpt/agent-wallet
Coverage
1 Files scanned · 248 Lines analyzed
Policy version
skillstore-security-audit-policy-v1

Highest confirmed finding severity

Medium

2 confirmed security findings require attention.

Installation context

Check the current Skill page

This page summarizes report evidence only. The Skill page provides the canonical install advisory.

Open current Skill page

This report does not block or authorize the manifest or ZIP.

Static detections are documentation and Markdown false positives; the file does not contain executable shell, network, or secret-exfiltration behavior. Two design risks remain: policy allowlists are permissive when omitted, and the local dashboard token is printed in tool output. Review the implementation separately before funding a wallet.

Report position

Latest published report

Latest refers to the report sequence, not to artifact currentness.

Audit attestation

Attestation unavailable

No public attestation is available for this report.

Human verification

Not verified

No human verification is recorded for this report.

Coverage

1 Files scanned · 248 Lines analyzed

2 items shown for review

Limitations

This report does not claim runtime or sandbox execution and does not prove the absence of side effects.

Evidence chain

Follow the evidence from source binding to the install contract. Available evidence supports verification; it is not a safety guarantee.

  1. Source

    Commit and path bound

  2. Artifact

    Content and tree hashes bound

  3. Audit

    Complete

  4. Install contract

    Open manifest to verify

    Open manifest

Capabilities observed

Observed means this report recorded supporting evidence. Not recorded does not prove that a capability is absent.

Contains scripts

May execute code included with the Skill.

Not recorded by this audit

Network access

May connect to external services.

Observed in 3 evidence locations

Filesystem access

May read or write local files.

Observed in 5 evidence locations

Env variables

May read values from the process environment.

Not recorded by this audit

External commands

May invoke commands or programs outside the Skill.

Observed in 50 evidence locations

Risk findings

Confirmed security concerns are separated from items that still need review.

Confirmed security concerns (2)

RISK-001 Medium
SKILL.md:106-110
Permissive policy fields when unset
The policy reference states that unset allowedChains and allowedToAddresses permit any chain or address. An administrator who disables the kill switch without setting these controls can unintentionally authorize broad transfers.
The documented behavior explicitly defines permissive defaults for the relevant allowlists, creating a clear configuration-risk path.
RISK-002 Medium
SKILL.md:186
Dashboard admin token exposed in tool output
The dashboard token is printed in tool output, which can place a policy-management credential in the agent conversation. Localhost binding limits exposure, but the token should remain outside model-visible output.
The documentation explicitly says the token is printed in tool output; the resulting exposure is mitigated, but not eliminated, by the localhost-only endpoint.

Remediation

Suggested fixes recorded by this audit. Applying them is the maintainer’s responsibility.

  1. FIX-001
    Medium
    Unset allowlists permit any chain or recipient.
    Make allowlists deny by default when the kill switch is disabled, or require an explicit unrestricted-policy acknowledgement.
  2. FIX-002
    Medium
    The dashboard admin token is printed in tool output.
    Display the token only through a user-controlled local channel and redact it from model-visible tool responses.
  3. FIX-003
    Medium
    The documentation presents wallet security guarantees without implementation files in this package.
    Publish the implementation, tests, and dependency versions so encryption, policy enforcement, and dashboard controls can be independently reviewed.

Expert evidence

Immutable subject identity, scanner metadata, dismissed matches, and source-level evidence.

Artifact subject

Marketplace commit
3f6e026a3363e0954ede7bef0cfe88d4475de137
Content hash
bae0beab74b95f7c604a884f7b1986d5c03d713cc9e78b3ebfc262f3241b9585
Tree hash
343a959300d51b27c6310cd2794319284ed9d9c3c0e248547ed907f85518d0e8
Skill path
skills/internet-court/agent-wallet
Audit payload hash
050218f25ec48ee31efe98e46af09dfd

Analysis metadata

Audit model: claude

Analysis state: Complete

Scope is limited to the recorded files, lines, methods, and evidence. No runtime or sandbox execution is claimed.

Verify and export

JSON report CITATION.cff SARIF 2.1.0 Signed installation manifest Source

The manifest and lockfile bind install artifacts to cryptographic hashes. This integrity claim is separate from the security assessment.

Audit attestation: unavailable