Versioned security assessment

Report ID: SA-A0668140

7/6/2026, 3:22:50 PM

twitter-automation security assessment v3

Skill Security Certification Report

Audit History
Audit model: codex Historical report
Skill name
twitter-automation
Version
v3
Maintainer
inference-sh-9
Source
github.com/inference-sh-9/skills/tree/main/skills/twitter-automation/
Coverage
1 Files scanned · 155 Lines analyzed
Policy version
Unavailable

Highest confirmed finding severity

Critical

2 confirmed security findings require attention.

Installation context

Historical evidence

This report may not describe the currently installable artifact. Open the current Skill page for install guidance.

Open current Skill page

This report does not block or authorize the manifest or ZIP.

Several static backtick findings are Markdown-only false positives, but multiple fenced examples do invoke external commands for Twitter/X account actions. The quick start contains a confirmed critical curl-to-shell installer pattern. Semantic review also found social engagement abuse risk because DMs, follows, likes, and retweets lack consent, rate-limit, or approval guidance.

Report position

Historical report

Open audit history before using this report to install.

Audit attestation

Not attestable

The required immutable binding is incomplete.

Human verification

Not verified

No human verification is recorded for this report.

Coverage

1 Files scanned · 155 Lines analyzed

16 items shown for review

Limitations

This report does not claim runtime or sandbox execution and does not prove the absence of side effects.

Evidence chain

Follow the evidence from source binding to the install contract. Available evidence supports verification; it is not a safety guarantee.

  1. Source

    Binding unavailable

  2. Artifact

    Identity incomplete

  3. Audit

    Complete

  4. Install contract

    Open manifest to verify

    Open manifest

Capabilities observed

Observed means this report recorded supporting evidence. Not recorded does not prove that a capability is absent.

Contains scripts

May execute code included with the Skill.

Not recorded by this audit

Network access

May connect to external services.

Observed in 8 evidence locations

Filesystem access

May read or write local files.

Not recorded by this audit

Env variables

May read values from the process environment.

Not recorded by this audit

External commands

May invoke commands or programs outside the Skill.

Observed in 36 evidence locations

Capability review items (14)
Critical
SKILL.md:17
Hardcoded URL
curl -fsSL https://cli.inference.sh | sh && infsh login
The hardcoded URL is used as the source for a curl-to-shell installer on the same line. That makes the network dependency part of an executable code path.
High
SKILL.md:15-21
Ruby/shell backtick execution
```bash
This fenced shell example includes a remote installer piped to sh and an infsh command. The Markdown backtick is harmless, but the mapped block gives executable shell instructions.
High
SKILL.md:75-80
Ruby/shell backtick execution
```bash
This block contains an infsh command that sends a direct message. It can contact another user through the account, so misuse could create spam or social-engineering risk.
High
SKILL.md:102-104
Ruby/shell backtick execution
```bash
This block contains an infsh command that deletes a post by ID. That is a destructive account action if run against a real account.
High
SKILL.md:134-146
Ruby/shell backtick execution
```bash
This block shows npx commands to install related skills from a package source. Running package-manager commands can execute third-party code and should require review.
Medium
SKILL.md:43-45
Ruby/shell backtick execution
```bash
This block contains an executable infsh command that posts to Twitter/X. The command is hardcoded, but it can perform a networked account action when run.
Medium
SKILL.md:49-59
Ruby/shell backtick execution
```bash
This block invokes infsh to sample and submit a media post request. It is expected functionality, but it still executes an external CLI with account effects.
Medium
SKILL.md:63-65
Ruby/shell backtick execution
```bash
This block contains an infsh command that likes a post. It can change account state on Twitter/X when executed.
Medium
SKILL.md:69-71
Ruby/shell backtick execution
```bash
This block contains an infsh command that retweets a post. It can publish account engagement on Twitter/X when executed.
Medium
SKILL.md:84-86
Ruby/shell backtick execution
```bash
This block contains an infsh command that follows a user. It can change account relationships on Twitter/X when executed.
Medium
SKILL.md:90-92
Ruby/shell backtick execution
```bash
This block contains an infsh command that queries a user profile. The command is fixed, but it still invokes an external networked CLI.
Medium
SKILL.md:96-98
Ruby/shell backtick execution
```bash
This block contains an infsh command that retrieves post details. The command is fixed, but it still invokes an external networked CLI.
Medium
SKILL.md:108-117
Ruby/shell backtick execution
```bash
This workflow runs external generation and posting commands, including redirecting output to a local file. It is intended behavior but expands external command and network exposure.
Medium
SKILL.md:121-130
Ruby/shell backtick execution
```bash
This workflow runs external video generation and posting commands, including redirecting output to a local file. It is intended behavior but expands external command and network exposure.

Risk findings

Confirmed security concerns are separated from items that still need review.

Confirmed security concerns (2)

RISK-001 Critical
SKILL.md:17
Pipe to shell pattern
curl -fsSL https://cli.inference.sh | sh && infsh login
The quick start pipes a remote installer directly into sh, then continues to login. This executes network-delivered code before the user can inspect it.
RISK-002 High
SKILL.md:3SKILL.md:31-36SKILL.md:73-85
Automated Social Engagement Abuse
The skill advertises engagement bots and audience growth, then provides actions for likes, retweets, DMs, follows, and deletes. Without approval, consent, or rate-limit guidance, it can enable spam, impersonation, or platform-policy abuse.
The skill explicitly promotes engagement automation and includes examples for DMs, follows, likes, and retweets. No countervailing safeguards or approval requirements are present in the cited lines.

Remediation

Suggested fixes recorded by this audit. Applying them is the maintainer’s responsibility.

  1. FIX-001
    Critical
    Remote installer piped to shell
    Replace the curl pipe with manual download steps, checksum verification, and a separate login command.
  2. FIX-002
    High
    Account-changing commands lack confirmation gates
    Require explicit user approval before posting, deleting, sending DMs, following, liking, or retweeting.
  3. FIX-003
    High
    Social engagement automation can enable abuse
    Document consent, rate-limit, anti-spam, and platform-policy requirements for DMs, follows, likes, and retweets.
  4. FIX-004
    Medium
    Related skill installation commands use npx
    Move related installs to non-executable references or require manual review before running package commands.

Expert evidence

Immutable subject identity, scanner metadata, dismissed matches, and source-level evidence.

Artifact subject

Marketplace commit
Unavailable
Content hash
Unavailable
Tree hash
Unavailable
Skill path
Unavailable
Audit payload hash
Unavailable

Analysis metadata

Audit model: codex

Analysis state: Complete

Scope is limited to the recorded files, lines, methods, and evidence. No runtime or sandbox execution is claimed.

Verify and export

JSON report CITATION.cff SARIF 2.1.0 Signed installation manifest

The manifest and lockfile bind install artifacts to cryptographic hashes. This integrity claim is separate from the security assessment.

Audit attestation: not_attestable