Versioned security assessment

Report ID: SA-A0668140

7/6/2026, 3:07:23 PM

remotion-render security assessment v3

Skill Security Certification Report

Audit History
Audit model: codex Historical report
Skill name
remotion-render
Version
v3
Maintainer
inference-sh-9
Source
github.com/inference-sh-9/skills/tree/main/skills/remotion-render/
Coverage
1 Files scanned · 210 Lines analyzed
Policy version
Unavailable

Highest confirmed finding severity

Critical

2 confirmed security findings require attention.

Installation context

Historical evidence

This report may not describe the currently installable artifact. Open the current Skill page for install guidance.

Open current Skill page

This report does not block or authorize the manifest or ZIP.

The skill appears to be a legitimate Remotion rendering workflow, but it depends on the inference.sh CLI and cloud renderer. The quick start includes a curl-to-shell installer, which is a confirmed critical supply-chain risk. Most Markdown backtick detections are false positives, while CLI examples and remote rendering remain real trust boundaries.

Report position

Historical report

Open audit history before using this report to install.

Audit attestation

Not attestable

The required immutable binding is incomplete.

Human verification

Not verified

No human verification is recorded for this report.

Coverage

1 Files scanned · 210 Lines analyzed

12 items shown for review

Limitations

This report does not claim runtime or sandbox execution and does not prove the absence of side effects.

Evidence chain

Follow the evidence from source binding to the install contract. Available evidence supports verification; it is not a safety guarantee.

  1. Source

    Binding unavailable

  2. Artifact

    Identity incomplete

  3. Audit

    Complete

  4. Install contract

    Open manifest to verify

    Open manifest

Capabilities observed

Observed means this report recorded supporting evidence. Not recorded does not prove that a capability is absent.

Contains scripts

May execute code included with the Skill.

Not recorded by this audit

Network access

May connect to external services.

Observed in 7 evidence locations

Filesystem access

May read or write local files.

Not recorded by this audit

Env variables

May read values from the process environment.

Not recorded by this audit

External commands

May invoke commands or programs outside the Skill.

Observed in 30 evidence locations

Capability review items (10)
Critical
SKILL.md:17
Hardcoded URL
curl -fsSL https://cli.inference.sh | sh && infsh login
The URL is fetched by curl and piped directly to sh, executing a remote installer before local inspection. This is a remote code execution trust risk.
Medium
SKILL.md:15-27
Ruby/shell backtick execution
```bash
This range includes shell examples for installing the CLI and running infsh. The curl-to-shell portion is handled by the blocker finding, but the external command exposure is real.
Medium
SKILL.md:70-78
Ruby/shell backtick execution
```bash
The bash example invokes infsh app run and sends TSX input to an external rendering service. This is expected behavior, but it is still a real external command boundary.
Medium
SKILL.md:82-90
Ruby/shell backtick execution
```bash
The bash example invokes infsh app run and sends TSX input to an external rendering service. This is expected behavior, but it is still a real external command boundary.
Medium
SKILL.md:94-96
Ruby/shell backtick execution
```bash
The bash example invokes infsh app run and sends TSX input to an external rendering service. This is expected behavior, but it is still a real external command boundary.
Medium
SKILL.md:106-115
Ruby/shell backtick execution
```bash
The bash example invokes infsh app run and sends TSX input to an external rendering service. This is expected behavior, but it is still a real external command boundary.
Medium
SKILL.md:119-127
Ruby/shell backtick execution
```bash
The bash example invokes infsh app run and sends TSX input to an external rendering service. This is expected behavior, but it is still a real external command boundary.
Medium
SKILL.md:188-203
Ruby/shell backtick execution
```bash
This bash block recommends npx skills add commands for additional skills. Installing more skills expands the trusted instruction surface beyond this package.
Low
SKILL.md:9
Hardcoded URL
Render videos from React/Remotion component code via [inference.sh](https://inference.sh) CLI.
The text states rendering is performed through the inference.sh CLI, so the workflow depends on an external service. This is expected but creates a real network trust boundary.
Low
SKILL.md:11
Hardcoded URL
![Remotion Render](https://cloud.inference.sh/app/files/u/4mg21r6ta37mpaz6ktzwtt8krr/01kg2c0egyg243m
The Markdown image points to a remote cloud.inference.sh asset that may be fetched by renderers. There is no code execution, so the impact is low.

Risk findings

Confirmed security concerns are separated from items that still need review.

Confirmed security concerns (2)

RISK-001 Critical
SKILL.md:17
Pipe to shell pattern
curl -fsSL https://cli.inference.sh | sh && infsh login
The quick start instructs users to run curl -fsSL https://cli.inference.sh piped into sh. That executes a remote script directly and is a critical supply-chain risk.
RISK-002 Medium
SKILL.md:20-26SKILL.md:35-37SKILL.md:136-165
External Service Receives Source Code and Props
The skill sends Remotion TSX component code and props to inference.sh for cloud rendering, which may expose proprietary code or sensitive data.
The examples show TSX code and input props being passed to infsh/remotion-render. The service is explicitly described as inference.sh-based rendering, so the data leaves the local environment.

Remediation

Suggested fixes recorded by this audit. Applying them is the maintainer’s responsibility.

  1. FIX-001
    Critical
    Remote installer is piped directly into sh.
    Replace the pipe-to-shell command with manual download, checksum verification, and an explicit install command.
  2. FIX-002
    Medium
    Component code and props are sent to an external renderer.
    Warn users not to include secrets, credentials, private customer data, or proprietary code without approval.
  3. FIX-003
    Medium
    Related examples recommend installing additional skills with npx.
    Mark related skills as optional and tell users to review each skill before installation.

Expert evidence

Immutable subject identity, scanner metadata, dismissed matches, and source-level evidence.

Artifact subject

Marketplace commit
Unavailable
Content hash
Unavailable
Tree hash
Unavailable
Skill path
Unavailable
Audit payload hash
Unavailable

Analysis metadata

Audit model: codex

Analysis state: Complete

Scope is limited to the recorded files, lines, methods, and evidence. No runtime or sandbox execution is claimed.

Verify and export

JSON report CITATION.cff SARIF 2.1.0 Signed installation manifest

The manifest and lockfile bind install artifacts to cryptographic hashes. This integrity claim is separate from the security assessment.

Audit attestation: not_attestable