Versioned security assessment

Report ID: SA-D2145E4F

6/30/2026, 4:01:17 AM

python-executor security assessment v2

Skill Security Certification Report

Audit History
Audit model: codex Historical report
Skill name
python-executor
Version
v2
Maintainer
inference-sh-9
Source
github.com/inference-sh-9/skills/tree/main/skills/python-executor/
Coverage
1 Files scanned · 184 Lines analyzed
Policy version
Unavailable

Highest confirmed finding severity

High

3 confirmed security findings require attention.

Installation context

Historical evidence

This report may not describe the currently installable artifact. Open the current Skill page for install guidance.

Open current Skill page

This report does not block or authorize the manifest or ZIP.

The static external-command results are mostly false positives from Markdown code fences, inline package names, and CLI examples. The pipe-to-shell quick start is a confirmed high-risk supply-chain pattern, while the network examples are intentional capabilities for scraping and API calls. No prompt injection text or confirmed malicious intent was found, so this is not a critical block.

Report position

Historical report

Open audit history before using this report to install.

Audit attestation

Not attestable

The required immutable binding is incomplete.

Human verification

Not verified

No human verification is recorded for this report.

Coverage

1 Files scanned · 184 Lines analyzed

3 items shown for review

Limitations

This report does not claim runtime or sandbox execution and does not prove the absence of side effects.

Evidence chain

Follow the evidence from source binding to the install contract. Available evidence supports verification; it is not a safety guarantee.

  1. Source

    Binding unavailable

  2. Artifact

    Identity incomplete

  3. Audit

    Complete

  4. Install contract

    Open manifest to verify

    Open manifest

Capabilities observed

Observed means this report recorded supporting evidence. Not recorded does not prove that a capability is absent.

Contains scripts

May execute code included with the Skill.

Not recorded by this audit

Network access

May connect to external services.

Observed in 7 evidence locations

Filesystem access

May read or write local files.

Observed in 4 evidence locations

Env variables

May read values from the process environment.

Not recorded by this audit

External commands

May invoke commands or programs outside the Skill.

Observed in 6 evidence locations

Risk findings

Confirmed security concerns are separated from items that still need review.

Confirmed security concerns (3)

RISK-001 High
SKILL.md:15-24
Remote Install Script Piped to Shell
The quick start recommends `curl -fsSL https://cli.inference.sh | sh && infsh login`. Piping a remote script directly into a shell can execute changed or compromised installer content before review. The later checksum note does not remove this risk because the repository does not include the installer logic for local verification.
The exact pipe-to-shell command is visible in the quick start. This is a well-known supply-chain execution risk even when the service itself may be legitimate.
RISK-002 Medium
SKILL.md:19-21SKILL.md:37-43SKILL.md:128-135
Hosted Arbitrary Python Execution Capability
The skill is designed to send user-provided Python code to the `infsh/python-executor` app. This is the core feature, but it can process sensitive data and produce files, so users need clear trust boundaries for the hosted sandbox.
The input schema and examples show arbitrary Python code supplied as input and output files returned from `outputs/`. Legitimate sandbox execution is possible, but data exposure risk remains.
RISK-003 Medium
SKILL.md:48-52SKILL.md:79-83SKILL.md:118-123
Network-Enabled Scraping and API Examples
The skill documents installed HTTP clients and includes examples that fetch web pages and call external APIs. This appears intentional and useful, but it can transmit user data to third-party services if prompts include secrets or private content.
The network libraries and request examples are explicit. They are not inherently malicious, but they create a real exfiltration path when users run unreviewed code.

Expert evidence

Immutable subject identity, scanner metadata, dismissed matches, and source-level evidence.

Artifact subject

Marketplace commit
Unavailable
Content hash
Unavailable
Tree hash
Unavailable
Skill path
Unavailable
Audit payload hash
Unavailable

Analysis metadata

Audit model: codex

Analysis state: Complete

Scope is limited to the recorded files, lines, methods, and evidence. No runtime or sandbox execution is claimed.

Static false positives ignored (4)
Low
SKILL.md:37-44SKILL.md:79-83SKILL.md:130-136SKILL.md:168-177
Markdown Backticks Misclassified as Ruby Execution
Most static external-command hits come from fenced Markdown examples and inline package names, not Ruby backtick execution. These examples still show CLI use, but the Ruby-specific finding is a false positive.
The surrounding lines are Markdown code fences and shell examples in SKILL.md. No Ruby source file or Ruby backtick operator is present.
Low
SKILL.md:3SKILL.md:11SKILL.md:24SKILL.md:181-183
Documentation URLs and Image Link
Several hardcoded URLs point to the service site, a hosted image, documentation, and a checksum page. These links are expected documentation content, not hidden callbacks or credential exfiltration code.
The URLs are visible in descriptive text and Markdown links. No evidence found that these links automatically transmit secrets from the user environment.
Low
SKILL.md:3SKILL.md:24
Weak Cryptography Pattern Not Confirmed
The weak cryptographic algorithm hit at the description line appears to be a pattern collision with service text or the `.sh` domain. The only explicit cryptographic statement is SHA-256 checksum verification in the install note.
No MD5, SHA-1, DES, or similar weak algorithm appears in the reviewed context. The file instead mentions SHA-256 verification on line 24.
Low
SKILL.md:159-163
Network Reconnaissance Not Confirmed
The network reconnaissance hit maps to the safe-execution note and nearby general documentation, not scanning code. No evidence found of port scanning, host discovery, or probing logic in the skill file.
The referenced lines contain user-facing notes about CPU-only execution, isolated subprocesses, plotting, and output files. They do not contain reconnaissance commands or code.

Verify and export

JSON report CITATION.cff SARIF 2.1.0 Signed installation manifest

The manifest and lockfile bind install artifacts to cryptographic hashes. This integrity claim is separate from the security assessment.

Audit attestation: not_attestable