Versioned security assessment

Report ID: SA-A0668140

7/6/2026, 3:29:33 PM

twitter-automation security assessment v3

Skill Security Certification Report

Audit History
Audit model: codex Historical report
Skill name
twitter-automation
Version
v3
Maintainer
inference-sh-8
Source
github.com/inference-sh-8/skills/tree/main/skills/twitter-automation/
Coverage
1 Files scanned · 155 Lines analyzed
Policy version
Unavailable

Highest confirmed finding severity

Critical

2 confirmed security findings require attention.

Installation context

Historical evidence

This report may not describe the currently installable artifact. Open the current Skill page for install guidance.

Open current Skill page

This report does not block or authorize the manifest or ZIP.

The skill is a Markdown wrapper for inference.sh Twitter/X automation, with most static command hits coming from fences, table entries, and CLI examples. The Quick Start contains a confirmed critical pipe-to-shell installer, and the remote image creates a low-severity external request. The skill also enables social engagement automation that could support spam or inauthentic outreach without safeguards.

Report position

Historical report

Open audit history before using this report to install.

Audit attestation

Not attestable

The required immutable binding is incomplete.

Human verification

Not verified

No human verification is recorded for this report.

Coverage

1 Files scanned · 155 Lines analyzed

5 items shown for review

Limitations

This report does not claim runtime or sandbox execution and does not prove the absence of side effects.

Evidence chain

Follow the evidence from source binding to the install contract. Available evidence supports verification; it is not a safety guarantee.

  1. Source

    Binding unavailable

  2. Artifact

    Identity incomplete

  3. Audit

    Complete

  4. Install contract

    Open manifest to verify

    Open manifest

Capabilities observed

Observed means this report recorded supporting evidence. Not recorded does not prove that a capability is absent.

Contains scripts

May execute code included with the Skill.

Not recorded by this audit

Network access

May connect to external services.

Observed in 8 evidence locations

Filesystem access

May read or write local files.

Not recorded by this audit

Env variables

May read values from the process environment.

Not recorded by this audit

External commands

May invoke commands or programs outside the Skill.

Observed in 36 evidence locations

Capability review items (3)
High
SKILL.md:17
Hardcoded URL
curl -fsSL https://cli.inference.sh | sh && infsh login
The URL is used in a curl command that downloads an installer and pipes it into sh. This creates a supply-chain and remote code execution risk if the script or transport path is compromised.
Medium
SKILL.md:15-21
Ruby/shell backtick execution
```bash
This Markdown quick-start block includes shell commands, including a remote installer piped to the shell on line 17. It is documentation rather than embedded code, but it still encourages risky external command execution.
Low
SKILL.md:11
Hardcoded URL
![Twitter/X Automation](https://cloud.inference.sh/app/files/u/4mg21r6ta37mpaz6ktzwtt8krr/01kgad3pxs
The Markdown embeds a remote image from cloud.inference.sh, which can trigger an external request when rendered. This is low severity because it is not executable code, but the network load is real.

Risk findings

Confirmed security concerns are separated from items that still need review.

Confirmed security concerns (2)

RISK-001 Critical
SKILL.md:17
Pipe to shell pattern
curl -fsSL https://cli.inference.sh | sh && infsh login
Line 17 directly pipes a remote installer script into sh. This is a confirmed critical pipe-to-shell pattern because users cannot inspect the script before execution.
RISK-002 High
SKILL.md:3SKILL.md:29-36SKILL.md:73-85
Social Platform Abuse Automation
The skill explicitly supports engagement bots, audience growth, DMs, follows, likes, retweets, deletes, and posting. These features can enable spam, unsolicited outreach, or inauthentic engagement if used without consent and rate limits.
The frontmatter names engagement bots and audience growth, and the available apps include direct messages, follows, likes, retweets, and deletes. This is a clear business-logic abuse risk rather than a static syntax pattern.

Remediation

Suggested fixes recorded by this audit. Applying them is the maintainer’s responsibility.

  1. FIX-001
    Critical
    Pipe-to-shell installer in Quick Start
    Replace it with a package-manager install or manual checksum-verified download. Do not recommend piping remote scripts directly to a shell.
  2. FIX-002
    High
    Social engagement automation can be abused
    Add consent, rate-limit, and platform-policy guidance for DMs, follows, likes, retweets, deletes, and posts.
  3. FIX-003
    Medium
    Mutating commands lack confirmation guidance
    Require the agent to summarize every action and obtain user confirmation before making account changes.
  4. FIX-004
    Low
    Remote image asset in Markdown
    Bundle a local image or remove the remote image to avoid automatic requests to cloud.inference.sh during rendering.

Expert evidence

Immutable subject identity, scanner metadata, dismissed matches, and source-level evidence.

Artifact subject

Marketplace commit
Unavailable
Content hash
Unavailable
Tree hash
Unavailable
Skill path
Unavailable
Audit payload hash
Unavailable

Analysis metadata

Audit model: codex

Analysis state: Complete

Scope is limited to the recorded files, lines, methods, and evidence. No runtime or sandbox execution is claimed.

Verify and export

JSON report CITATION.cff SARIF 2.1.0 Signed installation manifest

The manifest and lockfile bind install artifacts to cryptographic hashes. This integrity claim is separate from the security assessment.

Audit attestation: not_attestable