Versioned security assessment

Report ID: SA-5C8C16EF

6/30/2026, 4:01:17 AM

remotion-render security assessment v2

Skill Security Certification Report

Audit History
Audit model: codex Historical report
Skill name
remotion-render
Version
v2
Maintainer
inference-sh-8
Coverage
1 Files scanned · 210 Lines analyzed
Policy version
Unavailable

Highest confirmed finding severity

Medium

3 confirmed security findings require attention.

Installation context

Historical evidence

This report may not describe the currently installable artifact. Open the current Skill page for install guidance.

Open current Skill page

This report does not block or authorize the manifest or ZIP.

Static analysis correctly identified a pipe-to-shell installer pattern and real network use, but most Ruby backtick and weak-cryptography alerts are Markdown false positives. The skill appears legitimate and purpose-built for remote Remotion rendering, yet it should publish with warnings about executing installer scripts, sending TSX and props to inference.sh, and the broad infsh CLI allowance.

Report position

Historical report

Open audit history before using this report to install.

Audit attestation

Not attestable

The required immutable binding is incomplete.

Human verification

Not verified

No human verification is recorded for this report.

Coverage

1 Files scanned · 210 Lines analyzed

4 items shown for review

Limitations

This report does not claim runtime or sandbox execution and does not prove the absence of side effects.

Evidence chain

Follow the evidence from source binding to the install contract. Available evidence supports verification; it is not a safety guarantee.

  1. Source

    Binding unavailable

  2. Artifact

    Identity incomplete

  3. Audit

    Complete

  4. Install contract

    Open manifest to verify

    Open manifest

Capabilities observed

Observed means this report recorded supporting evidence. Not recorded does not prove that a capability is absent.

Contains scripts

May execute code included with the Skill.

Observed in 2 evidence locations

Network access

May connect to external services.

Observed in 5 evidence locations

Filesystem access

May read or write local files.

Not recorded by this audit

Env variables

May read values from the process environment.

Not recorded by this audit

External commands

May invoke commands or programs outside the Skill.

Observed in 8 evidence locations

Capability review items (1)
Low
Hardcoded external URLs are expected service links
The hardcoded URL findings are true positives for network references, but they point to the documented service, image asset, and official docs. No credential exfiltration or hidden callback endpoint was found.
The URLs are visible documentation and asset links. I did not find evidence that secrets are sent to an unrelated endpoint.

Risk findings

Confirmed security concerns are separated from items that still need review.

Confirmed security concerns (3)

RISK-001 Medium
Pipe-to-shell CLI installation instruction
The static pipe-to-shell finding at SKILL.md line 17 is a true positive for a dangerous install pattern. It fetches a remote shell script and executes it immediately, which creates supply-chain risk even though line 29 documents checksum verification.
The command directly pipes a remote URL into sh. The surrounding install note suggests legitimate intent, so this is risky but not confirmed malicious.
RISK-002 Medium
Broad inference.sh CLI command allowance
The skill allows Bash(infsh *), which permits any inference.sh CLI subcommand rather than only the remotion-render app. This is broader than required and can run other remote app operations under the user account.
The allowlist is explicit and semantically broader than the documented render workflow. Legitimate use is likely, but the scope should be narrowed.
RISK-003 Medium
Remote rendering receives user TSX and props
The render workflow sends user-provided TSX code and optional props to inference.sh for processing. This is the intended function, but users may expose proprietary code, media references, or sensitive data in props.
The examples and input schema show code and props sent to a named remote app. This is expected behavior, but it is a clear privacy boundary.

Expert evidence

Immutable subject identity, scanner metadata, dismissed matches, and source-level evidence.

Artifact subject

Marketplace commit
Unavailable
Content hash
Unavailable
Tree hash
Unavailable
Skill path
Unavailable
Audit payload hash
Unavailable

Analysis metadata

Audit model: codex

Analysis state: Complete

Scope is limited to the recorded files, lines, methods, and evidence. No runtime or sandbox execution is claimed.

Static false positives ignored (1)
Low
Markdown syntax caused static-analysis false positives
The Ruby backtick execution findings are false positives caused by Markdown fences, inline code, and example commands. The weak cryptography findings at lines 3 and 33 were not confirmed as real cryptographic use.
The cited lines are frontmatter text, Markdown code fences, a table header, or import examples. There is no Ruby execution or weak hash call in those locations.

Verify and export

The manifest and lockfile bind install artifacts to cryptographic hashes. This integrity claim is separate from the security assessment.

Audit attestation: not_attestable